The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review

New Relationship with Russia. The global security environment has changed considerably since the end of the Cold War.  While Russia still possesses the world's second largest nuclear arsenal, today these weapons are becoming increasingly antiquated. The danger posed by nuclear war, however, still looms on the horizon, but this time the source of the threat is uncertain.

The most recent NPR, mandated by Congress and released by President George W. Bush in December 2001, marks a shift in U.S. nuclear policy away from deterrence based on the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The United States continues to acknowledge, however, that the nuclear arsenal maintained by Russia can still destroy the United States. Nevertheless, the United States no longer considers Russia an enemy, and the NPR stresses the need for mutual cooperation in countering new threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. 

Rogue States and Negative Security Assurances. While the 1994 NPR mentioned the need to retain nuclear weapons to meet "regional contingencies," the 2001 NPR explicitly names five countries (North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya) that may become involved in a future nuclear "contingency" with the United States. The 2001 NPR was not the first U.S. nuclear policy document to name targeted states other than the two usual suspects: Russia and China. President Clinton's 1997 classified Presidential Decision Directive 60 (PDD-60) was the first of its kind to permit nuclear war planners to target "rogue" states that may or may not possess nuclear arsenals of their own.  

What is unique about listing the five aforementioned countries as potential targets of U.S. nuclear weapons is that there is no conclusive evidence that any of them actually possesses a nuclear arsenal. It remains to be seen how the 2003 war in Iraq, which confirmed that Iraq did not have WMD, and the recent renunciation of WMD by Libya will affect future U.S. nuclear targeting requirements and subsequent policy.

The fact that the states listed do not have confirmed nuclear arsenals also presents a problem for U.S. commitments under the NPT not to target non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) with nuclear weapons. This commitment is known as a negative security assurance (NSA). Because the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 hinged upon the nuclear weapon states collectively issuing NSAs to NNWS, critics believe that both PDD-60 and the 2001 NPR undermine U.S. commitments to the NPT.      

Capabilities-Based Posturing. In 2001, prior to the Nuclear Posture Review, the Department of Defense published the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This document stated that the United States was altering its strategy by moving away from Cold War-era threat-based posturing to a more adaptable capabilities-based posture. This shift means that instead of requiring the Pentagon to plan for contingencies involving specific states of known concern, defense planners now must plan to meet unforeseen contingencies across a broad spectrum of potential adversaries, including non-state actors and terrorist groups. The NPR is a product of the QDR strategy and contributes to the formulation and implementation of a U.S. deterrent posture based on a capabilities-based force structure. The goal is to maintain the lowest possible number of strategic nuclear warheads while still providing a credible deterrent posture.

New Triad. The 2001 NPR transforms the strategic posture of the United States by incorporating the traditional, Cold War nuclear triad into an offensive component of a New Triad. This offensive leg of the New Triad comprises both nuclear weapons and non-strategic precision guided munitions (PGMs). The second leg of the New Triad consists of both active and passive defenses. Active defenses include ballistic missile defense systems and their supporting infrastructure. Passive defenses include civil defense measures, like a robust emergency response system and crisis and consequence management.

The third leg consists of a robust, yet flexible defense infrastructure capable of adapting and responding to unexpected contingencies. According to the NPR,  the United States should maintain the ability to mass-produce nuclear warheads, missiles, bombers, and submarines on an as-needed basis. This requirement involves an enormous re-investment in the infrastructure that supports nuclear weapons development and deployment, including the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories, and manufacturing facilities. The purpose of re-establishing a flexible and responsive nuclear infrastructure, according to the 2001 NPR, is to permit the United States to respond quickly to new threats, and to dissuade adversaries from competing militarily with the United States.