Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Produced by the Monterey Institute's James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Updated October 2009
Background. Historically, the deployment of missile defenses has been limited because of political, economic, and technological constraints. Russia and other countries with nuclear infrastructures have voiced the concern that missile defense systems could upset the strategic nuclear balance. The reason for this concern is that all three powers, the United States, Russia, and China (as well as France and Britain), possess nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of missile defenses, these missiles are capable of striking distant territories on short notice. During the Cold War, this "balance of terror" was thought by many to provide stability and security in the form of deterrence. Nuclear deterrence, in this sense, allowed the United States and the Soviet Union to feel confident that they would not be attacked because each state had the ability to retaliate and cause unacceptable damage to the attacker. If the country that attacked had missile defenses, however, it could have the ability to strike first and then block a retaliatory strike. A state in possession of effective missile defenses, conceivably, could intimidate other nuclear countries because of this first-strike advantage. Therefore, many believe that missile defenses undermine deterrence and create strategic instability. Current Status. Ballistic missile defense (BMD) remains one of the most controversial issues in world politics and U.S. defense policy. In December 2002, six months after the United States formally withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty, the Bush administration announced that the United States would deploy a limited missile defense system in Ft. Greely, Alaska, by the end of 2004. Subsequently, a small site at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California was added. Also during the Bush administration, the United States proposed an expansion of its missile defense system into multiple sites in Eastern Europe. The controversial proposal was accepted by Poland and the Czech Republic; however, the Obama administration announced in September 2009 that the proposed system would no longer be pursued. Instead, U.S. officials decided that the focus of the BMD system will be short- and medium-range missile threats from Iran, as opposed to defenses previously targeted at long-range missiles. This decision was based on "accumulating evidence" of increased progress by Iran in developing short- and medium-range missiles that could target Israel and Europe. Opponents of this decision, such as Senator John McCain (R-Arizona), argue that it calls into question U.S. security and diplomatic commitments to Poland and the Czech Republic, and might weaken perceived U.S. leadership in Eastern Europe. Opponents also have contended that the changes reflect weakness in American foreign policy, and provide Russia and Iran with an early and unnecessary victory in arms control negotiations. Proponents of the policy change point to the likelihood that relations with Russia will improve as a result and that arms control negotiations, including those for an extension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), will proceed with greater ease. Additionally, proponents make the claim that the new system will utilize proven technology as opposed to the increasingly expensive (and widely criticized) technology of the previous system. According to news reports, the newly proposed, four-phase plan consists of the following: deployment of "existing SM-3 interceptors using the sea-based Aegis system in 2011, then [deployment of] an improved version in 2015 both on ships and on land." In place of the 10 larger interceptors included in the previous plan for Poland, there would be 40 to 50 smaller missiles deployed by sea and on land. The next phase would involve a "more advanced version" in 2018 and another in 2020, which would have an intercontinental missile defense capability. |
Further Reading:
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
![]()
This material is
produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not
necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents.
Copyright © 2008 by MIIS.