Issue: Threats to U.S. and Allies from North Korea
North Korea threatens South Korea, Japan, and potentially the United States with missiles, chemical weapons (CW) and, possibly, one or two nuclear weapons.
It is also thought to be developing biological weapons (BW). (See Proliferation
Threat and Response, page 21 on the screen.) North Korea has frozen
its nuclear program as the result of a 1994 agreement with the United States,
known as the
Agreed
Framework. Under that agreement, North Korea has also agreed to comprehensive
International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections that will establish how much plutonium
it produced in the past. That material would then be placed under continuing
IAEA monitoring to ensure that it is not used for weapons. However, to date,
the IAEA has not been able to verify that the
DPRK is not diverting nuclear material to
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, and is also unable to verify that the
DPRK has declared to the IAEA all the nuclear
material that is subject to safeguards.
In September 1999,
North Korea agreed to halt flight tests of its ballistic missiles, including
the long-range Taepodong missile, a system that could reach the United States.
North Korea announced at a September 2002 summit
with Japan that it would indefinitely
extend its missile testing moratorium, but
later threatened on multiple occasions to
reverse its decision. Concerns over the Taepodong are one of the principal factors leading the United
States to develop
missile defenses against long-range
missiles. North Korea's medium range
Nodong missiles are another source of
concern. There are already about 100 of
these missiles deployed, and their 1300-km range
can easily reach Japanese cities and U.S.
military bases located there. North Korean
missile exports to Pakistan, Egypt, Iran, Libya,
and Syria further add to regional and global
destabilization.
Since North Korea was founded in 1948, it has sought to take over South Korea
through war (1950), terrorism, and political subversion. The Soviet Union supported
North Korea with massive military and technical aid, but after the Cold War,
North Korea lost this support, and its economy seriously deteriorated. This
economic decline has made North Korea dependent on foreign assistance from international
organizations and Western countries, including the United States, to deal with
chronic food shortages. Under the Agreed Framework, the United States also supplies
heavy fuel oil free of charge, which North Korea uses to produce electricity.
The United States, Japan, and South Korea are building two light-water
nuclear power plants in North Korea as part of the Agreed Framework. These reactors
will be less likely to be used for weapons proliferation. The Korean
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) manages the funding and
building of these reactors and other aspects of the Agreed Framework. Although
the United States has had concerns that North Korea may be pursuing clandestine
nuclear activities, these concerns appear to have subsided for the moment.
Given its dire situation, North Korea had begun to improve relations with the
United States, South Korea, and Japan. Work has recommenced on a railway
connecting North and South Korea. In September 2002, Japan and North Korea
began to discuss bilateral issues blocking normalization of diplomatic
relations. And although the United States listed North Korea as a state
sponsor of international terrorism and part of an "axis of evil", the
United States agreed to meet with North Korea in October 2002 after North Korea
announced that it would extend its missile testing moratorium.
At the October meeting, however, North Korea confirmed U.S. suspicions that
it had been pursuing a
clandestine uranium enrichment program. The covert program may have breached
North Korea's nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and IAEA obligations, the
yet-to-be implemented 1992 Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula, and is also thought to violate the spirit and possibly
the specific terms of the Agreed Framework. North Korea, however, claimed that
the United States had not lived up to its end of the Framework and that recent
aggressive statements by the United States had effectively nullified the
agreement. The status of the agreement
remains under discussion. Although
one more shipment of heavy fuel oil from the United States was allowed after
North Korea's October confession, future shipments have been halted.
As of December 1, 2003 KEDO has suspended
construction of the
LWR Project for a period of one year.
The situation worsened in December 2002, when North Korea threatened to
restart its nuclear plant at Yongbyon, a site which could support a
plutonium-based weapons program, and which had been closed as part of the Agreed
Framework. Days later, Pyongyang
removed IAEA monitoring equipment and all IAEA seals on nuclear materials at
the Yongbyon facility. Subsequently, Pyongyang
expelled all IAEA inspectors from the country. These actions were in
complete defiance of the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and the DPRK, and
have effectively cloaked any effort on the part of North Korea to develop a
plutonium-based weapons program, casting serious doubts over the future of the
Agreed Framework.
South Korea and Japan have continued diplomatic efforts to pressure North
Korea to end its uranium enrichment program and peacefully resolve the nuclear
issue. Russia and China have also stressed the need for a peaceful resolution
and a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. North Korea, however, believes that
the issue can only be resolved through renewed negotiations with the United
States. While North Korea has expressed a willingness to discuss the cessation,
dismantlement, and possible inspections of its uranium enrichment facilities in
exchange for a non-aggression treaty with the U.S., the
United States has maintained that such actions by North Korea must precede
any renewal of negotiations. The United States has, however, signaled that
it is
willing to hold talks with North Korea, but insists that no additional
incentives will be offered until Pyongyang complies with its existing
international commitments to disarm.
The IAEA harshly condemned North Korea's defiance of its safeguards
agreements, and its threats to reactivate its plutonium-based weapons program,
but offered Pyongyang a
final chance at compliance before referring the matter to the UN Security
Council. South Korea, meanwhile, stepped up
diplomatic efforts to mediate a resolution to the crisis.
Nevertheless, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003.
North Korea - Options:
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