Produced by the Monterey Institute's James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Updated October 2009

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and President Obama at Arms Control and Missile Defense Negotiations, London, April 1, 2009
Source: photos.state.gov

ABM Treaty Background. Russia traditionally has opposed the deployment of a U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) system because of its possibly destabilizing effects on the current nuclear balance, which largely rests on the principle of deterrence. An attempt to maintain this balance was codified in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, signed in 1972.

The ABM Treaty prohibited the development of systems that could defend all of Russia or all of the United States. Initially, the treaty allowed each country to maintain ABM systems in two different locations. Each site was also limited to 100 ABM launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles. A protocol to the the treaty signed in 1974 limited each country to only one defensive site with 100 interceptor missiles. The U.S. Congress voted to close down its ABM system in 1975, only a day after it became fully operational. The system was costly to operate and deemed to be ineffective against new Soviet multiple-warhead missiles. Russia's ABM site near Moscow is still operational.

In 2001, President George W. Bush argued that the ABM Treaty should be modified or dissolved to allow the United States to develop small-scale defenses that could protect all of the United States from a limited number of missiles launched from countries like North Korea or Iran. Rather than simply withdraw from the ABM Treaty, however, President Bush stated in mid-2001 that he wanted to develop a new "framework" with Russia, in which the treaty would be modified or scrapped by mutual agreement and both sides would agree to significant reductions in their existing nuclear arsenals.

The United States officially withdrew from the ABM Treaty on June 13, 2002. The next day, Russia announced that it would no longer abide by START II. One consequence of this decision is that Russia could retain its multiple independently-targeted warhead (MIRV) ICBMs, which would have been eliminated under START II—a treaty that for Russia was linked to the continued existence of the ABM Treaty. By maintaining multiple warheads on its ICBMs, Russia theoretically maintains the capability to saturate U.S. missile defenses in a crisis. Thus, analysts argue that U.S. BMD encourages the continuity of Russia's large strategic nuclear arsenal.

Small-scale U.S. missile defenses, on the other hand, are likely to have little if any impact on Russia's ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the United States in response to a U.S. first strike. From the Russian point of view, the traditional logic of deterrence in this case remains intact, limiting its concern about U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Russian Reaction to Proposed U.S. BMD Installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. In 2007 the Bush administration announced that to counter Iranian missiles, it was negotiating to put installations for the U.S. BMD system in Poland and the Czech Republic. After the Polish and Czech leaderships signaled their interest in cooperating with the United States, Russia criticized the proposed system and hinted at possible Russian responses. Beginning in February 2007, high-level Russian officials warned that Russia would withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) if such a system were constructed.

Despite Russian criticism, however, the United States leadership indicated that it would continue to negotiate agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic to begin construction of the planned system. In June 2007, Russian rhetoric temporarily cooled, and the Russian leadership indicated that it was willing to compromise on the system, provided the United States used the Gabala early warning radar in the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan, in place of Eastern Europe deployments. After months of consideration, including a visit by American technical advisors to Azerbaijan to inspect the Soviet-era radar facility, the United States announced that the Azerbaijan compromise was insufficient to replace the proposed facilities in the Czech Republic and Poland.

Following the collapse of the compromise, Russia again reiterated its willingness to withdraw from the INF Treaty. Furthermore, in November 2007, President Putin signed legislation suspending Russia’s participation in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), which establishes limitations on the number of conventional weapons deployed west of the Ural Mountains. Although Russia gave many other reasons for its suspension of the treaty, a number of experts connect the decision to the unresolved missile defense dispute.

The “U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration,” released after an April 2008 meeting between Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, noted that while the countries were interested in a joint missile defense system with Europe, the Russians did not agree that sites should be established in Eastern Europe.

In November 2008, after the election of President Obama, President Dmitry Medvedev announced that Russia would be deploying short-range Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad as a response to the planned U.S. missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. He later clarified that such a move would not be preemptive, but carried out in response to any future deployment of missiles by the United States.

President Obama took office in 2009 and brought a more cooperative perspective to the BMD issue. In July 2009, President Obama and President Medvedev released a joint statement, which indicated their dedication to finding a solution. In this statement, the leaders discussed establishing a Joint Data Exchange Center as a possible forum for multilateral missile-launch notification.

In September 2009, the U.S. administration announced a shift in BMD policy away from long-range missile defenses and toward short- and medium-range defenses. Although U.S. missiles will still be placed in Eastern Europe, they do not have the strategic capability that was part of the previous Bush administration plan and that was of such concern to the Russian government. After this decision, President Medvedev also made a concession by announcing that Russia would no longer plan to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, as it had warned in late 2008.

Many observers contend that the decision by the Obama administration was motivated by a desire to improve relations with Russia and to improve its chances of negotiating a follow-on to START I, which is set to expire on December 5, 2009. Indeed, the decision largely removes the contentious elements of Bush's BMD proposal and thus may make START-I follow-on negotations proceed more smoothly. Some U.S. congressional members, however, have indicated that they will not accept ratification of a new treaty if it does not include provisions for continuation of the missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Whether they will be satisfied by the Obama administration's new plans incorporating tactical (but not strategic) defenses remains to be seen.

In April 2009, in reference to the defense budget for FY 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced that the missile defense program would be restructured "to focus on the rogue state and theater missile threat." He also said that the government should continue funding in the areas of research and development for long-range missile threats. It is not yet clear how these allocations will change after the policy shift declared in September 2009. Missile defense will also be a topic likely covered in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, although the specific parameters have not yet been announced.