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Unlike Russia,
China
has only a very small number of nuclear-armed missiles
that can reach the United States today. Current estimates are that China deploys
about 18 inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the United States. China's
ICBMs are mostly old, antiquated land-based and liquid-fueled systems, which
are highly vulnerable to a first strike. For China, a limited U.S. missile
defense system could potentially negate China's ability to retaliate effectively
against a U.S. nuclear attack. This problem is particularly acute for China
because it has a no-first-use
(NFU) policy. As a result, China will likely respond to U.S. missile defense
plans by expanding the size and sophistication of its nuclear arsenal, at
a time when the United States is trying to reduce its own arsenal and that
of Russia.
Concerns over Taiwan. China is especially sensitive about this issue because of the possibility
of a conflict involving the United States over the issue of
Taiwan. China
claims that Taiwan is part of China's sovereign territory. Beijing prefers
peaceful reunification but for decades has refused to renounce the use of
force against Taiwan if it declares independence. Thus, Chinese leaders often
state they are committed to eventual reunification by any means necessary.
The United States takes no position on the legal status of Taiwan and since
the 1970s has supported a "peaceful resolution" (which does not necessarily
mean reunification) of the Taiwan issue. Yet, under the 1979 Taiwan Relations
Act (TRA), the United States regards threats against Taiwan as a matter of
"grave concern" and is committed to supply Taiwan with "defensive weapons."
Many Chinese believe that as long as China can threaten the United States
with nuclear weapons, the United States would be cautious in escalating its
involvement in the defense of Taiwan during a conflict. In essence, Chinese
strategists believe that the United States would not be prepared to risk being
attacked with nuclear weapons by China in order to protect Taiwan's
independence. Chinese strategists and officials fear, however, that U.S.
deployment of defenses against ICBMs could make China vulnerable to nuclear
blackmail for the first time since it conducted its first nuclear test in
1964.
China is also concerned that the United States might supply Taiwan with defenses to counter
short-range missile threats. Although China could easily overwhelm these defenses by launching large numbers of offensive missiles, Beijing worries
that such U.S. transfers of defensive missiles would bolster independence advocates in Taiwan
and possibly enhance military cooperation between the United States and Taiwan.
China has long opposed any and all U.S. arms sales to Taiwan for these reasons.
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Further Reading:
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CNS, Stanley Foundation,
"Ballistic
Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security: Views from Washington, Beijing,
and Tokyo" |
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CNS,
"BMD in Northeast Asia: An Annotated Chronology" |
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Li Bin,
"U.S. NMD and Chinese Nuclear Modernization" |
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The Nonproliferation Review, Jing-dong Yuan,
"Chinese Responses to U.S. Missile Defenses" |
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The Nonproliferation Review, Wade L. Huntley,
"Missile Defense: More May be Better-For China" |
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Stimson Center,
James Mulvenon, "Missile Defenses and the Taiwan Scenario" |
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