BMD and China

Unlike Russia, China has only a very small number of nuclear-armed missiles that can reach the United States today. Current estimates are that China deploys about 18 inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the United States. China's ICBMs are mostly old, antiquated land-based and liquid-fueled systems, which are highly vulnerable to a first strike. For China, a limited U.S. missile defense system could potentially negate China's ability to retaliate effectively against a U.S. nuclear attack. This problem is particularly acute for China because it has a no-first-use (NFU) policy. As a result, China will likely respond to U.S. missile defense plans by expanding the size and sophistication of its nuclear arsenal, at a time when the United States is trying to reduce its own arsenal and that of Russia.

Concerns over Taiwan. China is especially sensitive about this issue because of the possibility of a conflict involving the United States over the issue of Taiwan. China claims that Taiwan is part of China's sovereign territory. Beijing prefers peaceful reunification but for decades has refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan if it declares independence. Thus, Chinese leaders often state they are committed to eventual reunification by any means necessary. The United States takes no position on the legal status of Taiwan and since the 1970s has supported a "peaceful resolution" (which does not necessarily mean reunification) of the Taiwan issue. Yet, under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the United States regards threats against Taiwan as a matter of "grave concern" and is committed to supply Taiwan with "defensive weapons."

Many Chinese believe that as long as China can threaten the United States with nuclear weapons, the United States would be cautious in escalating its involvement in the defense of Taiwan during a conflict. In essence, Chinese strategists believe that the United States would not be prepared to risk being attacked with nuclear weapons by China in order to protect Taiwan's independence. Chinese strategists and officials fear, however, that U.S. deployment of defenses against ICBMs could make China vulnerable to nuclear blackmail for the first time since it conducted its first nuclear test in 1964.

China is also concerned that the United States might supply Taiwan with defenses to counter short-range missile threats. Although China could easily overwhelm these defenses by launching large numbers of offensive missiles, Beijing worries that such U.S. transfers of defensive missiles would bolster independence advocates in Taiwan and possibly enhance military cooperation between the United States and Taiwan. China has long opposed any and all U.S. arms sales to Taiwan for these reasons.

Further Reading:

	Institute for Defense Analyses, Brad Roberts, "China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond"
	Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008"
	CNS, Stanley Foundation, "Ballistic Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security: Views from Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo"
	The Nonproliferation Review, Jing-dong Yuan, "Chinese Responses to U.S. Missile Defenses"
	The Nonproliferation Review, Wade L. Huntley, "Missile Defense: More May be Better-For China"
	Arms Control Today, Christopher P. Twomey, "Chinese-U.S. Strategic Affairs: Dangerous Dynamism"