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BMD: Polish and Czech Perspectives

 
 
Produced by the Monterey Institute's James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Updated October 2009

Background. In January 2007, the United States unveiled a plan to deploy a ground-based mid-course (GMD) system in Eastern Europe as part of its broader ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. Initial U.S. proposals outlined the construction of a radar station in the Czech Republic and the deployment of 10 interceptor missiles in Poland by 2012. Preliminary bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Czech Republic and Poland indicated a positive, albeit cautious response from the two proposed host states.

The system was designed to defend against “rogue” states, such as Iran and North Korea. Given its proximity to Europe and unresolved questions regarding its nuclear energy program, Iran has been cited as the primary threat. Iran has an active missile development program and has conducted several flight tests. However, estimations on the extent of Iran’s missile program have been speculative at best, and several experts have highlighted fundamental problems in Iran’s missile program. Experts estimate that Iran will be able to test a long-range missile by 2015, but this is conditional on foreign assistance.

Partially due to new threat assessments concerning the Iranian missile program, the Obama administration has chosen to shelve the Bush administration's plans for a long-range missile defense system in favor of a system aimed at short- to medium-range missiles. This new system will largely consist of the use of Standard Missile (SM)-3s, which have tactical (but not strategic) capabilities.

Russian and U.S. Governments Hold Talks in London, April 1, 2009
Russian and U.S. Governments Hold Talks in London, April 1, 2009
Source: www.whitehouse.gov

Domestic Resistance in Poland and the Czech Republic. The BMD system proposed under the Bush administration encountered a great deal of resistance.

In Poland, since early 2007, public opinion polls indicated a lack of support for the Polish government’s willingness to host interceptor missiles; a significant portion of the general population resisted the American proposal. In October 2007, elections in Poland ousted the previous pro-U.S. government. The new government’s lack of enthusiasm for missile defense and more conciliatory attitude toward Russia initially called into question Poland’s participation in the system. On August 20, 2008, however, Poland and the United States signed a formal agreement on missile defense, drawing harsh criticism from Russia.

Meanwhile, in the Czech Republic domestic resistance produced similar delays in bilateral negotiations with the United States. However, in April 2008, the United States and the Czech Republic announced that they had reached an agreement to construct the radar component of the system in the Czech Republic by 2012. The agreement was formally signed on July 8, 2008 and included guarantees by the United States to provide the Czech Republic with missile defense.

In October 2009, after President Obama announced new plans for the BMD structure, Poland indicated that it would support the proposal. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden met with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk to assuage Poland's initial concerns about the changes. The Vice-President reiterated to the Polish leader that Poland remained a vital ally of the United States. Biden also won the support of Romanian President Traian Basescu and Czech Prime Minister Jan Fischer, who both indicated their willingness to participate in the new system. The changes to the BMD plans will likely require modifications of the agreements between the United States and the Eastern European countries.

Diagram of Proposed Missile Defense System
Diagram of Proposed Missile Defense System
Source: U.S. Missile Defense Agency

 

U.S. Concerns. Many of the concerns behind U.S. resistance to BMD in general stem from reports of technical issues that question the effectiveness of the BMD system. Critics of the program primarily cite the inability of the technology to distinguish between warheads and basic countermeasures. Also of concern is the ability of the radar to detect warheads that might be out of range.

Congressional opposition also initially delayed the deployment of systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. For Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, Congress chose to deny funding for the sites and gave the following stipulations for future funding: Poland and the Czech Republic would need to sign formal agreements, further studies would need to be conducted on missile defense, and the Department of Defense would be required to certify the interceptor. For FY2009, the proposed funding sent to Congress totaled $712 million. Congress indicated support for this request, but stipulated that the Czech Republic and Poland would need to ratify their agreements with the United States before proceeding with site construction. Now that the sites will no longer contain long-range interceptors, it is unclear how this will affect funding requests and allocations in the future. Many in Congress support the Obama administration's new BMD system plans; however, there are various dissenters who strongly disapprove of the new direction being taken. In the past, some members had indicated that that they would not accept ratification of a follow-on to the START-I treaty if it did not include provisions for continuation of the missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Whether the new system Obama has proposed meets these expectations remains to be seen.

 

Further Reading:

WMD Insights, Richard Weitz, "Special Report: The European Ballistic Missile Defense Dispute--Part I: The View from Eastern Europe"
WMD Insights, Richard Weitz, "Special Report: The European Ballistic Missile Defense Dispute--Part II: The View from Western Europe"
WMD Insights, Richard Weitz, "After the Georgia War Part Three: Eurasian Missile Defense Dispute Intensifies"
CRS, Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, "Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe"
CRS, Steven A. Hildreth, "Ballistic Missile Defense: Historical Overview"
Arms Control Association, "Subject Resources: Missile Defense"
CNS, Dennis M. Gormley et al., "Managing U.S. Missile Defenses and Russian Concerns"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, "The European Missile Defense Folly"
Foreign Policy in Focus, Gabriela Campos, "Changes in the Missile Defense Program"
BBC, "Q&A: U.S. Missile Defence"


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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008 by MIIS.