BMD in Eastern Europe: Controversy and Resistance

Updated April 2008

Background. In January 2007, the United States unveiled a plan to deploy a missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Initial U.S. proposals outlined the construction of a radar station in the Czech Republic and the deployment of 10 interceptor missiles in Poland by 2012. Preliminary bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Czech Republic and Poland indicated a positive, albeit cautious response from the two proposed host states.

According to U.S. officials, the system will provide defense against “rogue” states, such as Iran and North Korea. Given its proximity to Europe and unresolved questions regarding its nuclear energy program, Iran has been cited as the primary threat. Iran has an active missile development program, culminating in several tests in 2007. However, estimations on the extent of Iran’s missile program have been speculative at best, and several experts have highlighted fundamental problems in Iran’s missile program.

Russian President Vladimir Putin speaking at the 2007 Munich Conference on Security Policy Source: People’s Daily Online

Russian Reaction. Following the announcement of the plan and the signaled willingness of the Polish and Czech leadership to cooperate, Russia quickly criticized the proposed missile defense system and hinted at possible Russian responses. Russian officials claim that the real objective of the deployments is to intercept Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, and that the United States could quickly replace defensive interceptors with offensive missiles trained on targets in Russia. Beginning in February 2007, high-level Russian officials warned that Russia would withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) if such a system were constructed. In a speech to the Munich Conference on Security Policy, Russian President Vladimir Putin cautioned against “an inevitable arms race” and dismissed the rationale for missile defenses in Europe, arguing that “missile weapons…that really pose a threat to Europe do not exist in any of the so-called problem countries.”

Despite Russian criticism, the United States leadership indicated that it would continue to negotiate agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic to begin construction of the planned system. In June 2007, Russian rhetoric temporarily cooled, and the Russian leadership indicated that it was willing to compromise on the system, provided the United States used the Gabala early warning radar in the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan, in place of Eastern Europe deployments. After months of consideration, including a visit by American technical advisors to Azerbaijan to inspect the Soviet-era radar facility, the United States announced that the Azerbaijan compromise was insufficient to replace the proposed facilities in the Czech Republic and Poland.

Following the collapse of the compromise, Russia again reiterated its willingness to withdraw from the INF Treaty. Furthermore, in November 2007, President Putin signed legislation suspending Russia’s participation in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), which establishes limitations on the number of conventional weapons deployed west of the Ural Mountains. Although Russia gave many other reasons for its suspension of the treaty, a number of experts connect the decision to the unresolved missile defense dispute.

During an April 2008 summit in Bucharest, Romania, NATO formally endorsed the proposed U.S. system in Poland and the Czech Republic. In the endorsement, NATO members expressed a desire to integrate the system with proposed NATO-led missile defense initiatives. Moreover, NATO recommended that greater effort be taken to accommodate Russian concerns. Following the summit, the United States announced that it would allow Russia to inspect the system. Instead, Russia insisted that it be allowed to maintain a constant military presence at the facilities. However, Polish officials have flatly rejected the notion of a permanent Russian military presence in Poland.

The “U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration,” released after an April 2008 meeting between Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, noted that while the countries were interested in a joint missile defense system with Europe, the Russians do not agree that sites should be established in Eastern Europe. The countries agreed to intensify their dialogue on missile defense cooperation both bilaterally and multilaterally.

Domestic Resistance. One significant factor influencing the possible deployment of a missile defense system in Europe has been domestic political opposition. Although this has been notable in both Poland and the Czech Republic, it has also been an important factor in the United States.

Diagram of Proposed Missile Defense System Source: U.S. Missile Defense Agency

In Poland, domestic opposition has been a major hurdle. Since early 2007, polls have indicated the Polish government’s willingness to host interceptor missiles has been at odds with public opinion; a significant portion of the general population resists the American proposal. In October 2007, elections in Poland ousted the previous pro-U.S. government. The new government’s lukewarm feelings on missile defense and more conciliatory attitude toward Russia have called into question Poland’s participation in the system. As of early 2008, however, the new Polish government agreed in principle to cooperate in return for significant conventional military aid from the United States, although no formal agreement has yet been signed. As of April 2008, details of the aid package are still being negotiated. Furthermore, Poland has continued to seek Russia’s endorsement of the system, although with little success.

Meanwhile, in the Czech Republic domestic resistance produced similar delays in bilateral negotiations with the United States. However, in April 2008, the United States and the Czech Republic announced that they had reached an agreement to construct the radar component of the system in the Czech Republic by 2012.

In the United States, political opposition from Congress has succeeded in delaying the deployment of systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. Of the $310 million originally sought by President Bush to begin deployment, Congress approved only $225 million. Furthermore, Congress placed limitations on the funds, which can only be used once bilateral agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic are first reached. Although bilateral agreements are still pending, the Bush Administration announced that it will seek $719 million for FY 2009 to begin deployment of the system, which will also include an additional X-band radar.

Further Reading:

	WMD Insights, Richard Weitz, “NATO Debates BMD Ahead of April Bucharest Summit”
	WMD Insights, Nikolai Sokov, "Moscow Rejects U.S. Written Proposals on Missile Defense, Downplays New Iranian Missile Test"
	WMD Insights, Nikolai Sokov, "Moscow Rejects U.S. Written Proposals on Missile Defense, Downplays New Iranian Missile Test"
	Jamestown Foundation, Pavel Felgenhauer, "U.S. Proposal to Base Missile Defense Systems in Poland, Czech Republic, Raises Alarm in Moscow"
	Richard L. Garwin, “Ballistic Missile Defense Deployment to Poland and the Czech Republic”
	Center for Defense Information, Philip E. Coyle, "A Game of Make-Believe: The European Missile Shield"
	Heritage Foundation, Sally McNamara and Peter Brookes, "International Missile Defense: Washington and Warsaw's Postive Step Toward Final Agreement"
	BBC, "Q&A: US Missile Defence"
	Arms Control Today, George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, "European Missile Defense: The Technological Basis of Russian Concerns"