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The Islamic Iranian Revolutionary government may threaten Israel and moderate
Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, with chemical and possibly biological weapons.
It has tested a missile capable of reaching Israel, the Shahab-3,
and is developing a longer-range missile or space launch vehicle. The United
States believes that Iran is actively pursuing the development of nuclear
weapons but has not yet reached this goal.
Iran's plans for building a civilian nuclear power program have prompted
much concern regarding its intention to develop nuclear weapons. Russia
is assisting Iran to construct a light water reactor at Bushehr, which is now
nearing completion, and will supply the nuclear fuel needed to run it.
Although the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) allows transfers of
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear weapon states, the
United States has vehemently opposed the Russian-Iranian deal. The
United States believes that nuclear energy is not necessary in a country with
Iran's large oil supply. It fears that the deal is being used as a cover for
the transfer of more sensitive nuclear technology to Iran and to provide
training for Iranian nuclear specialists that could be used to support a
nuclear weapons program. Russia, however, has expressed its intention to
complete the deal. But even Russia has begun to express doubts about
Iran's nuclear ambitions. In March 2003, the Russian Atomic Energy
Minister claimed that Russia did not know for certain that Iran was not
pursuing nuclear weapons. Later, according to British Prime Minister
Tony Blair, President Vladimir Putin announced during the June G-8 summit that
Russia would
halt "all nuclear exports" to Iran until that country agreed to more
stringent international inspections of its nuclear facilities. This
claim, however, was later refuted by the Russian Foreign Ministry, which
insisted that Russia would begin supplying nuclear fuel to the Bushehr plant
as soon as Russia and Iran sign an agreement requiring Iran to return the
spent fuel to Russia. Nonetheless, Russia joined the G-8 countries in a
statement that expresses the need to prevent Iran from developing nuclear
weapons. Iran has denied the charges that it is pursuing a
nuclear weapons program, and argues that nuclear technology for civilian use
is the right of every non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.
U.S. concerns over Iran's nuclear program intensified in
mid-2002, when U.S. intelligence learned of the existence of two
secret
nuclear facilities. According to an Iranian opposition group, the two
sites, a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water production
plant near Arak, had been funded by front companies.
In February 2003, Iranian leaders announced a new plan to develop a nuclear
energy plan using
entirely domestic resources. This development is of particular concern,
considering the revelation of the two secret facilities. The United
States believes that these facilities might contribute to Iran's development
of a
complete nuclear fuel cycle, which would enable Iran to build nuclear
weapons without importing nuclear material.
Later in February 2003, an IAEA delegation visited the pilot-scale gas
centrifuge enrichment plant at Natanz, which is nearly ready for operation.
The inspection team learned that Iran has the capability to build more
centrifuges. During the IAEA's visit to Iran, Iranian officials
indicated that Iran would honor its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, but
did not clearly indicate Iran's willingness to accept the Additional
Protocol. This means that Iran will place the Natanz facility, and any
enriched uranium it produces, under IAEA inspection but that, as long as no
nuclear materials are present, the IAEA would have no ability to examine
locations in Iran where it believed nuclear weapons design research might be
under way. Another visit by the IAEA to Iran in June 2003 resulted in a
report in which the IAEA faulted Iran for not declaring the purchase of two
tons of natural uranium in 1991. The report also urged Iran to show
restraint in its nuclear program, but did not cite Iran as violating the NPT. The United States is concerned that if Iran stockpiled enriched
uranium, it might, in the future, withdraw from the NPT (as North Korea has)
and then build nuclear weapons rapidly, perhaps even in a matter of months.
It is possible that construction of the Natanz plant violated Iran's IAEA
safeguards obligations. Such a violation would have occurred if Iran
introduced nuclear material into the facility to test it without informing
the IAEA. Reports in the Western media in March 2003 charged that Iran
may have taken this step. Iran responded by strenuously denying the
charges, but also maintained that it
reserved the right to possess nuclear weapons to counter Israel's
weaponry.
Iran's WMD programs are directed partly at Iraq, against
which Iran fought a bitter war from 1980-1988. During that war, Iraq used
chemical weapons (CW) extensively against Iranian forces. Both countries used
conventionally armed
missiles against each other's cities. During the war, the United States
and other Western nations "tilted" toward Iraq and hence did not
impose sanctions
on Iraq in response to its use of CW against Iran. After the 1991 Gulf War,
UN inspections revealed that Iraq had also developed and deployed biological
weapons (BW) and had made significant progress towards producing nuclear weapons.
Iraq's potential to develop such weapons in the future has been another factor leading
Iran to pursue WMD and missiles of its own.
It is not clear at this time what impact the fall of Iraqi leader Saddam
Hussein will have on Iranian nuclear ambitions. On the one hand, the
change of government in Iraq may reassure Iran and reduce its motivations for
acquiring nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Iran may consider that only by
acquiring nuclear weapons will it be able to prevent a future U.S.
invasion of the kind Iraq experienced. Even before the U.S.-led war
against Iraq, relations between the United States and Iran were
tense, creating a political motivation for Iranian WMD development.
Some Iranians blamed the United States for brutal repression
they suffered under the U.S.-backed Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. The Shah was reinstated to power in 1953
through a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-backed coup. Since the
Iranian Revolution of 1979, which overthrew the Shah and brought in
a fundamentalist Islamic government, Iran has called the United
States "the Great Satan." Iran held U.S.
diplomats hostage for 444 days, from mid-1979 to early 1981. In 1983, a truck
bomb detonated by an Iranian-backed group at a barracks in Beirut, Lebanon,
killed 241 U.S. Marines on a peacekeeping mission. In 1990, President Bush
awarded a medal to the captain of the U.S.S. Vincennes, which accidentally
shot down a civilian Iranian airliner in 1988, killing all 290 people aboard.
A bitter foe of Israel, Iran supports terrorist organizations based in Lebanon,
Syria, and the Palestinian Authority territories in order to undermine the
Middle East Peace Process through acts of violence against Israeli soldiers
and civilians. Iran has also instigated political unrest in more traditional
Arab states, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The United States considers
Iran to be a state
sponsor of international terrorism.
Iran's current president, Mohamed Khatami, who was democratically elected, and much of the Iranian population want to improve
relations with the United States. But hard-line fundamentalists, led by Iran's
supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (who has more power and authority
than the president in Iran's political system), appear to control the country's foreign policy and its WMD
and missile activities. This group is opposed to President Khatami's efforts
to reform the Iranian government and strengthen relations with Western
countries. Still, if Iran improved
relations with the United States, the threat posed by its WMD and missiles
might be reduced.
Iran - Options:
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Further Reading:
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U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation
Threat and Response (pages 45-48 on the screen) |
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CNS, Javed Ali,
"Chemical
Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance" |
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Chen Zak,
"Iran's Nuclear Activities: What might the IAEA learn?" |
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CNS,
"Iran: WMD Capabilities and Programs" |
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Carnegie Endowment, "Iran,"
Tracking Nuclear Proliferation |
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Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project, "Iran
Missile Sanctions" |
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Robert J. Einhorn, Testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee |
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A. Norman Schindler, "Iran's
Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs" |
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The
ILSA [Iran-Libya Sanctions] Extension Act of 2001 |
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CSIS, Anthony H. Cordesman, "Weapons
of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces,
Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects" |
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CIA, Report
to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction |
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Leonard Spector,
"Iran's Secret Quest for the Bomb" |
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WMD 411 Bibliography, The
Middle East |
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CNS, Jean du Preez and Lawrence Scheinman, "Iran
Rebuked for Failing to Comply with IAEA Safeguards" |
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David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
"Furor Over Fuel" |
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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, George Parkovich,
"Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Challenge" |
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