A Primer on WMD
Limiting Use of WMD
 

Iran - Option 1: Reduce Tensions

 
 
Produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies

updated July 28, 2003

Proponents Say: Reduce Tensions/Negotiate Limits on WMD and Missiles.

  • The United States should open discussions aimed at improving relations with moderate leaders in Iran, who received a strong mandate in the June 2001 Iranian presidential election.
  • If the United States can develop a more solid relationship with Iran, it can then perhaps more effectively press for an end to Iran's support of terrorist activities, a ban on new missile flight tests, full compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (including acceptance of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) new, strengthened safeguards system), and full compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
  • Improved relations might be achieved by the United States offering to open diplomatic talks and to end economic sanctions in return for these actions. Iran has signaled that it would be willing to sign the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA in exchange for the lifting of sanctions against it. This would improve the IAEA's ability to monitor nuclear activities in Iran.

Opponents Say: Negotiations are Unlikely to Produce Effective Limits on WMD and Missiles.

  • Iran's supreme leader and his radical followers—not the country's president—control Iranian foreign policy and the military. They are strongly committed to the terrorist groups challenging Israel and to Iran's enhancing WMD and missile programs. At best, negotiations would improve the atmosphere between Iran and the United States, but they are unlikely to lead to agreements restricting Iran's WMD and missile programs.
  • Iran will not be satisfied with diplomatic concessions from the United States. It will likely demand that Israel accept every restriction on WMD that Iran has accepted, including adherence to the NPT and the CWC. Israel is not prepared to take these steps in the absence of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, and the United States will not press Israel to do so. This stalemate would make U.S.-Iran talks on WMD a dead-end.
  • Even if the United States and Iran agree on additional restrictions on WMD and missiles, the United States could not be confident that Iran would live up to those agreements. As a large country, Iran has much territory within which it can hide its WMD activities. Even in Iraq, where UN inspectors had wide-ranging access, Iraq was able to hide important parts of its WMD activities, especially regarding its BW program. In Iran, inspections under the NPT and the CWC would be much more limited than the UN inspections in Iraq, and there are no inspections under the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC). Thus, Iran would have no trouble hiding significant WMD activities.

Further Reading:

CRS, Kenneth Katzman, "Iran: U.S. Policy and Options"

The Nixon Center, Geoffrey Kemp, ed., "Iran's Nuclear Weapons Options: Issues and Analysis"

 

CEIP, "Dealing With Iran's Nuclear Challenge"

Atlantic Council, Kenneth Katzman, "U.S. - Iranian Relations: An Analytic Compendium of U.S. Policies, Laws and Regulations"


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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2004 by MIIS.

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