A Primer on WMD
Limiting Use of WMD
 

Iran - Option 3: Launch a Military Assault on Suspected Nuclear and Chemical Weapon Production Sites in Iran

 
 
Produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies

updated July 28, 2003

Proponents Say: Only Military Action Can Prevent Iran from Developing WMD.

  • The current nonproliferation regime has been unable to prevent Iran from making significant progress towards developing uranium-based and plutonium-based nuclear weapons. Given the continued anti-U.S. stance of Iran's ruling hard-line clerics, and Iran's support for terrorist groups such as Hizbollah, Iranian acquisition of WMD would have catastrophic strategic consequences for the United States.
  • As evidenced by the convincing victories against the Taliban in Afghanistan and the forces of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the U.S. military is capable of executing highly effective strikes against enemy targets, while keeping allied and civilian casualties to a minimum. New technologies employed in both of these conflicts, such as "smart bombs" equipped with Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) technology and conventional "bunker busters," can destroy enemy targets with unprecedented accuracy. Such technologies could be used against suspected WMD facilities in Iran as well.
  • In the wake of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the United States military has forces deployed in the area with which it can conduct strikes against Iran. In addition, new military relationships between the United States and other countries in the region, such as Qatar, Pakistan and several Central Asian republics, may allow the United States to launch such an attack from bases in countries on all sides of Iran.
  • While the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was opposed by many other countries such as Germany, France, Russia and China, relations with these countries have not experienced the irreparable damage that many had predicted before the operation began. A similar operation, or even the mere threat of a similar operation against Iran, could end Iranian WMD development without incurring high political or diplomatic costs.
  • A successful operation against Iran's WMD program might have a significant effect on other states considering beginning WMD programs of their own. Potential proliferators may learn the lessons from Iraq and Iran that pursuing weapons programs in defiance of the international nonproliferation regime may lead to devastating military response from the United States.

Opponents Say: Military Action Would Create More Problems Than it Would Solve

  • The U.S.-led war on Iraq to dismantle that country's WMD programs generated stiff opposition from other Arab states, including states that had supported the United States during Operation Desert Storm. Another military operation, particularly one against another Muslim state, would support the claim that the United States is waging a war against Islam, further inflaming resentment towards the United States within the Muslim world. This would have significant negative consequences for the United States as it attempts to maintain its partnerships in the global war on terror, and to work towards mediating a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
  • Operation Iraqi Freedom also generated strong opposition from U.S. allies in Europe. Another military conflict undertaken without UN sanction would further strain ties between the United States and its European allies, and could jeopardize the future of the NATO alliance.
  • Relations between the United States and Russia would also be damaged if the United States took unilateral action against Iran, particularly considering the degree of nuclear cooperation between Iran and Russia. Russia maintains that its assistance to Iran will not contribute to a nuclear weapons program, but a U.S. attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would undoubtedly jeopardize Russia's nuclear contracts with Iran.
  • Generating support for attacks on Iran to stop its WMD programs would be particularly difficult following the war in Iraq. Before that conflict, U.S. and British intelligence cited Iraqi WMD programs as a justification for military action. After the war, however, coalition forces were unable to find these weapons within Iraq. As a result, even the presence of accurate and condemning intelligence regarding Iranian WMD programs would likely not be enough to convince other countries of the necessity to launch attacks against Iran.
  • Much like Iraq, the location of all of Iran's WMD facilities is not known to U.S. intelligence, so surgical air strikes may not be sufficient to completely dismantle the program. (A full invasion of the country would likely be more difficult than Operation Iraqi Freedom, considering the greater size and population of Iran, its more rugged topography, and its larger military.)
  • The political situation in Iran is also much different from that of Iraq before the war. Although conservative clerics control the Iranian government, due to their influence in the military and the judiciary, the democratically elected president, Khatami, is a moderate who favors closer ties with the United States. If the United States attacked Iran, moderates like Khatami would lose legitimacy, and the fundamentalists would be able to consolidate their power. This would reverse the trend of growing pro-American popular sentiment in Iran, as different groups in the country united against the attacker.

Further Reading:

U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation Threat and Response (page 46 on the screen)

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

CITS, Alexander Pikayev, "Strategic Dimensions of the Russo-Iranian Partnership"

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, George Parkovich, "Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Challenge"

Leonard Spector, "Iran's Secret Quest for the Bomb"

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Can Preventative War Cure Proliferation?"

Christian Science Monitor, "Diplomacy is Best Option With Iran"


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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2004 by MIIS.

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