Iran - Option 4: Support the Gradual Democratization of Iran

Proponents Say: Supporting the Grassroots Democracy in Iran Can Create a Moderate Government and Will Eliminate the Motivation for a WMD Program in Iran.

• Although military action may have prevented WMD development in Iraq, the political climate in Iran is very different. The regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq was a totalitarian dictatorship that suppressed any dissent, whereas the political system in Iran is much more open. In fact, the democratically elected President of Iran, Mohammad Khatami, favors better relations with the West. Unfortunately, real power in Iran remains in the hands of the radical Muslim clerics who control the country's military, its judiciary, and its police forces. An alternative to direct military action would be to work subtly to undermine the power of radical fundamentalists who argue for WMD development. This would be done through supporting the existing pro-Democracy movement in Iran.

• Such a campaign would likely involve secretly anti-clerical groups, labor unions, and other groups that have an interest in replacing the hard-line fundamentalist regime with a more liberal democratic regime. In addition, the United States would secretly fund independent newspapers, and radio and television stations that give these groups a means to express their discontent with the hard-line policies of the clerics. American satellites could be used to broadcast messages into Iran from the large community of Iranian exiles living in the United States and Europe. By helping create a free flow of ideas within Iran, by exposing its people to Western ideas of liberal democracy, and by funding those groups which would benefit most from liberal democracy in Iran, the United States may be able to encourage a second Iranian Revolution.
• One reason that the Shah lost power in January 1979 was because his regime ruthlessly suppressed all opposition. Despite significant support from the United States, the regime no longer seemed to represent the concerns of the Iranian public, and lost legitimacy. Similarly, as the fundamentalist forces violently crack down on all anti-government protestors, they lose legitimacy in the eyes of the Iranian public. If the United States can facilitate communication among different anti-clerical groups in Iran, news of the violent repression against the student protests, such as those of June 2003, can spread quickly across the country.
• Facilitating the free flow of information and ideas within Iran would allow citizens rights groups to develop further and to possess a greater voice in Iranian politics. The effect would be to produce a powerful force to challenge the religious fundamentalists, and strengthen the position of moderates like Khatami.
• A more moderate regime in Tehran, which embraces liberal democratic beliefs, would likely have less motivation to pursue a WMD program or to defy the international nonproliferation regime. The current Iranian government cites the security threats from the United States and animosity towards Israel as justifications for a nuclear weapons program (although it has not admitted to actually pursuing such a program). If the regime were replaced by a moderate regime, the security threat from the United States would be reduced. Resentment towards Israel, while perhaps still present, would likely not be a defining characteristic of the new democratic regime.
• Such an approach is particularly attractive because, if successful, it would lead to a peaceful and democratic decision to reverse a WMD program.

Opponents Say: Supporting a Grassroots Movement in Iran Will Likely be Counterproductive.

• The fundamentalist clerics in Iran control the country's judiciary, military, and secret security forces. These forces still harbor deep resentment towards the United States for its support of the Shah of Iran, for its support for Iraq in its war against Iran, for more than two decades of sanctions, and for its secular culture. Any attempt by the United States to support reformist political groups in Iran will not remain secret for long, and its exposure will support the clerics' charges that the United States is still attempting to manipulate or weaken Iran. This will undoubtedly help the fundamentalists—who portray themselves to the Iranian people as defenders against American imperialism—consolidate power.
• Not only would this derail the process of growing pro-American sentiment in Iran, but it would undermine the pro-Democracy movement as well. The student protestors at the University of Tehran demonstrations have already been condemned by the fundamentalists as "stooges" of the Americans. If the United States took any visible steps to assist the pro-Democracy movement, it would be increasingly difficult for pro-reformist activists to prove to the Iranian public that their loyalty is indeed to Iran, and not the United States. For this reason, many pro-Democracy leaders in Iran have attempted to distance themselves from the United States.
• There is another danger behind such a strategy. Current Western intelligence suggests that if the Iranian uranium enrichment development and its plutonium-producing heavy water reactor programs are left unchecked, Iran may be able to produce nuclear weapons in one to two years. Any attempt to bring about a second Iranian Revolution must succeed before then. If not, the United States runs the risk of bringing instability to the country just as it develops a nuclear arsenal. The security of the arsenal during the transition period would then be in question, and the weapons could be vulnerable to theft, or perhaps even use by fundamentalist forces.

Further Reading:

	U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation Threat and Response (page 46 on the screen)
	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
	CITS, Alexander Pikayev, "Strategic Dimensions of the Russo-Iranian Partnership"
	Leonard Spector, "Iran's Secret Quest for the Bomb"
	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, George Parkovich, "Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Challenge"
	American Enterprise Institute, "The Future of Iran"

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