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A
U.S.-led coalition of nations defeated Iraq in the
1991 Gulf War. After that war, the United Nations
imposed a powerful
inspection regime.
The UN inspectors exposed and destroyed most of
Iraq's WMD and missiles, as well as the facilities
used to develop and produce them. The United
Nations also restricted Iraqi trade, in particular
its sales of oil. Arguing that these sanctions
were hurting innocent Iraqi civilians, Iraq
gradually persuaded key members of the
UN Security Council
to support the easing of sanctions. In late 1998,
Iraq refused to permit UN inspections to continue.
In 1999, China, France, and Russia chose neither
to veto nor support a new U.S.-backed UN
resolution creating the UN Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC),
stating that the resolution neglected to establish
a concrete benchmark at which sanctions on Iraq
could be lifted. Because of Iraq's continued
refusal to permit the return of inspectors,
however, UNMOVIC was unable to recommence
UN-sponsored efforts to eliminate Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction and long-range missiles.
In
order to eliminate the threat posed by Saddam
Hussein’s pursuit of WMD capabilities, the Bush
administration repeatedly emphasized the need for
resumed inspections and, ultimately, for regime
change in Iraq. Faced with growing U.S. and
international pressure, Iraq announced that it
would allow a recommencement of inspections based
only on previous UN resolutions and related
agreements. This would have included the 1998
agreement between Iraq and the UN that limited and
dictated strictly supervised inspections of
Iraqi-designated "presidential
sites." Bush administration
officials responded that only a stronger UN
resolution, backed up by the threat of military
force, would give inspectors the access and
abilities necessary to uncover any illegal WMD
activities.
Doubts remained, however, regarding
the potential efficacy of the
UNMOVIC inspections themselves, given Iraq’s proven record of concealment and deception.
The
Bush administration contended that Saddam Hussein
continued his efforts to develop WMD and missile
capabilities. Inspections by
UNSCOM from 1991 through 1998 were not able to
completely eliminate Iraq’s biological and
chemical weapons programs, and the administration
claimed that Iraq had resumed its efforts to
acquire nuclear weapons. While Iraq is not thought
to currently possess nuclear weapons capability,
the
U.S. and
British governments in September 2002
cited intelligence reports of Iraqi efforts to buy
uranium and aluminum tubes that could be used to
construct centrifuges for uranium enrichment.
Iraqi officials denied these reports and stated
that Iraq is in compliance with all relevant UN
resolutions. (At the UN Security Council Briefing
on Iraq on March 7, IAEA Director General Mohamed
ElBaradei concluded that the aluminum tubes Iraq
was attempting to purchase were not likely to be
used to construct centrifuges. Dr. ElBaradei also
stated that the allegations that Iraq sought to
buy uranium from Niger were based on forged
documents and unfounded.)
In
September 2002, The
United States and Britain circulated a draft UN
resolution and actively consulted with the UN
Security Council for eight weeks in order to
adequately address these and other concerns.
Although the United States and Britain pressed for
one resolution authorizing the use of force if inspections
were unsuccessful, France and Russia adamantly
stated their preference that inspections and the
use of force be addressed in two separate
resolutions. Compromises on both sides led to the
unanimous passage in early November 2002 of a new
UN Security Council resolution (Res.
1441). The new resolution required
Iraq to submit to the Security Council within
thirty days a declaration of all aspects of its WMD and missile programs. It called on Iraq to
provide inspectors with unrestricted access to all
facilities and documents, as well as the
opportunity to conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq of
relevant Iraqi officials. The resolution threatened
“serious consequences” if Iraq were found to be in
material breach of the resolution’s provisions.
“Material breach” is defined in the resolution as
“false statements or omissions in the declarations
submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and
failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and
cooperate fully in the implementation of, this
resolution.” However, there was significant
disagreement on the interpretation of
this provision. While Mohammed ElBaradei, head of
the nuclear inspection team, stated that a “pattern”
of obstruction could be considered a material
breach, the United States promoted a “zero
tolerance” policy. If Iraq was found to be
obstructing inspections, the resolution required
further discussion within the Security
Council—though not necessarily a new
resolution—before military action could be taken.
Inspections of Iraqi facilities resumed in late
November with the arrival of the first team of 17
UNMOVIC and Iraq Action Team inspectors.
Although many of the
early inspections have been of sites
visited during previous rounds of inspections,
inspectors also conducted a surprise inspection of
the al-Sajoud presidential palace.
On
December 7, one day before the deadline set by
Resolution 1441, Iraq turned in its 12,000 page
declaration of its past WMD and missile programs
and facilities to the UN. Members of UNMOVIC and
the IAEA Iraq Action Team analyzed the
declaration, which was compared with
information gathered by U.S. and other
intelligence agencies and information obtained
through past inspections and analysis. Gaps or
inaccuracies, which can be considered a “material
breach” of Resolution 1441, were later used to challenge Iraq’s
statements of its truthfulness and willingness to
comply with the resolution. Indeed, in late
December 2002, the United States announced it
considered Iraq to be in
material breach of its obligations as
a result of these omissions.
The
inspection team submitted its first report to the
UN Security Council (as required by Resolution
1441) on January 27, 2003. This report noted that
while Iraq had not denied access to sites for
inspection, the inspectors had uncovered “no
convincing evidence” that Iraq had indeed
disarmed, and claimed that more time for
inspections was needed. In response, US Secretary
of State Colin Powell outlined several examples of
Iraqi noncompliance during his
address to the UN Security Council on
February 5, 2003. He stated, for example, that in the early weeks
of 2003, over a dozen empty 122 mm chemical
munitions that had not been disclosed in the
December 7 declaration were found by inspectors.
In late February 2003, the Iraqi regime refused to
destroy nearly 100 al-Samoud ballistic missiles,
arguing UNMOVIC had erroneously determined that
they were not within the 150 kilometer
(93.2 mile) range limit imposed by UN Security
Council resolution 687. Under pressure,
however, Iraq reversed this decision and destruction began on March 1.
On
March 7, 2003, chief weapons inspector Hans Blix
and IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei
briefed the U.N. Security Council on the
state of inspections in Iraq. Blix noted an
increase in Iraqi cooperation since January, while
ElBaradei reported that no evidence had been found
that would support claims that Iraq was
reconstructing its nuclear arms program. France,
Germany, and Russia cited the report as evidence
that the inspection regimes were effective and
should be given more time. Britain and the United
States, however, interpreted the reports to mean
that Iraq was still not complying with Resolution
1441, and that the inspections had run their
course.
The United States and
Great Britain then sought to gain support
for a new resolution declaring that Iraq was in
material breach of Resolution 1441 and authorizing
the use of force to disarm that country. Despite
weeks of effort, however, the United States was
unable to convince a majority of the Security
Council (nine states) to support such a resolution
and, indeed, France declared that it would veto
such a measure if it were presented for a vote.
Two other permanent members of the Council, China
and Russia, also indicated they would not support
the measure and might also cast vetoes alongside
France.
While
the U.S. worked within the UN structure to
implement the new resolution, it also asserted
that regime change was the only way to truly
reduce the threat posed by Iraq's pursuit of WMD.
Earlier, in a
September speech to the United Nations, President Bush stated
that the United States would work with the UN
Security Council to enforce UN resolutions, but
indicated that the United States would not
hesitate to take unilateral action if the
resolutions did not produce the desired results.
In mid-October, after much debate, the U.S. House
and Senate passed the “Joint Resolution to
Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces
Against Iraq” (H.J.RES.114).
The resolution supported President Bush’s efforts
in enforcing all relevant UN Security Council
resolutions, and granted the President the
authority to use force against Iraq – with or
without Allied support – if inspections and other
diplomatic measures are unsuccessful. The Joint
Resolution and the support of Congress were widely
seen as strengthening the President’s efforts in
building an international coalition to pressure
Iraq into full disarmament of its weapons of mass
destruction.
On
March 20, 2003, the U.S.- and British-led
coalition of states invaded Iraq with the purpose
of eliminating that country's WMD programs and
removing Saddam Hussein's regime. Prior to this
act, however, the question of whether an invasion
was justified was widely debated in the UN
Security Council and in other settings. The
principal arguments on each side of the debate are
presented next.
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