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last updated March 27, 2003
Proponents Say: UN Inspections,
Backed by the Threat of Military Force, Can Successfully Limit Iraq’s WMD
Efforts.
- The UN Security Council
resolution allows Iraq 30
days to declare its WMD and missile capabilities. The resolution also authorizes
no-notice inspections at the “presidential sites” and religious
facilities that are of limited access to inspectors under the current UN
mandate. While the resolution threatens “serious consequences” in
the case that inspections are deemed unsuccessful or ineffective, the
appropriate procedures for the authorization of military action continues to be
negotiated.
- Continued international support will play a vital role
if military action must be taken in the future. While Britain and several other
UN Security Council members have indicated support for a U.S.-led attack on
Iraq, many other nations have expressed reservations regarding triggers for and
potential consequences of an attack. The views of UN Security Council permanent
members France, Russia, and China are of particular importance, as they have the
right to veto any UN resolutions authorizing the use of force.
- During and after the previous Gulf War, the detection
and destruction of Iraq’s WMD programs were more the result of
UNSCOM
inspections than the actual military attack. Although intelligence reports can
give some indication of where WMD facilities may be located, inspectors on the
ground will be far more likely to find and confirm suspicious activity.
Detection efforts may also be enhanced if Iraqi scientists are willingly and
safely interviewed by the inspection teams. If military action is later deemed
necessary, the inspectors’ reports can improve the accuracy of the
attacks.
- While doubts remain as to whether inspections can
completely detect and eradicate Iraqi WMD programs, at a bare minimum, the
presence of inspectors can hamper Saddam Hussein’s WMD efforts and make
progress more difficult.
Opponents
Say: Inspections Will Never be Effective.
- It is too late for UN inspectors to effectively
mitigate and dismantle WMD and missile programs being pursued by Iraq. According
to a recent
intelligence report, over the past
four years, Iraq has re-established its biological weapons (BW) program, which
UN inspectors never fully eliminated. Iraq has also taken steps to rebuild its
chemical weapons (CW) and nuclear weapons programs. Considering Saddam
Hussein’s past record of deception, inspections will take months, if not
years, to verify the existence and extent of these programs. Waiting for an
actual Iraqi WMD attack or allowing Saddam Hussein to get even closer to
possessing a nuclear weapon are not acceptable options.
- Iraq is suspected of having mobile laboratories that
are constantly changing locations and deeply buried bunkers housing WMD. Given
this constraint, UN inspectors may never be able to prove the existence of Iraqi
WMD programs and arsenals.
- The successes achieved by
UNSCOM
and
UNMOVIC were
highly dependent on the information flow between the inspection teams and
national intelligence agencies. Inspectors often shared their discoveries with
intelligence agencies for confirmation and analysis, and in return, intelligence
agencies identified potential inspection sites where suspicious activities had
been sighted. However, due to information leaks by the inspection teams, and the
sensitivity and classified nature of intelligence sources,
UNMOVIC inspectors
today are unlikely to be privy to the intelligence information necessary for
effective detection and analysis. Even if inspectors are successful in finding
evidence of Iraqi WMD programs, they may have neither the background nor the
relevant information needed to analyze their findings.
-
UNSCOM and
UNMOVIC inspections were greatly hampered by
Saddam Hussein’s elaborate and comprehensive system of denial and
concealment of information. After revelations by Iraqi defectors and years of
inspection experience, inspectors and intelligence agencies were able to break
encryption codes and work around this concealment mechanism. However, new
inspection team members may not have been trained to defeat Iraqi methods of
concealment and deception, and will thus have to re-learn the lessons of the
former inspection teams. This will further increase the time needed for
effective inspections and reduce their likelihood of
success.
- During the 1991-1998
inspections, many of the important discoveries occurred because of information
shared by Iraqi defectors. Although Resolution 1441 allows relevant Iraqi
scientists and their families to be interviewed outside of the country,
realistically, such interviews will face organization and execution
difficulties. Inside or outside of Iraq, those scientists who agree to be
interviewed necessarily endanger not only their own lives, but also those of
their immediate and extended family members. Thus, inspectors may find that this
option is not feasible.
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Further Reading:
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International
Space Station Authorization Act of 1995 |
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Senate Hearing,
"Has
the Russian Space Launch Quota Achieved its Purpose?" |
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CRS, Marcia S. Smith, "Space
Launch Vehicles: Government Activities, Commercial Competition, and Satellite
Export" |
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Clayton Mowry, "U.S.
Bilateral Space Launch Trade Agreements |
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CIA, Report
to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction |
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United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) |
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CSIS, Anthony Cordesman, "WMD
in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities,
Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects" |
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National Security Council, "Iraq's
Program of Mass Destruction" |
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CRS, Steve Bowman, "Iraqi
Chemical and Biological Weapons" |
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