Iraq - Option 2: Attempt to Topple Saddam Hussein

Proponents Say: Regime Change is the Only Way to Limit the WMD and Missile Threat.

• Even in the unlikely event of successful inspections, the process could take months, if not years, to verify and dismantle Iraq’s WMD inventory and facilities. In the interim, Saddam Hussein could continue his WMD programs, enhance weapon capabilities, or use or provide terrorists with a chemical, biological, or eventually, a nuclear weapon. The United States cannot afford to wait for an actual WMD attack.
   
• Though pre-emptive military action to eliminate Iraq's WMD programs could unintentionally set a precedent that other states might use to justify the use of force against others, Iraq’s WMD capabilities pose a unique and destructive threat that must be addressed. Today’s WMD threats are qualitatively different from those of past conventional weapons and warfare. Saddam Hussein’s demonstrated willingness to use WMD, his relentless pursuit of WMD capabilities, and his hostility towards the United States and its allies, justify the U.S. quest for regime change.
   
• The most effective way to reduce the long-term risk of WMD and long-range missiles in Iraq is through political change. Unlike leaders in Iran, Libya, and North Korea, however, Saddam Hussein has not shown any interest in more harmonious relations with the United States and its friends in this region.
   
• A government oriented favorably towards the United States and its allies would not need WMD and long-range missiles and would stop these programs.
   
• Peaceful political change is impossible in Iraq because Saddam Hussein maintains dictatorial power over his citizens.
   
• The United States should continue to support Iraqi exile groups seeking to overthrow Saddam Hussein by military means, and prepare its own forces for military action in Iraq.

 

Opponents Say: Unilateral U.S. Action Would Be Risky and Destabilizing.

• Since the September 11 attacks, seeking out terrorist cells and preventing terrorists from obtaining WMD has been the primary concern of the U.S. war on terror. In the months following the attacks, the Bush Administration succeeded in building an international coalition to assist in addressing this threat. Since then, the strength of that coalition has been gradually eroding, but the threat of terrorist attacks remains as strong as ever. Unilateral U.S. action against Iraq may further weaken the international coalition and will divert U.S. attention from the actual and imminent threats to the nation’s security.
   

• Despite accusations by the Bush administration of Iraqi ties to al-Qaida, Iraq would have little to gain at the present time through its own use of WMD or by sharing its WMD with other terrorist organizations. A letter from CIA Director George Tenet suggested that Saddam Hussein would be more likely to use WMD or provide them to terrorists if he faces the imminent demise of his regime and wanted to share his fate with others. Another fear is that if U.S. action is successful in instituting regime change, Iraq’s WMD may be lost to terrorists in the chaotic aftermath of war.
   

• An attack on Iraq could cause tremendous casualties, both military and civilian. Saddam Hussein is more likely to use his chemical and biological weapons against attacking forces, and has reportedly considered plans to draw U.S. troops into urban Baghdad to increase the technical difficulty of attack. Another concern is that Iraq could launch missiles tipped with chemical or biological weapons towards Israel, which has stated that it will not show the same restraint in response that was exercised during the previous Gulf War. If Israel is attacked with WMD, it is likely to respond with WMD. The use of WMD by either Iraq or Israel could lead to further destabilization of the Middle East region and lower the threshold for WMD use.
   
• Multilateral support will be politically, financially, and logistically vital should the U.S. attempt regime change and wage a war on Iraq.

• Several European countries, such as France, Germany, and Russia, have expressed vehement opposition to unilateral American action, and have moved to block any U.N. endorsement of such an attack. If the United States were to proceed with an invasion of Iraq, anti-American sentiment in Europe would likely continue to increase, hindering international cooperation not only in post-war Iraq, but also in other proliferation hot spots, such as Iran and North Korea.
   
• The U.S. is in the midst of its war on terror, and is still feeling the effects of the recent economic recession. Japan paid two-thirds of the financial costs of the Gulf War of 1991, which had widespread international support. If the U.S. unilaterally attacks Iraq, it will have to bear the costs itself. These costs could be even greater than those of the Gulf War, given that Saddam Hussein will not easily be defeated if he thinks regime change is the ultimate goal of the attack.
   
• In the event of a U.S. victory, indefinite peacekeeping operations will further add to the financial costs, and will emphasize the need for multilateral support.

• In addition, most opponents of Saddam Hussein share much of his outlook. They favor a dictatorial strongman in charge of a country that inspires fear throughout the region. They would continue Saddam Hussein's WMD and long-range missile programs, not abandon them.
   
• Some opposition groups, moreover, are controlled by Iran. If they came to power in Iraq, the resources of Iran and Iraq might be joined in working against U.S. interests.

Further Reading:

	The Nixon Center, Morton H. Halperin and Geoffrey Kemp, "A Report on U.S. Policy Options Towards Iraq"
	The Wisconsin Project, Iraq Watch

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