NTI: WMD 411

Libya

Libya - Option 1: Reduce Tensions

Produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Proponents Say: Reduce Tensions/Negotiate Limits on WMD and Missiles.

After decades of isolation, it appears that Libyan leader Muammar Quaddafi wants better relations with the West. The United States should take advantage of this change and open negotiations with Libya to achieve new restraints on its WMD and long-range missile programs.
Libya would have less need for these weapons if it improved relations with the United States. Unlike many other countries that have sought WMD and long-range missiles, Libya has no enemies on its borders except Chad, which does not pose a major military threat.
Once the United States is convinced that Libya has ended its support for international terrorism, the United States should offer to establish diplomatic relations with Libya and to end economic sanctions in exchange for Libya's pledge to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (leading to the declaration and destruction of its chemical weapons (CW) stocks and production capabilities) and not to develop intermediate - or longer-range missiles.

Muammar Quaddafi wants negotiations with the United States to avoid further international pressure until he has developed longer-range missiles able to strike southern Europe and/or Israel. Such missiles, tipped with CW or possibly biological weapons (BW) warheads, would pose a powerful threat. He could then renew his support for terrorism without fear of U.S. or European retaliation.
Whatever restrictions Quaddafi might accept on his WMD and long-range missiles, he likely would seek ways to cheat on his commitments, so that he can keep these capabilities. He has already located major WMD facilities underground, making it more difficult to determine how they are being used. It would be difficult to determine Libya's compliance with any pledges it might make.

Further Reading:

CSIS, Anthony Cordesman, "WMD in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects"

U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation Threat and Response (pages 56-59 on the screen)


	This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2004 by MIIS.