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Critics of missile defenses to protect the United States question whether
missile defense technology will actually work. They believe that simple countermeasures,
such as the use of radar-reflecting metal chaff (small bits of metal), balloon
decoys, or dummy warheads, could defeat defenses aimed against long-range
missiles during their mid-course
or terminal phases (the
times after the launch of a missile when it is flying through space or when
the warhead has separated from the missile body and is reentering the atmosphere).
The critics also argue that defenses will not work in the boost phase, while
a missile is still burning its propellant to generate thrust, because the
defensive systems will not be able to get close enough or fire quickly enough
to hit the target missile during its first few minutes of flight.
Critics also point to the high costs of missile defenses. According to some
estimates,
a layered BMD system capable
of protecting all 50 states with both ground- and space-based interceptors
could cost $60 billion or more.
Critics of BMD argue further that missile defenses would not help defend
against a rogue country WMD
attack that did not use missiles. They argue that a rogue state could, for
example, bring a nuclear weapon into a U.S. port on board a ship and then
detonate it, or smuggle biological warfare (BW) agents into the United States
and disperse them secretly. Such convert means of delivery would be preferable
to using missiles because a missile has a "return address," that is, the United
States could determine the country that had launched it and then retaliate.
If the country secretly brought WMD into the United States and used them,
however, it might be able to disguise its involvement and avoid retribution.
The December 2001
National
Intelligence Estimate acknowledged the threat of non-missile WMD delivery.
Moreover, critics of missile defense argue that no BMD system, no matter
how comprehensive, can guarantee total security against a ballistic missile
attack. Since no defensive system could provide total protection, and even
a single nuclear strike on a U.S. city would constitute "unacceptable damage,"
the United States would be deterred by nuclear rogue states even if it did
possess a national missile defense system.
The development of defenses against longer-range missiles is highly controversial.
The main reason is that if the Unites States develops defenses of this kind,
it could upset the nuclear balance between the United States and Russia and
between the United States and China. Today, each of these countries knows
that it could survive a U.S. nuclear first strike and still be able to retaliate
against the United States with its own nuclear-armed missiles, and that the
United States could do the same. The existence of this "second-strike capability"
provides security to all three countries. It allows each to feel confident
that it will not be attacked because it has the ability to retaliate and cause
unacceptable damage to the attacker. If one country had missile defenses,
however, it might be able to strike first and then block a retaliatory strike.
This capability, even if it was never used, could allow the possessor to intimidate
other major nuclear countries.
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