Produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Updated December 2006

Overview. India and Pakistan have many reasons for developing and maintaining nuclear weapons. The primary reason for both countries may be the strategic security environment in which they find themselves on the Asian sub-continent, and their history of deadly conflicts. But, other factors like prestige, nationalism, and domestic politics also exert pressure on both to develop nuclear weapons.  Both states view nuclear weapons as symbols of national honor, and both continue to produce fissile material suitable for use in nuclear weapons. Despite a recent reduction of tensions between the two powers and unilateral, declaratory commitments to nuclear nonproliferation, neither country has signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or the nuclear  Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

India. India believes that its nuclear arsenal is necessary to ensure strategic stability in the region. In addition, an ongoing strategic rivalry with China has fueled India's quest for nuclear technology.  India lost a large portion of its territory in a border war with China in 1962.  Just two years later, in 1964, China conducted its first nuclear test. China also maintains a military relationship with neighboring Burma, and has built military fortifications in the Indian Ocean. These facts, coupled with China's military and economic support to Pakistan have contributed to feelings of strategic inferiority in India. Hence, India's nuclear weapon program is largely propelled forward by a need to deter a nuclear-armed China. Estimates of India's nuclear stockpile range from a few to 100 plutonium-based nuclear warheads, but a conservative estimate is about 50 weapons in 2006. India could deliver nuclear weapons using Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft and ballistic missiles.

India began a plutonium-based nuclear program in 1958, under the "Atoms for Peace" campaign.  India purchased a CIRUS 40 MWt research reactor from Canada, and with the plutonium extracted from that reactor, India carried out its first nuclear test in 1974. That test was presented to the international community as a "peaceful" nuclear explosion, and not a test of a nuclear weapon. In May 1998, both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests.  During this time, India conducted five underground tests that marked the end of a 24-year self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing.  Pakistan quickly followed suit and conducted five nuclear tests of its own. Following the tests, both countries instituted a bilateral moratorium banning further tests. 

Pakistan. Pakistan views its nuclear weapons as a deterrent against India. Given Pakistan's lack of strategic depth and inferior conventional forces, nuclear weapons form the centerpiece of its national security policy. Pakistan's nuclear program, based on highly enriched uranium (HEU), began in the mid-1970s, and by the beginning of 1990, Pakistan probably had acquired the capability to build a nuclear weapon. Pakistan's nuclear complex was founded primarily by Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) and its founder, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. China also played a critical role in providing expertise and nuclear-related technology to Pakistan's nuclear weapon program. Pakistan is believed to have between 40 and 60 nuclear warheads in 2006, and produces the HEU fuel for its warheads at three unsafeguarded reactors dispersed throughout the country. Pakistan could deliver nuclear weapons using modified F-16 fighter aircraft (purchased from the United States) and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.

Revelations in early 2004 that Pakistan's premier nuclear scientist and the founder of the Pakistani nuclear weapon program, A.Q. Khan, was involved in a global network that trafficked illicit nuclear-related materials and know-how have alarmed the international community. Serious questions about Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's ability to control his nation's nuclear arsenal and the personnel associated with it have surfaced since the Khan network was exposed. In his 2006 memoir, Musharraf admitted that Khan may have exported Pakistan's most advanced nuclear centrifuges. Pakistan has passed a bill that would strengthen existing nuclear export control laws by instituting stiff penalties for violations. However, most participants in the Khan network have not been caught or punished. The United States has considered measures to help India and Pakistan improve physical security at nuclear their facilities.