A Primer on WMD
Curbing WMD Proliferation
 

Normalization of Relations in South Asia

 
 
Produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Updated December 2006

Rapprochement. Following the climatic force posturing at the end of 2002, India and Pakistan have engaged each other on a series of initiatives designed to bring peace to the region. A formal offer of peace to Pakistan from former Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in 2003 ushered in a normalization of relations between the two archrivals. Furthermore, a series of high-level summit meetings in 2004 between India and Pakistan have led to a general cease-fire at the Line of Control in Kashmir.

Nuclear tensions between India and Pakistan can be described as relatively stable since 1998. When the new Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh was voted into office in May 2003, he calmed international fears about nuclear tensions in South Asia by seeking rapprochement with Pakistan. Singh's government has made the development of closer ties with Pakistan, including easing travel restrictions and the continuation of bilateral talks, a priority for his administration. On September 24, 2004, Singh made good on his commitment to pursue peace and met with Pakistani President Musharraf in New York. On the table were plans for a proposed gas pipeline that would go through Pakistan and supply India with natural gas imported from Iran.

Formal talks on the peace agreement began on November 23, 2004, when Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz was sent to New Delhi to work on negotiations. It was the first visit to India by a high-ranking Pakistani official in 13 years. Prior to the visit by Aziz, India withdrew 3,000 troops from fortified positions in Kashmir. The move was partly intended as a goodwill gesture to improve the chances of success at the peace talks. But, it may also signal that India intends to use its military posture as a bargaining chip at the negotiating table; Pakistan feels threatened by India's large conventional forces (400,000 troops) forward-deployed in Kashmir. During talks in October 2005, India and Pakistan signed an agreement to provide advance notice about surface-to-surface ballistic missile tests. However, the agreement does not cover cruise missiles; Pakistan test-fired its first cruise missile in August 2005 without alerting India.

Bilateral Confidence-Building Measures. Following a series of nuclear tests in 1998, India and Pakistan bilaterally agreed to a moratorium to ban further tests. Both parties agreed to extend this bilateral arrangement in 2004.  In February 1999, India and Pakistan negotiated the "Lahore Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU) to institute further confidence-building measures (CBM) to reduce the risk of a nuclear war. As part of the Lahore MOU, both sides agreed to establish a nuclear hotline between their respective foreign ministries, similar to the arrangement established between Moscow and Washington, DC during the Cold War. The hotline linking New Delhi with Islamabad is intended to prevent miscommunication during a crisis so as to avoid an escalation to nuclear war. During their 2005 talks, India gave Pakistan a draft MOU on measures to reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of each country's nuclear weapons.

Further Reading:

Gabrielle Kohlmeier, Arms Control Today, "India and Pakistan Hold Nuclear Talks"

U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Pakistan & India: Steps Toward Rapprochement

Rear Admirals Hasan Ansari & Ravi Vohra, "Confidence Building Measures at Sea: Opportunities for India and Pakistan"

Stimson Center, Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia
Gaurav Rajen, "Nuclear Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia: Managing Nuclear Operations and Avoiding Inadvertent Nuclear War"
Pugwash, Samina Ahmed, "Workshop Report: Avoiding an India-Pakistan Nuclear Confrontation"
CRS, K. Alan Kronstadt, "India: Chronology of Recent Events"
Stimson Center, Pakistan-India Confidence Building Measures Timeline 1988-Present


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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2004 by MIIS.

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