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South Asia and
the Global Nonproliferation Regime. Both India
and Pakistan have resisted calls by the international community to renounce
their nuclear weapons and join the global nonproliferation regime. Neither India
nor Pakistan is a member of the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India claims the NPT discriminates against the
non-nuclear weapon states by preventing states beyond the so-called "declared"
five nuclear powers (the United States,
Russia, China, Britain, and France) from building nuclear weapons.
Pakistan refuses to sign the NPT because it
believes that the treaty would unduly interfere with its ability to maintain its
nuclear arsenal, which it claims is strictly for defensive purposes and is vital
for national security. Nevertheless, Pakistan has stated on occasion that it
will sign the NPT only after India joins the treaty.
The International Reaction to the 1998 Nuclear
Tests. The international community responded to the 1998 nuclear
tests by placing economic sanctions on India (sanctions had already
been placed on Pakistan since its nuclear program was discovered in
1990). India, in an effort to mitigate international criticism,
immediately after the tests pledged to join the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but to date has not done so. The U.S.
rejection of the CTBT in 1999 may have contributed to India's and Pakistan's
refusal to sign the treaty. The
international community also called on India and Pakistan to
participate in negotiations to develop a
Fissile Material Cut-Off
Treaty (FMCT), but again, neither state to date has taken
substantive action on the issue.
The
United States, under the
Arms Export
Control Act, placed sanctions
on both states by restricting non-humanitarian aid to the region.
These sanctions were fully lifted from both India and Pakistan in
October 2001. The lifting of sanctions was intended as a reward for
cooperation in the U.S. war on terrorism. The international
community's overall approach to a nuclear South Asia has been to
engage India and Pakistan, particularly in efforts against
terrorism, to encourage stability in the region and to promote
participation in arms control accords. In 2005, both the United
States and Russia agreed to increase military trade and civilian
nuclear cooperation with India. Critics of the
U.S. nuclear deal with India emphasize that it undermines
international treaties and agreements aimed at preventing the spread
of nuclear weapons. The United States rejected Pakistan's request
for similar nuclear aid. However, despite concerns about Pakistan's
nuclear program and A.Q. Khan's proliferation of nuclear
technologies to Iran, Libya, and North Korea, the U.S. Congress in
2005 funded a five-year $3 billion package of economic and military
assistance for Pakistan.
In
March 2006, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh signed an agreement that would allow the United
States to provide sensitive civilian nuclear technology to India
provided certain conditions are met, including the revision of
international and domestic export control restrictions. The agreement requires India to
separate its civilian and military nuclear reactors and to place the
civilian reactors under IAEA safeguards. However, the deal does not
place restrictions on India's development or testing of nuclear
weapons. The U.S. House of Representatives and the
Senate have each
approved different bills authorizing the agreement. Before the
agreement can take effect, the bills will have to be reconciled and
the Nuclear Suppliers Group will have to lift certain restrictions
on U.S. transfer of nuclear technology to a nuclear weapons states
outside the NPT. In the wake of the U.S. deal, both Russia and China
have agreed to provide more nuclear assistance to India, and China
may also help Pakistan. Concerns have also been raised about India's
WMD-related transfers to Iran.
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Further Reading:
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U.S. Department of State, Sanctions on India and Pakistan |
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CRS, K. Alan Kronstadt,
"Pakistan-U.S. Relations" |
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CRS, K. Alan Kronstadt,
"India-U.S. Relations" |
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CNS, Resources on India
and Pakistan,
World
Reaction to Indian Nuclear Tests |
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CRS, Jeanne J. Grimmett, "Nuclear
Sanctions: Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and Its Application
to India and Pakistan" |
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U.S. Department of Commerce,
India and Pakistan Sanctions Center |
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Robert E. Rehbein, Nonproliferation Review,
"Managing Proliferation in South Asia: A Case for Assistance to Unsafe
Nuclear Arsenals" |
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CRS, Sharon Squassoni & Jill Marie
Parillo,
"U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Side-by-Side Comparison of
Current Legislation" |
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NTI, Dennis Gormley & Lawrence
Scheinman,
"Implications of Proposed India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation" |
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CRS, Richard Cronin, K. Alan Kronstadt,
Sharon Squassoni,
"Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy constraints and Options" |
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CEIP, George Perkovich,
"Faulty Promises: The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal" |
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CRS, Sharon Squassoni,
"India and Iran: WMD Proliferation Activities" |
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