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Pakistan, Khan,
and the Nuclear Black Market. Revelations in
February 2004 that Pakistan's premier nuclear scientist, Dr. A.Q. Khan,
was behind an illicit nuclear trafficking network raised international concern
about the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear know-how and equipment.
Khan confessed to Pakistani security officials that he had transferred
nuclear-related technologies to
Iran,
Libya, and
North Korea, but denied that he
received any support from the Pakistani government. President Musharraf pardoned
Khan following Khan's public confession aired on national television, but placed
the scientist under house arrest pending a more thorough
investigation by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). The official
position of the Bush administration is that Pakistan's government did not
know about or support Khan's activities. However, many
analysts
believe that given Khan's connections to the Pakistani leaders and the military
and the size of his black market operation, Pakistan's government must have been
aware of his illicit activities. Pakistan has refused to let foreign officials
question Khan, although it cooperated with the International Atomic Energy
Agency's investigation into the origin of enriched uranium particles found in
nuclear facilities in Iran.
In May 2006, Pakistan's government declared closed its
investigation into the Khan
nuclear proliferation network. Khan remains under house
arrest. Around the world, most participants in the network have not
been charged or punished for helping to provide nuclear weapons
technology to Iran, Libya, North Korea, and other countries, and
smuggling of such technology continues.
Client States and Middlemen. Several
middlemen in countries around the world played a significant role in helping
Khan deliver illicit goods to client states. (See
"How to Buy a Centrifuge on the Black Market.") Buhary Syed Abu Tahir, a middleman
in Malaysia, helped Khan deliver centrifuge parts and blueprints to Iran and
Libya. Tahir subsequently identified middlemen that operated out of Germany,
Turkey, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Khan's network also supplied North
Korea with centrifuge technology and depleted uranium hexaflouride gas between
1997 and 2002. Khan is believed to have personally visited Pyongyang 12 times
during this time period. (See "A.Q. Khan, the DPRK, and
Nuclear Proliferation.")
The Aftermath: New Pakistani Export Control Law. The Khan network has
revealed how weak Pakistan's pre-existing export control laws were. Pakistan had
passed export legislation in July 1998, February
1999, August 1999, and again in November 2000. Several loopholes and
contradictions permeated these laws, and, facing increased
international pressure in light of the Khan revelations, Pakistan moved to pass a new export control bill
on July 7,
2004. The legislation, known as the "Export Control on Goods, Technologies,
Material, and Equipment Related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their
Delivery Systems Act," was ratified by the Pakistan National Assembly and the
Senate on September 19, 2004. The bill entails harsh penalties for violators,
including up to 14 years imprisonment, seizure of personal assets, and a
fine of up to 5 million rupees ($86,500 dollars).
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Further Reading:
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NTI, Shi-chin Lin,
"The AQ Khan Revelations and Subsequent Changes to Pakistani Export
Control Laws" |
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CNS, Guarav Kampani,
"Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan" |
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The Nonproliferation Review, Guarav Kampani,
"Second Tier Proliferation: The Case of Pakistan and North Korea" |
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CRS, Richard Cronin, K. Alan Kronstadt,
Sharon Squassoni,
"Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission" |
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Disarmament Diplomacy,
Christopher Clary,
"Dr. Khan's Nuclear WalMart" |
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Arms Control Today, Paul Kerr,
"New Details Emerge on Pakistani Networks" |
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The Washington Quarterly, David
Albright & Corey Hinderstein,
"Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks" |
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WMD Insights,
"The A.Q. Khan Network: Crime... and Punishment" |
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CRS, K. Alan Kronstadt,
"Pakistan-U.S. Relations" |
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ISIS, Jacob Blackford,
"Multilateral Nuclear Export Controls After the A.Q. Khan Network" |
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