Option 1: Continue Negotiations

Proponents Say: Continue the Ad Hoc Group Negotiations Without the U.S.

• Although the draft BWC Protocol is less than perfect, it would allow better monitoring of activities at dual-use facilities and permit on-site challenge inspections in case of suspected production or use of BW. It would also provide an international forum for any state party to air its compliance concerns, and create a lean international organization that would keep global attention focused on the BW threat.
• Establishing an operational compliance-monitoring regime for the BWC would prove the feasibility of the concept, and would keep the door open for U.S. accession when the political climate changes (e.g., after the 2004 elections).

Opponents Say: With or Without the U.S., the Proposed BWC Protocol Will be Ineffective.

• A BWC inspection regime would be almost meaningless without the participation of the U.S., the world’s sole superpower and leader in biotechnology.
• If the BWC Protocol enters into force without the United States, a future U.S. administration might be reluctant to accede to it, and the Senate might refuse to give its consent to ratification.
• The BWC would still be essentially unverifiable. Determined cheaters might still be able to conduct BW research and production at clandestine facilities without being detected by the proposed inspection regime. Only a small fraction of relevant dual-use facilities would be declared and subject to inspection, the great majority of them in the U.S. and other advanced industrial countries.
• As a result, the BWC Protocol could create a false sense of security, making it less likely that member-states would be prepared to invest in other useful measures such as BW defenses and strengthened export controls.

Further Reading:

	CBACI, Michael Moodie, "The BWC Protocol: A Critique"
	US Dept. of State, "US Says Biological Weapons Protocol 'Would Not Achieve Its Objectives'"

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