CTBT - U.S. Action

President Obama speaks in Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009
Source: paei.state.gov

Background. The United States was the first country to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but on October 13, 1999, the U.S. Senate voted 51 to 48 not to ratify it. (Approval would have required a vote by two-thirds of the Senate, or 67 votes.) The Clinton administration supported the CTBT but failed to organize an effective campaign on behalf of the treaty in the Senate. Conservative Republican Senators opposed to the treaty, in particular Senator Kyl of Arizona, won over moderate, uncommitted Republican Senators. These efforts, and political maneuvers that brought CTBT ratification to a vote before the Clinton administration had time to build support for the treaty, eventually contributed to its defeat.

Although animosity toward President Clinton and other domestic political considerations played a role in the Senate vote, substantive issues were more important to the outcome. Some treaty opponents argued that arms control treaties like the CTBT were not in the U.S. national security interest and should be avoided. Most opponents of the treaty voiced three main concerns:

1. Stockpile Stewardship. Deterrence, it was argued, is still central to U.S. security policy, and without further nuclear testing, the United States could not maintain the necessary confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Treaty opponents considered the stockpile stewardship program, designed to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. weapons stockpile, to be uncertain and possibly ineffective.
2. Verification. CTBT critics argued that the treaty verification regime was not sufficient to detect low-yield tests (of less than one kiloton). As a consequence, advanced nuclear weapon states such as Russia and China would be able to conduct militarily significant tests without being detected, enabling them to verify the reliability of their weapons or even to develop new ones. Such cheating could give these countries a military advantage over the United States should it honor its non-testing obligation.
3. Nonproliferation Impact. Critics argued that the CTBT would not impede further nuclear proliferation as treaty proponents claimed. The rudimentary fission weapons that would probably be attractive to new proliferators would not require testing. It was also argued that more sophisticated states not already bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (India, Israel, and Pakistan) might be able to build more nuclear weapons without additional testing.

Current Status. During the Bush administration, the CTBT was not withdrawn from the Senate, thus the U.S. signature on the treaty remained valid during Bush's two terms as an expression of tacit U.S. adherence to the provisions of the CTBT. (Two-thirds of the Senate must vote to send the treaty back to the president for disposal or to ratify it.) However, the Bush administration also vocally opposed the CTBT and never explicitly ruled out the possibility of continuing tests. Between 2000 and 2008, the U.S. government obeyed the provisions of the CTBT despite the administration's opposition to the treaty. This restraint followed an important norm in international law, whereby a country that has signed but not yet ratified a treaty is bound not to take actions that would undermine its fundamental purposes, unless and until it withdraws from the treaty. Although not legally binding, this interpretation placed a continuing political restraint on the resumption of U.S. nuclear testing.

The Obama administration has indicated that it will press for CTBT ratification and negotiate a new Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). In April 2009 in Prague, Obama clearly indicated that his administration would "immediately and aggressively pursue" U.S. ratification of the CTBT. Ratification of the treaty may face difficulty in the U.S. Senate largely due to concerns about the potential need for future nuclear testing. However, key Republican figures have signaled they may approve of ratification, which might influence others within the largely unsupportive Republican bloc.

Through Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, the administration has also declared its intention to negotiate a new FMCT, which will likely include verification provisions (a component the Bush administration strongly opposed). Renewed U.S. support for the CTBT and FMCT are the foundations for the Obama's administration's dedication to re-establishing the United States as a leader in arms control and nonproliferation.

Further Reading:

	Arms Control Association, Tom Collina with Daryl G. Kimball, "Now More Than Ever: The Case for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty"
	NTI, Sean Dunlop & Sean Dupreez, "The United States and the CTBT: Renewed Hope or Politics as Usual"
	CRS Report for Congress, Jonathan Medalia, "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments"
	The Acronym Institute, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
	NTI, Liviu Horovitz & Luis Gain, "One Year of Test Ban Commitment Cannot Erase a Decade of Dismissal: Discussing the Outcome of the CTBT Article XIV Conference "
	NTI, Cole Harvey, "Nuclear Stockpile Modernization: Issues and Background"
	Arms Control Today, Amb. Tibor Toth, "Building Up the Regime for Verifying the CTBT"
	Multimedia:
	CNS, Interview with CTBTO's Tibor Toth (video)
	YouTube, Paul Richards CNS seminar, "Verifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty" (video)
	YouTube, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization's Channel (videos)