A Primer on WMD
Curbing WMD Proliferation
 

Dismantlement and Inspections

 
 
Produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Updated August 2007

Member states are obligated to dismantle and destroy any existing CW or CW-production capability, and to pledge not to produce a further CW capability. For this purpose, inspections are critical in verifying that obligations are met. As a result, the CWC and OPCW established extensive protocol for dismantlement and inspections.

Dismantling Declared CW. To date, only six member states --Albania, India, Libya, Russia, South Korea, and the United States -- have declared that they possessed CW at the time of the Convention's entry into for them, although several other states, including the United Kingdom and France, admitted that they had possessed CW in the past but have since destroyed them. Japan has acknowledged responsibility for eliminating CW left in China during World War II. Other states, including Iran, have declared, and the OPCW has verified, that they have destroyed or converted into civilian use what were once chemical weapons production facilities.

Upon the declaration of CW possession, states are given a timeline by the OPCW to eliminate their CW stockpiles, munitions, and/or production facilities. In some circumstances, the OPCW can grant extensions to complete the process of dismantlement. Although the OPCW provides technical assistance, states are generally expected to fund the dismantlement themselves.

In practice, the process of dismantlement has been prolonged and difficult. The original CWC dismantlement deadline was 2007. As of August 2007, however, only one declared CW state (Albania) has completed dismantlement, and Russia and the United States will likely not complete dismantlement by their extended 2012 deadline. Furthermore, some experts have estimated that it may take until 2023 for the United States to fulfill their treaty obligations. Other countries have also sought and won extensions of the 2007 deadline: South Korea until 2008, Libya until 2009, Libya until 2010, and Japan until 2012 to clean up CW left in China during World War II.

Inspections Process. To ensure that states fulfill their obligations, the CWC established measures of verification through inspections. Routine inspections are carried out in the chemical-related facilities of member countries and depend upon the type of facilities declared. Facilities dealing with schedule 1 chemicals face the most rigorous routine inspections, which can be conducted with as little as 24 hours notice. Facilities involving schedule 2 chemicals are subject to inspection based upon pre-arranged agreements individual states sign with the OPCW, and the frequency depends largely upon the specific chemicals involved. Inspections of facilities involving schedule 3 chemicals occur at random, although the treaty stipulates that inspectors must give notice no less than 120 hours prior to inspection.

In addition to routine inspections, the CWC also includes the possibility of short-notice "challenge" inspections. If one member is suspected of not fulfilling its treaty obligations, another member may request that the Executive Council authorize further inspections. If the Executive Council agrees that a member is not fulfilling its obligations, the Director-General may then issue a mandate for a challenge inspection. These inspections may occur at facilities beyond those designated by the state in question, essentially granting the inspectors the right to investigate any facility that another state party has raised concerns about. The process for challenge inspections involves many steps and requires the cooperation of other member states, which partially explains why there has not been a single challenge inspection as of August 2007.

Members of inspection teams are designated and voted upon by member states. Member states subject to inspection must provide visas and transport for the inspectors, and must care for their general well-being during the inspections process. To date, thousands of routine inspections have taken place in over 79 member countries.

 

Further Reading:
Amy Sands and Jason Pate, “CWC Compliance Issues,” in "The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation Challenges and Solutions"

WMD Insights, Richard Weitz, "Russian Chemical Weapons Dismantlement: Progress with Problems"

Arms Control Today, Michael Nguyen, "U.S. Unable to Meet CWC 2012 Deadline"

OPCW, "Status of Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention"
Jacqueline Simon, "Ensuring the Long-Term Adherence to the CWC: Problems and Perspectives"
Congressional Research Service, Steve Bowman, "Chemical Weapons Convention: Issues for Congress"
GAO, "Delays in Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention Raise Concerns About Proliferation"


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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2004 by MIIS.

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