| |
Implementation. Despite the successes
that the CWC witnessed in its first decade, several substantial problems remain
to be solved. First and foremost are the difficulties in
eliminating declared CW stockpiles and CW production facilities in a timely
fashion. Of the six states with declared CW stockpiles, only Albania eliminated
its stockpile by the original 2007 deadline. The original CWC deadline of 2007 for disposal
has proven optimistic, as technical difficulties and high costs, as well as
public concerns over environmental and health consequences, have significantly
slowed the destruction process. Most notably, the United States and Russia are
far behind schedule and likely will not meet their 2012 extended deadlines. As a
result, two-thirds of the world's declared CW stockpiles and munitions
have not yet been destroyed.
Even within member states with no declared CW
stockpiles or production facilities, less than half have passed domestic laws
codifying their CWC obligations or developed
chemical
agent control lists. According to
Article VII of the CWC, all member states must take steps to align their
domestic law and policy with those of the CWC. Although there has been increased
compliance with Article VII following the creation of a
two-year
Action Plan by the First Review Conference in 2003, many states still fall
short of their Article VII obligations.
A U.S. chemical weapons destruction plant.
Source: www.opcw.org
The OPCW tends to encourage states to meet their obligations rather than
penalize those that do not. In fact, the OPCW is reluctant to even publicly name
countries that are not meeting their obligations. The OPCW could take
steps to penalize noncompliant members such as limiting their voting
rights in the OPCW or a denying employment for their nationals in the
organization. However, the likelihood of penalties in the short-term is remote
given the relatively large number of non-compliant states and the short history
of the convention.
Verification. There has also been
growing concern regarding the CWC verification apparatus. Although the CWC has
verified and inventoried all declared chemical weapons and inspected many
CW-related sites, it has paid relatively little attention to potential
"dual-use" facilities-chemical production facilities that ostensibly produce
commercial agents but could also be used to produce prohibited agents. The
dangers posed by ostensibly commercial facilities will continue to grow as new
technologies allow manufacturers to change rapidly the chemical agents they
produce. The OPCW may need to redirect more of its inspection efforts from
Schedule 1 declared chemical weapons facilities to dual-use and other chemical
facilities. However, many OPCW members resist a change in inspection priorities,
and the OPCW's current budget is strained by even its basic inspection program. Additionally, the verification regime has
attempted to provide equal treatment for members, and thus states have received
roughly the same number of inspections regardless of the size of their chemical
industry or declared CW stockpiles. As a result, a disproportionately low
percentage of chemical sites in larger countries have been subject to
inspection.
OPCW inspectors have focused overwhelmingly on declared CW-related facilities. Source: www.opcw.org
Though the CWC verification apparatus
includes the possibility of challenge inspections, no challenge inspection has
yet occurred. Some experts worry that without the deterrent of challenge inspections,
states will no longer fear the verification regime and may choose to develop CW
covertly.
Because challenge inspections in the current
verification mechanism lack precedent and therefore credibility, there has been
a push to reinvent the current verification procedure. One solution would be to
loosen the criteria for challenge inspections, thus allowing the OPCW to
realistically conduct such inspections at least on occasion. Another solution
would be to create a new method of verification altogether, one which would more
rigorous than routine inspections but less intrusive than challenge inspections.
Either solution would enhance the current verification mechanism, thereby
reassuring compliant member states and serving as a deterrent for cheating.
Non-member States. A final challenge
for the CWC is the presence of states outside the treaty. Although there are
only a handful of states not party to the CWC, several of these states
(including
Syria,
North Korea, and
Israel)
are suspected of possessing chemical weapons. As long as states exist outside the
treaty, it is unlikely the CWC will be able to achieve its goal of complete and
verifiable CW disarmament.
Improved Integration with Other Treaties and Agreements. Several agreements
exist that overlap with the mandate of the CWC. The
Australia Group (AG), for example, coordinates
CW-related export controls and encourages related intelligence sharing among its
32 member countries. The
Proliferation Security
Initiative strives to prevent the transfer of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
including chemical weapons. More broadly,
UN Security Council Resolution
1540 requires all states to take all possible measures to prevent the proliferation of WMD. In some cases, such as
with the Australia Group, countries perceive a conflict between mandates. For
example, some states complain that the AG restricts the free trade in chemicals
and chemical process equipment to CWC members in good standing with the OPCW and
the CWC. By improving the integration of these agreements, the
inducements for treaty compliance as well as the punishments for non-compliance
can be reinforced, and with them the mandate of the CWC as a whole.
The Second Review Conference. In April
2008, member states will meet in the Hague to establish a strategic plan for the
future of the CWC. As they did during the First Review Conference in 2003,
member states at the Second Review Conference will attempt to predict what
impact advances in technology will have on the operation of the treaty and
accommodate them. More importantly, the CWC have an opportunity to address the
major challenges the convention faces in its verification mechanism and the problems caused
by the slow implementation of the treaty's provisions.
|
 |
Further Reading:
 |
Nonproliferation Review, Sergey Batsanov
"Approaching the 10th Anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Plan for Future Progress" |
|
WMD Insights, Richard Weitz,
"Chlorine as a Terrorist Weapon in Iraq" |
|
OPCW,
"Second Review Conference of the CWC" |
|
Arms Control Today, Jonathan B. Tucker,
"The Chemical Weapons Convention: Has
It Enhanced U.S. Security" |
|
Verification Yearbook 2003, Robert J. Matthews,
"Reviewing the Chemical Weapons Convention: Gently Does It" |
|
American Society of International Law, David P. Fidler,
"The Chemical Weapons Convention After Ten Years: Successes and Future Challenges" |
|
German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Oliver Thränert and John Tucker,
"Freeing the World of Chemical Weapons: The Chemical Weapons Convention at the Ten-Year Mark" |
|
