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International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Excerpted from the Inventory of International Organizations and Regimes 2001 published by the CNS International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project. A complete PDF copy of the 2000 edition of the Inventory is available in the Publications section of the NTI website.

Established: 1957
Membership: 130 States
Functions: to encourage and assist research, development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world; to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that such activity assisted by the Agency is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; to apply safeguards to relevant activities at the request of member states; to apply, under the NPT and other international treaties, mandatory comprehensive safeguards in NNWS party to such treaties.

In carrying out its functions, the Agency conducts its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN to promote peace and international cooperation, and in conformity with policies of the UN for furthering the establishment of worldwide disarmament through safeguards.

The Agency's safeguards system is defined primarily in Art. XII of the IAEA Statute, and in documents INFCIRC/66 (designed to be applied in any state that concluded a safeguards agreement), INFCIRC/153 (used as a basis for agreements with states parties to the NPT; the Tlatelolco Treaty; the SEANWFZ Treaty, the Treaty of Pelindaba, the Treaty of Rarotonga; the ABACC.)

Principal organs: General Conference, Board of Governors, Secretariat.

General Conference

Consists of all 130 IAEA member states.

Functions: The General Conference has a broad review and policy guidance function in regard to all IAEA programs, but no day-to-day safeguards role. It may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the IAEA Statute or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the Statute.

The General Conference endorsed the safeguards systems adopted by the Board of Governors, and approved the IAEA's safeguards role under the NPT.

The 2000 session of the General Conference, September 18-22, adopted resolutions regarding, inter alia:

• The Financing of Technical Co-operation - Contributions to the Agency's Technical Co-operation Fund (GC(44)/RES/8 adopted 22 September);
• Measures to Strengthen International Co-operation in Nuclear, Radiation and Waste Safety (GC(44)/RES/11, adopted 22 September);
• The Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (GC(44)/RES/12, adopted 22 September);
• Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (GC(44)/RES/16, adopted 22 September);
• Safety of Transport of Radioactive Materials (GC(44)/RES/17, adopted 22 September);
• Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Model Protocol (GC(44)/RES/19, adopted 22 September);
• Measures Against Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials and Other Radioactive Sources (GC(44)/RES/20, adopted 22 September);
• Outcomes of the NPT Review Conference Relevant to the Activities of the IAEA (GC(44)/RES/25, adopted 22 September).

The 1999 session of the General Conference, 27 September - 1 October, adopted resolutions regarding, inter alia:

• Implementation of the Agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (GC(43)/RES/3 adopted 1 October);
• Measures to Strengthen International Co-operation in Nuclear, Radiation and Waste Safety - The Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials (GC(43)/RES/10 adopted 1 October);
• Measures to Strengthen International Co-operation in Nuclear, Radiation and Waste Safety - Safety of Transport and Radioactive Materials (GC(43)/RES/11 adopted October 1);
• Plan for Producing Potable Water Economically (GC(42)/RES/15 adopted 1 October);
• Extensive Use of Isotope Hydrology for Water Resources Management;
• Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Model Protocol (GC(43)/RES/17 adopted 1 October);
• Measures Against Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials and Other Radioactive Sources (GC(43)/RES/16 adopted 1 October).

The 1998 session of the General Conference, 21 - 25 September, adopted resolutions:

• expressing concern over continued non-compliance by North Korea and urging it to cooperate fully with the Agency regarding the Implementation of the Agreements Between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (GC(42)/RES/2);
• condemning Iraq's decision on 5 August 1998 to suspend cooperation with the IAEA, demanding that it rescind its decision, resume dialogue and begin full cooperation with the Agency. It stressed that the Agency's Action Team should continue to further investigate any aspects of Iraq's nuclear program (GC(42)/RES3);
• appealing to all states not parties to join the Convention on Nuclear Safety (GC(42)/RES/10);
• emphasizing that Member States make all necessary efforts to have contingency plans in place for nuclear power plants, fuel cycle and medical facilities which use radioactive materials well before 31 December 1999 in order to share information and handle potential problems which may arise due to the Year 2000 problem (GC(42)/RES/11);
• encouraging all governments to join in international co-operative efforts to strengthen the safety of radiation sources and the security of radioactive materials (GC(42)/RES/12);
• expressing "grave concern" and strongly deploring the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998; calling on them to conclude the additional protocols as called for by resolution GC(41)/RES/16;
• urging all States to become Parties to the NPT and the CTBT and to place all their nuclear material and facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards without delay and conditions; urging all States to support negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the five nuclear-weapon States to fulfill their commitments under Article VI of the NPT (GC(42)/RES/19);
• confirming the urgent need for all States in the Middle East to immediately accept the application of IAEA Safeguards in the region; calling upon "all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and appropriate steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a mutually and effectively verifiable NWFZ in the region"; and inviting all countries to adhere to the international non-proliferation regime" (GC(42)/RES/21).

In addition, the General Conference decided to endorse a statement by the President on the inclusion of the agenda item "Israeli Nuclear Capabilities and Threat." The statement noted that the item had been discussed in the 42nd session and that certain Member States intended to include the item on the provisional agenda of the 43rd session of the General Conference (GC(42)/DEC/11).

The 1997 session of the General Conference, 29 September - 3 October, adopted resolutions:

• requesting all concerned States and other Parties to safeguards agreements to sign additional protocols on Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Model Protocol (GC(41)/RES/16);
• urging North Korea to cooperate fully with the Agency regarding the Implementation of the Agreements Between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (GC(41)/RES/22);
• appealing to all states not parties to join the Convention on Nuclear Safety (GC(41)/RES/10);
• welcoming the adoption of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (GC(41)/RES/11);
• welcoming the Agency activities taken in regard to the Measures Against Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials and Other Sources (GC(41)/RES17);
• calling upon Iraq to cooperate fully with the Agency in the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to Iraq (GC(41)/RES/23);
• confirming the urgent need for all parties in the region to immediately accept the application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East and "calling upon all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and appropriate steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a mutually and effectively verifiable NWFZ in the region" (GC(41)/RES/25).

Board of Governors

In accordance with the Statute and the existing practice, the Board is responsible for approving safeguards procedures and safeguards agreements, and for the general supervision of the Agency's safeguards activities. In case of non-compliance with safeguards, the Board is to call upon the violator to remedy such non-compliance and to report the non-compliance to the UN Security Council and General Assembly. The Board generally meets five times a year: March, June, before and after the regular session of the General Conference in September, and immediately after the meeting of its Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee in December.

The Board of Governors has 35 members, of which 13 are designated by the Board and 22 elected by the General Conference. At the 44th General Conference Mr. I. H. Umar of Nigeria was elected chairman of the board for the 2000-2001 session. 11 Member states - Argentina, Egypt, Ghana, Ireland, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine - were newly elected to the Board. The other 24 Member States of the Board which have either been designated by the Board of Governors or elected by the General Conference are: Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, Cuba, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Nigeria, Poland, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Syrian Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The member states on the Board for 1999-2000 were: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay.

Strengthening of safeguards:

2001. The Board of Governors held its meeting in Vienna on 11-14 June 2001 to review the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the year 2000. The Board concluded that in 2000 in the 140 states (and Taiwan, China), which had safeguards agreements in force, the Agency found no indication of diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards or of misuse of facilities, equipment or non-nuclear material placed under safeguards. For seven states, which have a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force or being provisionally applied, the Agency concluded that all nuclear material in these states had been placed under safeguards and was used for peaceful purposes.

2000. On 5-8 June 2000, the Board of Governors reviewed the implementation of IAEA safeguards last year. In 1999, the IAEA concluded that in States, which have safeguards agreements in force, declared nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for. The Secretariat found no indication that the nuclear material, which had been declared and placed under safeguards had been diverted for any military purpose or for purposes unknown, or that facilities, equipment or non-nuclear material placed under safeguards were being misused.

1997. On May 16, 1997 the Board of Governors approved new strengthened measures for use by its inspectors who verify States' compliance with their commitments not to produce nuclear weapons. The new measures are detailed in an agreed Protocol through which countries would accept stronger, more intrusive verification on their territory. The key objective of the new measures is to enhance the IAEA's capability to detect possible clandestine nuclear activities in non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) and thus to increase confidence that these States are abiding by their obligations. However, while the Protocol is part of a plan for strengthened and more efficient safeguards in NNWS, it also contains measures that could improve safeguards in other States, including nuclear-weapon States. These new measures provide enhanced access for inspectors - access to more information about States' nuclear programs, current and planned, and access to more locations on their territory. Inspectors will have access not only to nuclear sites but also to other locations that could contribute to a nuclear program, such as research or manufacturing facilities. The new measures include use of state-of-the-art technologies to trace nuclear activity through samples taken from the environment and to remote operation surveillance and monitoring systems at key locations in the inspected state. States accepting the Protocol will also be required to simplify the designation of inspectors and visa requirements for them, thus facilitating inspections at sites on short notice. Many of the new measures have undergone extensive field trials in cooperating Member States and build on reinforcing steps already implemented under the IAEA's existing legal authority.

1996. At its March 1996 session the Board considered the proposed measures of Part 2 of "Program 93+2." The Board commended the Agency for responding positively to several concerns, which had been raised by some States, but emphasized the need to maintain the present momentum and encouraged States to cooperate in the interests of finalizing the Part 2 measures. The Director General informed the Board there had been considerable progress towards achieving consensus on Part 2 measures, and that the Agency was continuing to make progress on the implementation of Part 1 measures.

1994. At its June 1994 session, the Board commended the Secretariat for the efforts made so far in the implementation of the program for a strengthened and more cost-effective safeguards system; reiterated the importance of an appropriate balance being maintained between strengthening and cost efficiency measures; reiterated the importance of the legal and financial implications of the proposals being examined at a sufficiently early stage; and expressed the hope that the Board would receive proposals in time for consideration at its March 1995 series of meeting at the latest (GOV/INF/737, 742, and Mod.1).

1993. At its June 1993 session, the Board of Governors considered recommendations by the IAEA's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system. A program for the development, assessment, and testing of SAGSI's recommendations (known as "Program 93+2") was undertaken by the IAEA Secretariat.

Safeguards in the DPRK: The DPRK joined NPT in 1985 and its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency entered into force in 1992. However, since 1993 the IAEA has been unable to verify the Pyongyang's compliance with its safeguards agreement.

2001. As of August 2001, the Agency was unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial report of the nuclear material made by the DPRK, and, therefore, unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material. IAEA considers Pyongyang to be in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement that remains binding and in force.

2000. In his Statement to the 2000 NPT Review Conference in New York on April 24, 2000, the Director-General noted that with regard to the DPRK, there was regrettably little to report since the 1995 NPT Conference and that the DPRK remained in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement

The DPRK continued to accept IAEA activities solely in the context of the "Agreed Framework" which it concluded in October 1994 with the United States of America. As requested by the Security Council, the Agency was monitoring a "freeze" of the DPRK's graphite moderated reactors and related facilities under that agreement.

In November 2000, the IAEA Secretary-General voiced hope that with the recent positive developments in the Korean Peninsula, the DPRK would soon be ready to commence active co-operation with the Agency so that it can verify that all nuclear material in the country, subject to safeguards, had been declared. In 2000, the Agency was permitted by the DPRK to identify some of the documents that needed to be preserved for the verification.

1999. Further technical rounds in March and December 1999 yielded little to no progress. At the June 1999 meeting of the Board of Governors, the Director General noted again the Secretariat's continued inability to verify the DPRK's initial inventory declaration, and that the DPRK remained in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement. He further said that there remained a fundamental difference of view between the Agency and the DPRK regarding the status of the Safeguards Agreement. The Agency viewed the Safeguards Agreement as binding and in force, while the DPRK did not accept all the measures required under the Safeguards Agreement but in practice accepted ad hoc and routine inspections at facilities not subject to the freeze without major difficulties. The DPRK also continued to link progress with the IAEA to the implementation of the Agreed Framework.

1998. As there was also no progress made during the ninth round of technical discussions in February 1998, the Director General emphasized to the Board of Governors in June that the Agency continued to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial report and could not verify that there had been no diversion of nuclear material. Furthermore, the canning operation of spent fuel rods had been suspended in April at the DPRK's request; 97% of the irradiated discharged rods were canned and under Agency seal by that time. Further technical rounds in June and October 1998 did not lead to any progress.

1997. At the meeting of the Board of Governors on 17 March 1997, the Director General reported that the seventh round of technical discussions, which took place on 20-24 January 1997 in Pyongyang, also produced few results. No progress was made on the issues of the preservation of information or the reprocessing plant. The Director General informed the Board that the Agency inspectors had a continuous presence in the Yongbyon area to monitor the freeze. As of August 1997, the canning operation for the irradiated fuel rods from the 5 MWe reactor, which started in April 1996, was about 90% complete. The rods were placed in containers under Agency seals. In January 1997, the DPRK clarified that the nuclear graphite which was manufactured for use at the 50 MWe power reactor was subject to IAEA monitoring. In October 1997, at the eighth round of technical discussions, no progress was made on the outstanding issues.

1996. A fourth round of technical discussions took place in Pyongyang from January 23-29, 1996, at which the DPRK said that the Agency could "resume ad hoc and routine inspections" (required by the Safeguards Agreement) but made clear that such inspections would be permitted only at facilities not subject to the freeze.

At the June 1996 meeting of the Board, the DG said that "because of unforeseen reasons", the DPRK had postponed the fifth round of technical discussions from May until mid-June. The DG noted that canning of the spent fuel rods at the 5 MWe reactor had started at the end of April 1996.

The fifth round of technical discussions between the IAEA and DPRK took place on June 25-28, 1996. Discussions resulted in some progress in certain areas, but the meeting did not result in agreement about the long-standing issue of reports by the DPRK on facilities subject to the freeze, or on installing monitoring equipment to allow the monitoring of nuclear waste tanks. Neither was there agreement about measuring or taking samples at locations in the Radiochemical Laboratory selected by the IAEA. As for monitoring the graphite blocks and other nuclear related equipment and components for the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors under construction at the inception of the freeze, the DPRK reiterated that manufacturing such equipment and components had been discontinued in 1993.

The sixth round of technical discussions between the IAEA and DPRK was held on 23-27 September 1996 in Vienna, but no progress had been made on issues such as the preservation of information. The Director General informed the UN Security Council on 7 November 1996 that the Agency could not provide any assurance that the required information was actually being preserved.

1995. During talks held in the DPRK from September 12-18, 1995, the DPRK agreed to measurements of irradiated fuel rods in storage at the 5 MWe experimental reactor which would verify whether the rods were all irradiated fuel, but did not agree to measures which would give information about the total amount of plutonium in the spent fuel. No agreement had been reached about installing additional Agency monitoring equipment at nuclear waste tanks in the DPRK's reprocessing plant, to enable the Agency to verify, on a continuous basis, the absence of any movement or operation involving those wastes.

On 12 December 1995, the Director General said that in September 1995 the Agency had asked the DPRK to undertake minor but essential modifications to the design of the storage racks for the cans to contain spent fuel discharged from its experimental reactor. This was to allow the cans to be sealed effectively in the racks under water. The modifications requested would not cause delay in the canning operations, the timetable for which appeared to have slipped because of technical difficulties. The DG also said that, despite the agreement reached with the DPRK about photographing the new process line and other areas of the Radiochemical Laboratory, DPRK operators had raised fresh objections and the photographing had still not been possible.

1994. At its June 1994 session, the Board of Governors found that the DPRK continued in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement. It therefore decided in conformity with the provisions of Article XII.C of the Statute to suspend non-medical Agency assistance to the DPRK and requested the Director General to transmit that resolution to the all members of the Agency and to the UN Security Council (GOV/2742). On June 13, 1994, the DPRK officially withdrew its IAEA membership.

At the December 1994 session of the Board of Governors, the Agency's DG reported that the DPRK was cooperating fully with the IAEA over the freeze of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, as agreed upon in the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994, and that the DPRK had indicated its willingness to consider the designation of additional inspectors and to facilitate the granting of visas for inspectors.

1993. On February 9, 1993, the IAEA Director General (DG) requested the DPRK to provide access, under Article 73b of the safeguards agreement (provision on special inspections), to additional information and locations in the DPRK, in order to clarify inconsistencies between Agency verification results and DPRK-declared data and materials. After the DPRK refused to give the requested access, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution on February 25, calling upon the government of the DPRK to urgently extend full cooperation to the IAEA to enable the Agency fully to discharge its responsibilities under the Safeguards Agreement. Confronted with the continued refusal to give access to additional information and locations, on April 1, 1993, the Board of Governors decided to report the DPRK's non-compliance to the UNSC and to inform all members of the Agency.

On June 11, 1993, the Board welcomed the fact that Agency inspectors had carried out surveillance and maintenance activities in the DPRK in May, but expressed regrets that its earlier resolutions had not been fully implemented. The Board requested the Director General to intensify his efforts and continue consultations with the DPRK.

Safeguards in Iraq: The IAEA is in charge of applying safeguards in Iraq under a comprehensive safeguards agreement signed in 1973 as required by the NPT. In 1991, after the Gulf War, the IAEA was tasked with carrying out inspections in Iraq pursuant to the UNSC Resolution 678. Its mandate included uncovering and dismantling Iraq's clandestine nuclear program and developing and implementing an Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) Plan. Between 1991 and 1996 the IAEA Action Team in cooperation with UNSCOM conducted 29 numbered on-site inspections related to implementation of Resolution 678. Since 1994, it has also conducted more than 1500 OMV inspections. As of August 2001, the Action Team has 16 staff members from 10 different nationalities.

2001. In January 2001 the Agency inspection team carried out a physical inventory verification of the declared nuclear material remaining in Iraq under IAEA seal. As in the case of a previous inspection, its objectives were limited to verifying the presence of nuclear material in question and could not serve as substitute for the activities under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

2000. In January 2000, pursuant to a comprehensive safeguards agreement the Agency was able to inspect the presence of the nuclear material subject to safeguards, which is still in Iraq. This inspection had a limited objective of a physical inventory verification of nuclear material remaining at the Tuwaitha site and was in no way a substitute for the required activities under the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Agency could therefore not provide any assurance that Iraq was in compliance with its obligations under those resolutions. In May 2000, the Agency completed the destruction of a filament winding machine and its spare parts that had been intended by Iraq for use in its clandestine uranium enrichment program. In his Statement to the 2000 NPT Review Conference in New York on April 24, 2000, the Director-General of the IAEA, Mohamed El Baradei, noted that with regard to Iraq, the Agency has not been in a position since December 1998 to implement its mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 687 and related resolutions.

1999. Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), which established UNMOVIC as UNSCOM's successor, reaffirmed the provisions of the relevant resolutions with regard to the role of the IAEA in addressing compliance by Iraq with resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, and requested the Director General of the IAEA to maintain this role with the assistance and cooperation of UNMOVIC. The Security Council also requested the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to establish a unit, which would be responsible for the export/import mechanism established to ensure that Iraq did not reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction programmes.

1998. The IAEA reported in October 1998 that no indication of prohibited equipment, material or activities had been detected in its most recent inspections in Iraq. Earlier, in August of that year, Iraq suspended cooperation with both UNSCOM and the IAEA, but in November the IAEA resumed its activities in Iraq until just before the U.S.-UK military action in mid-December, 1998. On 16 December 1998, the Agency withdrew its personnel out of concern for their safety and security. Since December 1998, the Action Team has focused on preparations to resume inspections, including creating a detailed plan for resumption of activities, revising the list of items to be reported to the IAEA in the context of OMV plan and export-import mechanism, conducting additional analysis of available information, etc.

1996. At its March 1996 session, the Board received a report on Agency implementation of nuclear verification activities in Iraq. The work was related to the assessment and follow-up of documentation supplied to the Agency by a high-ranking Iraqi official who had departed Iraq. Concurrently, work continued with monitoring and verification activities. On March 27, 1996, UN Security Council Resolution 1051 was adopted to bring into force a mechanism for monitoring sales and supplies to Iraq of certain items or technologies that could be used for the production or acquisition of banned biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. The mechanism was operated by a joint unit of UNSCOM and IAEA. Under the resolution, the joint unit received transmissions from States on intended sales or supplies to Iraq, on any information States may have at their disposal on attempts to circumvent the mechanism or supply Iraq with prohibited items. Under the resolution, Iraq needed to notify the joint unit of imports beginning 60 days from the adoption of the resolution. The monitoring mechanism was not intended to be a regime for international licensing, but rather a mechanism for timely provision of information by States that located companies that were contemplating sales or supplies to Iraq. Within 45 days of the resolution's adoption, UNSCOM and IAEA were required to provide all States with information necessary to make preparatory arrangements for implementing the mechanism's provisions.

Safeguards Agreements: 2000. As of 31 December 2000, safeguards agreements with 140 States (and with Taiwan, China) were in force and 54 non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had yet to conclude or bring these agreements into force. The Additional Protocol agreements were approved with 57 states, but only 18 states had it thus far in force. In 2000, the Agency carried out safeguards inspections in 70 states with significant nuclear activities. Some inspections took place in the five nuclear-weapon states.

As of 31 December 2000, there were 902 facilities and other locations under the IAEA safeguards. The Agency had performed a total of 2467 inspections at 584 facilities.

1999. At the end of 1999, 224 safeguards agreements were in force in 140 states (and in Taiwan). These included 128 NPT-related safeguards agreements. However, 54 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT had not yet concluded a safeguards agreement with the Agency pursuant to the treaty. During the year, the Agency applied safeguards in 70 States (and in Taiwan, China), and undertook inspections in the P-5 States.

Strengthening Safeguards: In 2000, the IAEA continued to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of its safeguards system. It enhanced computerized Protocol Data Information System that processes and utilizes information submitted by states, and installed and rendered operational 18 surveillance systems in seven member states. The Agency's high priority remained development of integrated safeguards. To this end, it prepared guidelines for implementing integrated safeguards in a state, and prepared integrated safeguards approaches for three generic facility types: light water reactors without MOX fuel, research reactors, and spent fuel storage facilities. The first state-level integrated safeguards approach for a member state with an additional protocol in force was prepared for Australia for provisional implementation in 2001.

Convention on Nuclear Safety: The Convention was adopted on June 17, 1994; was opened for signature on September 20, 1994; and entered into force on October 24, 1996. The Convention was written during a series of expert level meetings from 1992-1994 and was the result of considerable work by Governments, national nuclear safety authorities and the IAEA's Secretariat. The objective of the Convention is to legally commit participating States operating land based nuclear power plants to maintain a high level of safety by setting international benchmarks to which States subscribe.

The Convention is not designed to ensure fulfillment of obligations by Parties through control and sanction but is an incentive instrument, which bases adherence on Parties' common interest to achieve higher levels of safety, which will be developed and promoted through regular meetings of the Parties. The Convention obliges Parties to submit reports on the implementation of their obligations for "peer review" at meetings to be held at the IAEA. This mechanism is the main innovative and dynamic element of the Convention.

The Parties' obligations cover, for example, design, construction, operation, the availability of adequate financial and human resources, the assessment and verification of safety, quality assurance and emergency preparedness of their nuclear installations. These obligations are primarily based on the principles contained in the IAEA Safety Fundamentals document "The Safety of Nuclear Installations".

As of 15 July 2000, 53 States were Parties to the Convention and 65 were Signatories. An Organizational Meeting was held from 29-30 September 1998, and the first Review Meeting was held at IAEA headquarters from 12-23 April 1999 in accordance with Article 20 of the Convention. The meeting was chaired by Mr. Lars Högberg, Director General of the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI).

Joint Convention on the Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management: The Joint Convention was adopted on 5 September 1997 at a Diplomatic Conference convened by the IAEA at its headquarters from 1 to 5 September 1997. It was opened for signature at the IAEA General Conference on 29 September 1997 and will enter into force on 18 June 2001. The Joint Convention is the first international instrument that deals with the safety of management and storage of radioactive waste and spent fuel in countries with and without nuclear programs. It also considerably elaborates on and expands the existing IAEA nuclear safety regime and promotes international standards in the area.

The Convention covers the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management from civilian applications. It also applies to management of the military- or defense-originated spent fuel and radioactive waste if and when such materials are transferred permanently to and managed within exclusively civilian programs, or unless declared as such materials for the purposes of the Convention.

As of 1 March 2001, 25 states were parties to the Joint Convention and 42 were signatories.

Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) - An ad hoc committee established by the Board of Governors in 1980, to seek agreement between supplier and recipient states on a regime that would assure the latter more dependable supplies, under adequate international nonproliferation safeguards. The CAS Bureau periodically holds informal consultations and has recommended the Secretariat's preparation of papers on the global supply and demand situation, the latest of such papers was prepared for the Board of Governors' consideration in September 1994.

Secretariat

Headed by the Director General, who is the chief administrative officer of the Agency. The Director General is responsible for the appointment, organization, and functioning of the Agency's staff.

Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Co-operation - assesses and recommends policies, strategies and measures to enhance the scientific, technological and socio-economic benefits to IAEA Member States, especially developing countries, through the transit of nuclear and associated technology. The group was formed in 1995.

Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) - advises the Director General on matters related to the improvement of safeguards procedures. The Director General annually submits Safeguards Implementation Reports (SIRs) to the Board of Governors. SIRs usually contain a statement saying that no event was detected which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of nuclear material placed under Agency safeguards for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon, or for any other military purpose, or for the manufacture of any other nuclear explosive device, or for purposes unknown.

Department of Safeguards - The Secretariat's Department of Safeguards carries out practical safeguarding activities. It has a staff of approximately 200 inspectors and a support staff of 300.

In his Statement to the 2000 NPT Review Conference in New York on April 24, 2000, the Director-General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, noted that regarding the conclusion of safeguards agreements, a further 28 Treaty Parties had brought comprehensive safeguards agreements into force since the beginning of 1995, raising the overall total to 128. Unfortunately, however, a large number of States Parties continued to be in non-compliance with this Treaty obligation. The Agency was making every effort to encourage the remaining 54 Parties to conclude the required agreements.

The International Advisory Committee was established by the IAEA Director General in order to implement an (approx.) 18-month radiological study of the Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls in French Polynesia. The IAEA managed and coordinated the project. The study, which covers and evaluates the current and long-term radiological situation at the atolls, was requested by the French authorities and was funded through a voluntary contribution from France. The Committee was chaired by Dr. Gail de Planque and held its first meeting at the IAEA from April 13-14, 1996 to discuss action plans. A reconnaissance mission of the atolls was completed in March 1996 by a four-member IAEA team. Other members of the committee included experts from various member states Parties and ex officio experts selected from intergovernmental bodies. An International Conference on the Radiological Situation at the Atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa was convened by the IAEA from 30 June to 3 July 1998 to examine the results of the investigation. The study concluded that there will be no radiation health effects attributable to the residual radioactive materials at the two atolls, that no remedial action at the atolls is needed on radiological protection grounds, and no further environmental monitoring at the atolls is needed for purposes of radiological protection. The IAEA General Conference agreed in September 1998 that these results should in no way justify the development of nuclear weapons.

In 1997, the Third Inter-agency Meeting on the Illicit Cross-border Movement of Nuclear Materials and Other Radioactive Sources was convened in Vienna with the aim of establishing a co-ordination mechanism for the participating organizations. A number of training courses were conducted on physical protection, illicit trafficking and the detection and response to illicit trafficking at borders. The IAEA maintains an Illicit Trafficking Database containing reports of incidents. By the end of 1998, 60 States were participating in this database, which contains confirmed reports of 217 incidents since 1993, covering both radioactive sources and nuclear materials. Reports on trafficking and periodic summaries of incidents continue to be shared by the participating countries.

IAEA financial resources come from the regular budget and voluntary contributions. The preliminary regular budget estimates for 1998 amount to $230,060,000, of which $224,568,000 are in respect of Agency programs. The 42nd General Conference appropriated $224,247,000 for its regular budget for 1999 (GC(42)/RES/6). The budget for 2000 is $226,327,000 (GC(43)/RES/5.)

Director General - Mohamed El Baradei (Egypt) since 1 December 1997. Tel: (43-1) 2600-21111.

Deputy Directors General:

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