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Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

 
 

Excerpted from the Inventory of International Organizations and Regimes, 2002 Edition published by the CNS International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project. A complete PDF copy of the 2002 edition of the Inventory is available on the NTI website.

Established: April 1987.
Membership: 33 states.

Formal discussions on controlling missile proliferation began in 1983 among France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They were later joined by Canada and Japan, and in 1985, an interim agreement to control the proliferation of nuclear capable ballistic missiles, including dual-use missile items, was reached. A nuclear capable missile was defined as one capable of delivering at least 500 kg to a range of 300 km or more. The G-7 states formally announced the MTCR on April 16, 1987.

Since then, membership has expanded to the present 33 states, the additional members being: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. Some other states, including China, Israel, Romania and Slovakia, have pledged to abide by the MTCR Guidelines.

The MTCR is an informal non-treaty association of governments sharing common interests in the nonproliferation of missiles, unmanned air vehicles, and related technologies. The regime consists of the Guidelines and an Equipment and Technology Annex.

Regime goal: to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons), by controlling the transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons.

Regime Guidelines: national control laws and procedures; two-category common control list; information-sharing on any denied cases to ensure no commercial advantage; no impediment to national space programs; presumption of denial of any transfers in terms of nuclear weapons delivery systems development; and no retransfers without authorization.

Equipment and Technology Annex: Category I items of the Equipment and Technology Annex include complete rocket and unmanned-air-vehicle delivery systems and subsystems. The transfer of Category I items is subject to a strong presumption of denial. The transfer of production technology for Category I items is prohibited. Category II items include propulsion and propellant components, launch and ground support equipment, as well as materials. The transfer of Category II items is less restricted, but still requires end-use certification or verification where appropriate.

Plenary: The 16th Plenary is scheduled to be held in Ottawa on September 24-28, 2001.

The 15th Plenary took place in Finland on October 10-13, 2000. The Partners confirmed that WMD and their means of delivery posed the major security threat to global and regional stability and further deliberated on the responses to challenges posed by indigenous missile programs and missile exports. They agreed that the MTCR must continue to adapt itself to developments in technology and renewed their commitment to firmly implement their export controls and strengthen them if necessary. MTCR members expressed willingness to promote dialogue with non-Parties, and to consult with them on the variety of aspects related to missile nonproliferation in order to encourage them to observe the MTCR guidelines. The issues of principles, commitments, confidence-building measures and a "code of conduct" against missile proliferation were also discussed during the 2000 Plenary.

The 14th Plenary was held in Noordwijk, the Netherlands from October 1-15, 1999. MTCR members agreed on the need for continued vigilance in light of developments in South and North East Asia and in the Middle East, with particularly concern for the number of indigenous programs with increasingly longer-range delivery systems. Members renewed their commitment to combating missile proliferation and to the strict implementation of their export controls. Confidence and security building measures as well as increased outreach activities with non-members were discussed.

The 13th Plenary took place from October 5-9, 1998 in Budapest. Three new members, the Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine, were in attendance. MTCR partners agreed to make the regime more transparent. To that end, they supported the idea of establishing dialogues with non-Partner governments. Partners repeated their invitation to China to join, and issued a statement in which they expressed concern over the missile-related activities of North Korea. They also agreed to organize a seminar for border guards and customs experts in 1999.

The 12th Plenary was held in Tokyo from November 4-6, 1997. Members expressed their concern over missile developments in the Middle East and Asia, and stressed continuing restraint and vigilance in bilateral contacts with non-MTCR members. Members did agree, however, to encourage non-members to abide by MTCR guidelines, in addition to reaffirming the usefulness of dialogues with transshipment centers.

During the 11th Plenary Meeting, held in Edinburgh in October 1996, the partners supported U.S. initiatives to follow up on the success of the June/July 1996 meetings. The partners agreed to "be proactive in encouraging" key non-MTCR transshippers to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex, and to give them "practical assistance" to implement transshipment controls on missile technology. The member states agreed on steps that could be taken to improve the regime's effectiveness in restricting missile proliferation in South Asia and the Persian Gulf. In addition, the partners agreed to increase the transparency of the regime's objectives and activities, and to pursue dialogues with non-MTCR countries to encourage their voluntary adherence to the regime's guidelines.

In July 1996, the U.S. hosted an MTCR Seminar on Transshipment Issues in Washington, DC. The seminar was attended by foreign policy makers and specialists from 12 MTCR member states and seven non-MTCR countries. During the seminar, a "productive exchange of ideas on how to impede proliferators' misuse of transshipment" took place. The participants identified a number of issues for potential future deliberation, which the U.S. addressed subsequently during the MTCR's 1996 Plenary Meeting in Edinburgh, UK, on October 7-11, 1996.

In June 1996, the MTCR member states held the regime's Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting on Regional Missile Proliferation Issues. Participants discussed actions that could be taken both collectively and individually to address specific concerns raised by missile proliferation in regions of tension.

The MTCR held its 10th plenary session in Bonn, Germany, on October 10-12, 1995. The meeting was attended by 27 member states, including Russia and South Africa for the first time. The partners agreed to expand the regime's membership to include Brazil, and amended the Equipment and Technology Annex to reflect technical developments. The members also considered the impact of missile proliferation on regional security and reaffirmed their commitment to preventing the proliferation of delivery systems capable of carrying WMD through export controls. The members expressed a willingness to cooperate in space activities for peaceful purposes. The meeting was chaired by Adolf von Wagner, Deputy Director General of the German Foreign Office.

On October 4, 1994, the U.S. and China issued a joint statement on "missile proliferation". The U.S. agreed to lift sanctions imposed on China (in August 1993) for missile exports to Pakistan. Once sanctions were lifted, China agreed not to export missiles "featuring the primary parameters of the MTCR". This Chinese commitment, according to the statement, goes beyond the MTCR's "strong presumption of denial" language. China also agreed to the U.S. formulation on "inherent capability", that is, any missile capable of generating "sufficient energy to deliver a 500 kg payload at least 300 km, regardless of its demonstrated or advertised combination of range and payload".

At the plenary held in Stockholm in October 1994, partners pledged to intensify their contacts and cooperation with non-partners in order to foster understanding of the purposes and goals of the MTCR. They reacted favorably to Russia's application for full membership.

The plenary held in Interlaken, Switzerland, in November-December 1993, was devoted to planning the future of the regime. It was agreed to redouble efforts to persuade potential exporters outside the regime to abide by MTCR guidelines. The third update to the Annex was agreed upon there and it became effective in July 1994.

At the plenary held in Canberra in March 1993, it was agreed that MTCR Guidelines for missile-related transfers remain an essential mechanism for the prevention of the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

In July 1993, members implemented two new annex items: item 19 (complete rocket systems not covered in item 1, capable of a range greater or equal to 300 km), and item 20 (complete subsystems usable in item 19, but not in item 1, and production facilities and equipment for individual rocket stages and solid/liquid propellant rocket engines).

This was the second update of the annex. The annex was first amended in November 1991, with the addition of items 17 (materials, devices, and specially-designed software for reduced observables) and 18 (devices to protect rocket systems against nuclear effects), new definitions, and supplementary terminology.

In January 1993, MTCR coverage was expanded to include missiles intended to deliver biological and chemical weapons, as well as nuclear weapons.

France is the permanent administrative point-of-contact for MTCR affairs.
Address:
c/o Daniel Parfait,
Direction des Affaires Politiques,
Sous-Direction des Questions Atomiques et Spatiales,
37 Quai d'Orsay, 75007 Paris, FRANCE.
FAX: 33 1 4753 5410.

 



This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2004 by MIIS.

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