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Excerpted from the Inventory of International Organizations
and Regimes 2001 published by the CNS International Organizations and Nonproliferation
Project. A complete PDF copy of the 2000 edition of the Inventory is available in the Publications section of the NTI website.
First met in November 1975 in London. Popularly referred to as the "London
Club" ("Club de Londres").
Membership: 39 supplier states - Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic
of Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States
of America. Permanent Observer: European Commission.
Membership criteria: Factors taken into account for membership
include the following:
- the ability to supply items (including items in transit) covered by the annexes to Parts 1 and 2 of the NSG guidelines;
- adherence to the Guidelines and action in accordance with them;
- enforcement of a legally based domestic export control system which gives effect to the commitment to act in accordance with the Guidelines;
- adherence to one or more of the NPT, the Treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Tlatelolco, Bangkok or an equivalent international nuclear nonproliferation agreement, full compliance with the obligations of such agreement(s); and
- support of international efforts towards nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery vehicles.
The NSG is a group of nuclear supplier countries which seeks to contribute
to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two
sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports. The members
pursue the aims of the NSG through adherence to the NSG Guidelines which are
adopted by consensus, and through an exchange of information, notably on
developments of nuclear proliferation concern. The first set of NSG Guidelines
governs the export of items that are especially designed or prepared for nuclear
use. These include: (i) nuclear material; (ii) nuclear reactors and equipment
therefore; (iii) non-nuclear material for reactors; (iv) plant and equipment for
the reprocessing, enrichment and conversion of nuclear material and for fuel
fabrication and heavy water production; and (v) technology associated with each
of the above items. The second set of NSG Guidelines governs the export of
nuclear related dual-use items and technologies, that is, items that can make a
major contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive
activity, but which have non-nuclear uses as well, for example in
industry.
The NSG Guidelines are consistent with, and complement, the various
international, legally binding instruments in the field of nuclear
nonproliferation. These include the NPT, and the Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific
Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok).
The NSG Guidelines aim to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes
does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, which would not hinder international trade and cooperation in
the nuclear field. The NSG Guidelines facilitate the development of trade in
this area by providing the means whereby obligations to facilitate peaceful
nuclear cooperation can be implemented in a manner consistent with international
nuclear nonproliferation norms. The NSG urges all States to adhere to the
Guidelines.
The commitment of NSG members to rigorous conditions of supply, in the
context of the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes, makes the NSG one of the elements of the international
nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Regime goal: to ensure that nuclear exports are made only under
appropriate safeguards, physical protection, and nonproliferation conditions,
and other appropriate restraint. The NSG also seeks to restrict the export of
sensitive items that can contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The NSG, taking into account the work already done by the Zangger Committee,
agreed on a set of guidelines incorporating a trigger list. These were published
in 1978 as IAEA Document INFCIRC/254 (subsequently amended), to apply to nuclear
transfers for peaceful purposes to help ensure that such transfers would not
be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities.
There is a requirement for formal government assurances from recipients to this
effect. The Guidelines also adopted a requirement for physical protection measures,
agreement to exercise particular caution in the transfer of sensitive facilities,
technology and weapons materials, and strengthened re-transfer provisions. In
doing so, the Guidelines recognized the fact that there is a class of technologies
and materials, which are particularly sensitive because they can lead directly
to the creation of weapons usable
material. The implementation of effective physical protection measures is also
critical. This can help prevent the theft and illicit transfer of nuclear material.
At the 1990 NPT Review Conference, a number of recommendations were made by
the committee reviewing the implementation of Article III, which had a
significant impact on the NSG's activities in the 1990s. These included
the following: that NPT parties consider further improvements in measures to
prevent the diversion of nuclear technology for nuclear weapons; that states
engage in consultations to ensure appropriate coordination of their controls on
the exports of items, such as tritium, not identified in Article III.2 but
still relevant to nuclear weapons proliferation and therefore to the NPT as a
whole; that nuclear supplier states require, as a necessary condition for the
transfer of relevant nuclear supplies to non-nuclear weapon states, the
acceptance of IAEA Safeguards on all their current and future nuclear activities
(i.e. fullscope safeguards, or comprehensive safeguards).
Shortly thereafter, it became apparent that export control provisions then
in force had not prevented Iraq, a party to the NPT, from pursuing a clandestine
nuclear weapons program, which later prompted UN Security Council action. A
large part of Iraq's effort had been the acquisition of dual-use items not
covered by the Guidelines and then building its own trigger list items. This
gave major impetus to the NSG's development of its dual-use guidelines. In
doing so, the NSG demonstrated its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation by
ensuring that items like those used by Iraq would from now on be controlled to
ensure their non-explosive use. These items would, however, continue to be
available for peaceful nuclear activities subject to IAEA safeguards, as well as
for other industrial activities where they would not contribute to nuclear
proliferation.
Following these developments the NSG decided in 1992: to establish
guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material and
technology (items which have both nuclear and non-nuclear applications), which
could make a significant contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or
nuclear explosive activity. These dual-use guidelines were published as part 2
of INFCIRC/254; to establish a framework for consultation on the dual-use
guidelines, for the exchange of information on their implementation and on
procurement activities of potential proliferation concern; to establish
procedures for exchanging notifications which have been issued as a result of
national decisions not to authorize transfers of dual-use equipment or
technology, and to ensure that members do not approve transfers of such items
without first consulting with the state that issued the notification; to make a
fullscope safeguards agreement with the IAEA a condition for the future supply
of trigger list items to any non-nuclear weapons state. This decision ensured
that only NPT parties and other states with fullscope safeguards agreements
could benefit from nuclear transfers.
The endorsement at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) of
the fullscope safeguards policy already adopted by the NSG in 1992 clearly
reflects the conviction of the international community that this nuclear supply
policy is a vital element to promote shared nuclear nonproliferation commitments
and obligations. Specifically, Paragraph 12 of the Decision on
"Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and
Disarmament" at the 1995 NPTREC states that fullscope safeguards and
international legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices should be a condition for granting licenses for
trigger list items under new supply arrangements with non nuclear-weapon
states.
The 2000 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed Paragraph 12 of the Decision
on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and
Disarmament" and recognized the value of export restrictions to prevent
the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Regime procedures: NSG requires IAEA safeguards as a condition
of supply, with full-scope safeguards as the norm; national control laws and
procedures; physical protection against theft for sensitive parts of the nuclear
fuel cycle; restraint of enrichment and reprocessing plant assistance to countries
of proliferation concern; common control list; export restraint to regions of
conflict and instability; and information-sharing among members.
The Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers, initially agreed upon by supplier
states in 1977 and transmitted to the IAEA Director General in January 1978,
envisage additional export control restraints beyond those provided for in the
NPT: use of exports should not result in any nuclear explosive device; restraint
in the transfer of facilities and technologies used for reprocessing, uranium
enrichment, and heavy water production; physical protection of nuclear materials
and facilities; control of re-transfer of transferred items; and acceptance of
the Zangger Committee Trigger List.
At its 1992 Warsaw meeting, the NSG agreed on the Guidelines for Transfers
of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology and the
List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment and Materials and Related Technology,
which includes 67 categories of dual-use items.
The 1992 Warsaw NSG meeting also adopted the Statement on Full-Scope
Safeguards, requiring the application of IAEA safeguards on all source and
special fissionable materials in recipient states' current and future
nuclear activities.
The 1993 Lucerne NSG meeting endorsed an amendment to the NSG Guidelines
that requires IAEA safeguards on all current and future nuclear activities as a
condition for any significant new supply commitments to NNWS. Transfers to NNWS
without a full-scope safeguards agreement shall be authorized only in
exceptional cases when they are deemed essential for the safe operation of
existing facilities, and only if safeguards are applied to those facilities.
This policy does not apply to agreements or contracts drawn up on or prior to
April 3, 1992. The updated NSG Guidelines were published as IAEA document
INFCIRC/254/Rev 1, Parts 1 and 2
(http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/infcircs/inf254.html) . The Group called
on nuclear supplier countries, which have not yet adopted the full-scope
safeguards policy to do so as soon as possible, and said it would try to ensure
that indirect supply through third countries does not undermine this
policy.
The meeting adopted a procedural arrangement, which established the
procedure for joining the regime. The procedure calls for the NSG members to
reach a consensus about the invitation of a new state and requires the new state
to accept the NSG Guidelines in their entirety (i.e., both Parts 1 and 2 of
INFCIRC/254/Rev 1).
Countries adhering only to Part 1 may be granted the right to attend the
meetings, although they may not participate fully before their adherence to Part
2. The invitation of observers, whether they are countries or international
organizations, requires the members' consensus.
On the basis of recommendations by the Working group on conditions of
supply, the NSG reviewed the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers
(INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Mod. 1, Part 1) and adopted several changes in order to
respond to new concerns in the field of nuclear proliferation. The Group agreed
to strengthen the retransfer provisions of the Guidelines and to incorporate a
new provision underlining the importance of members' satisfying themselves
that their transfers would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
The Technical Working Group was mandated to continue reviewing the
nuclear-related items included in the Annex to Part 1 of the Guidelines. A new
Technical Working Group was created to review the Annex to Part 2 of the
Guidelines.
The Group decided to restructure its arrangements for exchanging
information on proliferation threats with the objective of further enhancing the
members' ability to respond to these threats. The Group affirmed the
principle of transparency and agreed that members should continue their efforts
to brief nonmembers on the aims and activities of the Group.
Plenary: The 2000 Plenary was held in June in Paris. The
members endorsed the provisions of the IAEA's 1997 model Additional
Protocol for more intrusive safeguards, as it would "strengthen the
nuclear safeguards regime and facilitate the exchange of nuclear and
nuclear-related material in peaceful nuclear cooperation." Belarus, Cyprus
and Turkey were admitted as members at the 2000 meeting, and Slovenia attended
as an observer. In an effort to open up the Group to new members, continued
contacts with non-member states were mandated, particularly with Slovenia and
Kazakhstan. The NSG also decided to establish a web site to ensure better public
information and transparency. A proposal for reorganizing NSG activities will be
presented at the next plenary in Aspen (Colo.) in May 2001.
In October 2000, at the meeting held in Vienna, Slovenia was admitted as a
new member and subscribing government thus expanding NSG membership to 39.
Nuclear suppliers made substantial progress towards reaching agreement on
eliminating the current separate dual-use regime. The U.S. delivered a report on
India's nuclear program and voiced concerns about nuclear cooperation between
Russia and India. This issue was fully discussed in a special intersessional
plenary meeting held in early November 2000 in Vienna.
The 1999 Plenary Meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was held in
Florence, Italy, on 5-6 May. The NSG agreed to improve electronic information
sharing among its members and to address issues of intangible technology
transfer. Two working groups were established, one to clarify the appropriate
control of components and the other to study ways to improve the effectiveness
of the Dual-Use Regime. The Chair was mandated to contact Turkey, Belarus,
Cyprus, Kazakhstan and Slovenia with a view to taking inter-sessional decisions
on their membership.
The 1998 NSG Plenary was held in Edinburgh on 1-2 April. Latvia was
admitted to the Group. NSG members again agreed to continue its efforts to
promote greater transparency and openness in the activities of the NSG to
non-members. The Group decided to follow the success of the 1997 International
Seminar on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Non-Proliferation with an
additional seminar in New York in the spring of 1999 before the NPT Preparatory
Committee.
The 1997 NSG Plenary was held in Ottawa on May 8-9. At the meeting the
Group reiterated its commitment to greater transparency and openness in its
activities and agreed to host an International Seminar on the Role of Export
Controls in Nuclear Nonproliferation to be held on October 6-7, 1997 in Vienna.
Additional measures to facilitate the sharing of information among Member States
were adopted. Matters relating to membership issues and expressions of interest
by some non-member states in joining the NSG were discussed.
The 1996 Buenos Aires NSG Plenary noted the positive developments that had
taken place: the decision on the indefinite extension of the NPT and on
strengthening the review process for the Treaty; the signature by France, the
UK, and the U.S. to the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga; and also the
signature of the Pelindaba Treaty, which make a significant contribution to
international peace and security, together with the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
Responding to Decision 2 "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", adopted at the NPT Review and
Extension Conference (NPTREC) on May 11, 1995, the NSG agreed to promote
openness and transparency through further dialogue and cooperation with
non-member countries by establishing a working group to advance this objective.
The NSG welcomed the endorsement by the NPTREC of the requirement for IAEA
full-scope safeguards as a precondition for new supply arrangements.
The plenary held in Helsinki from April 5-7, 1995, reviewed the Guidelines
for Nuclear Transfers on the basis of recommendations by its working groups.
It also considered options to update its Guidelines and Annexes. The NSG decided
to continue its efforts to ensure that exports of nuclear or nuclear-related
dual-use items for peaceful purposes were not diverted to nuclear explosive
or unsafeguarded nuclear activities. The NSG affirmed the principle of openness
and agreed that members should continue to brief other countries on the aims
and activities of the NSG in order to increase transparency and to enlarge membership.
The NSG, the Zangger Committee, and the NPT: The Zangger
Committee's provisions are closely tied to Article III.2 of the NPT.
In contrast to the Zangger Committee, NSG members are not required to be parties
to the NPT, but they all must adhere to instruments which contain equally
binding commitments. The NSG guidelines are designed to strengthen
implementation of the strong nonproliferation undertakings contained in those
legal instruments.
The NSG and the Zangger Committee differ in the scope of their trigger
lists of especially designed or prepared items (EDP) and in the export
conditions for items on those lists. Concerning the scope of those lists, the
Zangger list is restricted to items falling under Article III.2 of the NPT.
On export conditions for the items on the "Trigger Lists", the NSG
has a formal fullscope safeguards requirement as a condition of supply. However,
all members of the NSG and of the Zangger Committee apply fullscope safeguards
as a condition of supply for trigger list items to NNWS.
The NSG arrangement covering exports of dual-use items is a major
difference between the NSG and the Zangger Committee. As dual-use items cannot
be defined as EDP equipment, they fall outside the Zangger Committee's
mandate. As noted above, the control of Dual-Use items has been recognized as
making an important contribution to nuclear nonproliferation.
The NSG guidelines apply to transfers to all NNWS. The Zangger Committee
memoranda only apply to transfers to NNWS not party to the NPT, as compliance
with NPT obligations fulfills the criteria of the Zangger Committee
understandings. In 1994 the NSG also strengthened its retransfer provisions to
require government-to-government assurances to support the stipulation that a
supplier's consent be obtained for the re-transfer of trigger list items
from any state which does not require fullscope safeguards as a condition of
supply. At the same time, the NSG also adopted the so-called nonproliferation
principle whereby a supplier, notwithstanding other provisions in the
Guidelines, should authorize a transfer only when satisfied that the transfer
would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The
nonproliferation principle seeks to cover the rare, but important cases where
adherence to the NPT or to a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty may not by itself
be a guarantee that a state will consistently share the objectives of the Treaty
or that it will remain in compliance with its Treaty obligations.
Despite these differences between the two regimes it is important to keep
in mind that they serve the same objective and are equally valid instruments of
nuclear nonproliferation efforts. There is close cooperation between the NSG and
the Zangger Committee on the review and amendment of the trigger
lists.
NSG Point of Contact:
Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna,
Andromeda Tower, 23rd Floor,
Donau-City Strasse 6, A-1220 Vienna, Austria.
Tel: 43-1-260-6342.
FAX: 43-1-263-6749.
Telex: 111542.
Current Chairman of the NSG - Ambassador Enrique de la Torre, Director
of International Security, Nuclear and Space Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Reconquista 1088, piso 11, (1003) Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Tel: (54-1) 311-5708.
FAX: (54-1) 311-5708.
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