Global Security Newswire

A senior U.S. Army officer yesterday said that security measures put in place since the 2001 anthrax mailings would make it difficult for someone to conduct a similar campaign today, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Oct. 27).

"I can't say for certain it could not happen today. ... But it would be much more difficult," said Maj. Gen. Robert Lennox, Army assistant deputy chief of staff.

Lennox noted that military services have approved increased camera surveillance and adopted new security measures for 12 laboratories used for research of anthrax and other lethal agents. The military deemed some proposed rules unfeasible, however, including limits on working hours at secure sites and restrictions requiring scientists to work in pairs when handling dangerous disease materials.

As the Navy and Air Force prepare to lift their suspension on transfers of potential biological-weapon ingredients, the military has instituted a rule requiring such shipments to be accompanied by two-person escorts and satellite surveillance (see GSN, Aug. 22).

While the military has expanded background checks of candidates for sensitive biological defense positions, the largest challenge remains in rooting out personnel who might take part in an attack, Lennox said. Investigators looking into the 2001 anthrax mailings overlooked Army microbiologist Bruce Ivins for years before identifying him as the perpetrator of the attacks that killed five people.

However, such extensive security measures could ultimately cause the United States to lag in biological defense studies, warned David Franz, a former head of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Md.

Franz said biological defense researchers must do more to display the advances they help produce. "I see more good coming from the life science enterprise than harm," he said. (Lolita Baldor, Associated Press/Google News, Dec. 18).