Global Security Newswire

The U.S. Government Accountability Office has found that the Homeland Security Department exaggerated the ability of a new generation of radiation sensors to detect materials that could be used in a radiological or nuclear weapon, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Oct. 7).

The yet-unpublished congressional report states that "Phase 3" tests of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal monitors were too limited in scope to support the department's assertion that the machines can detect dangerous radiation sources significantly more effectively than sensors already deployed at U.S. entry points.

"Because the limitations of the Phase 3 test results are not appropriately stated in the Phase 3 test report, the report does not accurately depict the results from the tests and could be misleading," the report states.

Congressional investigators determined that the new machines would each cost roughly $778,000 to purchase and install. That is a significantly higher estimate than provided in 2006.

"I'm concerned that the testing for the new detectors remains flawed," said House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman John Dingell (D-Mich.). "Until there is objective and concrete evidence that the new machines have clear benefits over the existing detectors, I cannot support additional procurements."

However, Homeland Security's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office dismissed the GAO findings as "misleading and not substantiated." In a written response to the report, the office accused congressional auditors of failing "to acknowledge the depth and breadth" of the detector tests.

The department said in a statement that the office "is currently undertaking a comprehensive test and evaluation program on ASP systems and will use previous test data as well. The department has been following a prudent path leading to certification of ASP systems."

Previous GAO reports raising concerns about the detectors led lawmakers to demand that Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff certify the effectiveness of the machines prior to their installation. Chertoff ordered the DNDO tests partly to support his certification (Robert O'Harrow, Washington Post, Oct. 30).

Former U.S. nuclear negotiator Robert Gallucci last week described use of radiation-detection systems at U.S. entry points as a last-resort measure, the American Association for the Advancement of Science reported (see related GSN story, today).

"I think it is great to have port monitors," he said, but said the machines were "largely a CYA exercise." If detectors identified a weapon being smuggled into the country, "you're already in a bad place," he said during an Oct. 20 discussion on nuclear security (American Association for the Advancement of Science release, Oct. 29).