Global Security Newswire

U.S. and U.N. experts inspecting Libyan WMD sites have learned that Tripoli had a mixed record of success in its efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction — achieving some progress while also being hampered by a lack of materials and expertise, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, March 1).

Libya was able to achieve some success in its WMD efforts, mainly with help from other countries such as Pakistan, according to U.S. and U.N weapons experts. For example, Libya was working through the international nuclear black market to obtain a large uranium enrichment plant that would have been capable of producing enough material to build several nuclear weapons per year, the Post reported.

On the other hand, Libya’s WMD programs were hindered by international sanctions that blocked access to supplies and expertise, according to U.S. officials, diplomats and independent experts. While Libya had developed chemical weapons, it lacked the long-range ballistic missiles and other delivery systems needed to deliver chemical warheads to other countries, according to U.S. officials. They also said Libyan scientists have complained about difficulties in effectively storing chemical weapons agents.

“It was interesting to see the effects of sanctions,” a senior U.S. State Department official said. “The things they got weren’t the best, and they weren’t in a position to go to the supplier and complain,” the official added.

While U.S. officials have been reluctant to point out the shortcomings of Libya’s WMD efforts for fear of embarrassing leader Col. Muammar Qadhafi, experts said such flaws were difficult to ignore.

“The Libyans certainly accumulated a lot of bits and pieces, but that’s very different from putting it all together,” said Gary Samore, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. “I may have all the bits and pieces of a car in my garage, but that’s not the same as having a working automobile,” he said (Warrick/Slevin, Washington Post, March 2).