Global Security Newswire
Daily News on Nuclear, Biological & Chemical Weapons, Terrorism and Related Issues
North Korea Has Large CW Production Capacity, Report Says
A new report says North Korea has the ability to manufacture as much as 12,000 metric tons of chemical warfare materials, which could kill or injure large numbers of civilians if used against South Korea, Agence France-Presse reported today (see GSN, June 18).
In addition to the North's evolving nuclear abilities, the country's chemical arsenal the South's most pressing security concern, according to Korea Institute for Defense Analyses issue expert Kwon Yang-joo.
"The international community must show its strong will in seeking disarmament of North Korea's chemical weapons along with its denuclearization," Kwon wrote.
The North Korean military is thought to possess one of the world's largest chemical weapons stockpiles. The Stalinist state is believed to hold between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of toxic chemical agents including phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, mustard blister agent and sarin nerve agent. Pyongyang has refused to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention.
About 5,000 metric tons of chemical warfare material would be required to poison a 950-square-mile area, according to Kwon. If North Korea employed its full chemical arsenal, it could manufacture between 625,000 and 1.25 million chemical munitions, he stated.
The North could deliver its warfare materials using airplanes, artillery or missiles, Kwon said (Agence France-Presse/Google News, Oct. 13).
Nov. 8, 2013
This report is part of a collection examining implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires all states to implement measures aimed at preventing non-state actors from acquiring NBC weapons, related materials, and their means of delivery. It details implementation efforts in Central America, South America and the Caribbean to-date.
Oct. 31, 2013
This CNS issue brief examines the lessons learned from dismantling Libya and Iraq's chemical weapons programs and what these two cases presage for disarmament in Syria. In particular, this article explores the challenges relating to ensuring material and physical security for both inspectors and the chemical weapons stockpile itself; verifying the accuracy and completeness of disclosed inventories; and developing effective monitoring and verification regimes for the long-term. The conclusion examines recommendations stemming from this analysis.
This article provides an overview of North Korea's historical and current policies relating to nuclear, chemical, biological and missile proliferation.