Global Security Newswire
Daily News on Nuclear, Biological & Chemical Weapons, Terrorism and Related Issues
Russia, U.S. Could Work Together to Secure Syrian Chemical Arms: Biden
U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden reportedly suggested on Saturday that Russia and the United States could work together to ensure that Syria's chemical arms stocks remain protected following a potential collapse of the Assad regime, according to the Washington Post.
Biden is said to have raised the idea while meeting in Munich with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
Russia has worked to prevent strong action by the U.N. Security Council in response to the Syrian civil war that has killed more than 60,000 people.
The conflict has forced the United States and partner nations to prepare for the possible use or loss of control of the Assad government's large stockpile of nerve and blister agents and delivery systems.
The Syrian chemical arms complex is believed to be scattered around the country. Previous reports have indicated it could take as many as 75,000 troops to secure the sites.
New satellite images indicate there was no damage to a Syrian research site close to Damascus from a recent Israeli air assault, Reuters reported.
The Jan. 30 attack is believed to have targeted Syrian vehicles suspected of transporting antiaircraft weapons to the militant organization Hezbollah in neighboring Lebanon. News reports indicated that the airstrike might have produced collateral damage to a nearby facility said to be key to Syria's biological and chemical weapons activities.
May 23, 2014
The UNSCR 1540 Resource Collection examines implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires all states to implement measures aimed at preventing non-state actors from acquiring NBC weapons, related materials, and their means of delivery. It details implementation efforts in all of the regions and countries of the world to-date.
Oct. 31, 2013
This CNS issue brief examines the lessons learned from dismantling Libya and Iraq's chemical weapons programs and what these two cases presage for disarmament in Syria. In particular, this article explores the challenges relating to ensuring material and physical security for both inspectors and the chemical weapons stockpile itself; verifying the accuracy and completeness of disclosed inventories; and developing effective monitoring and verification regimes for the long-term. The conclusion examines recommendations stemming from this analysis.
This article provides an overview of Syria's historical and current policies relating to nuclear, chemical, biological and missile proliferation.