Global Security Newswire

Staged assaults of U.S. atomic energy plants by counterterrorism professionals in recent years have revealed security weaknesses that could be exploited by terrorists in an attack aimed at releasing stored radioactive material into the surrounding area, Newsweek magazine reported yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 5, 2010).

All 104 of the nation's atomic energy installations are faced every three years with mock terrorist attacks intended to help the sites assess potential security vulnerabilities.

The drills are planned with care and facility chiefs receive 60 days advance notice to ready their security personnel. The attackers follow a choreographed plan of infiltration. Even with all of this advance information, since 2005 nearly 10 percent of the fake attack teams were able to cut through plants' security efforts, according to Newsweek.

In a 2009 drill, trainers posing as extremists armed with automatic weaponry and grenade launchers were able to infiltrate an atomic energy site in the South by cutting through the barbed wire and chain-link barriers. The attackers fought with plant security personnel. Survivors from the assault force disrupted a key part of the reactor's operating machinery, which threatened in the scenario to produce a reactor core meltdown and the dispersal of radioactive material stored at the facility.

Spent atomic fuel -- comprised of plutonium, uranium and some other chemicals and formed into small pellets -- is generally stored on-site at plants within cement containers in large pools of water. The material essentially constitutes a massive radiological "dirty bomb" that could be released to the surrounding area if the water is drained away from the containers.

U.S. regulators say that these successful staged attacks valuably highlight reactor vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission says federal monitors stay at a plant until its weaknesses have been eliminated. Specifics about the defenses and weaknesses of U.S. plants are kept secret.

"We think in the end overall security is best achieved by keeping most of (our security information) protected," NRC chairman Gregory Jaczko said.

Outside analysts contend that U.S. nuclear reactor security is not as strong as NRC officials and the industry have maintained. Concerns are especially high as the country's atomic energy industry is expecting new growth.

"The industry is hiding behind the 9/11 tragedy to withhold information -- like which plants have failed tests and repairs that have been made -- that should be available," Union of Concerned Scientists researcher David Lochbaum said.

It became public in 2005 that atomic installations were not passing approximately 50 percent of mandatory security assessments. That resulted in U.S. lawmakers ordering NRC regulators to ratchet up their monitoring and to make the mock terror attacks even more lifelike.

In fall 2010, visiting International Atomic Energy Agency officials offered their backing to NRC security efforts while highlighting the value of additional improvements.

Many specialists advocate used nuclear fuel reprocessing as is already done in Belgium, China, France, Japan and the United Kingdom. The practice reduces the amount of atomic waste that is stored at a facility but could also pose a nuclear proliferation risk as fuel reprocessing technology can be exploited to produce bomb-grade material (Daniel Stone, Newsweek, Jan. 4).