Characteristics of CBW Terrorists

hose groups and individuals most likely to engage in terrorism with chemical or biological weapons lie at the intersection of three attributes: (1) motivation, (2) organizational structure, and (3) technical capability.

1. Motivation: The terrorist groups and individuals of greatest concern are motivated to inflict indiscriminate mass casualties and to engage in innovative and risky tactics. Some groups may have a particular fascination with plagues and poisons.
2. Organizational Structure: The terrorist groups of greatest concern have an organizational structure and internal control mechanisms that enable them to prevent penetration by government agents or defection by group members.
3. Technical Capability: The terrorist groups and so-called "lone wolf" actors of greatest concern possess the technical capability and know-how to acquire, produce, and deliver chemical or biological agents, or to recruit scientific experts in these areas.

Historically, very few terrorists have possessed the motivation, the organization, and the technical capability to conduct a successful chemical or biological terrorist attack, particularly on a large scale.

• Some groups in the past have tried to acquire a CBW capability, but have lacked the technical expertise to do so.
• Other groups have acquired a pathogen or toxin and have been motivated to use it, but were penetrated by law enforcement or exposed by defectors before the attack could be carried out.

Is the number of groups capable of CBW terrorism increasing? Even before the events of September 11 and the anthrax letter attacks of fall 2001, analysts began to observe some troubling developments along all three dimensions of the CBW terrorism threat. A few terrorist groups active today are more motivated to carry out mass-casualty attacks, better organized to resist outside penetration, and are actively pursuing technologies and know-how relevant to CBW terrorism. Yet although small terrorist cells may be more motivated to use CBW and more difficult for counterterrorism authorities to interdict, they may lack the technical and financial resources needed to produce and deliver CBW agents.

Further details about the motivation and organizational structure of the terrorist groups most likely to carry out CBW attacks are provided in the next two pages. (The specific capabilities required to acquire and deliver biological agents are discussed in subsequent chapters.)

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents.
Copyright © 2004 by MIIS.