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Prevention of Bioterrorism
 he best way to
avoid the large-scale release of a biological agent is to prevent it
from happening in the first place. To this end, federal government is
taking the following steps to reduce the threat of
bioterrorism.
Improving Intelligence Capabilities
Stopping bioterrorists before they attack requires reliable intelligence
information about their plans and whereabouts. Relevant types of intelligence
include information provided by human agents and informants (human
intelligence, or HUMINT), data collected by monitoring voice or electronic
communications (signals intelligence, or SIGINT), and the detection
of infrared radiation and other "signatures" indicative of biological
weapons production (measurement and signatures intelligence, or MASINT).
In October 2001, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act gave federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies
expanded powers to conduct searches and detain individuals suspected
of planning terrorist attacks. This law has been criticized, however,
for going too far in taking away the civil liberties and privacy of
American citizens.
Tightening Export Controls
Given the "dual-use dilemma" described in Chapter 4 and the rapid diffusion
of legitimate pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries around the
world, strengthened export controls can buy time but do not offer
a long-term solution to the problem of biological weapons proliferation.
Accordingly, export controls should be seen as just one of a group
of policy tools for preventing the terrorist acquisition of biological
weapons.
Strengthening Biosecurity Measures
Another approach to preventing bioterrorism is to improve the security
of research laboratories and culture collections that possess or work
with dangerous pathogens. In April 1996, Congress passed legislation to
regulate the access to and transfer of pathogens and toxins on a
list of "select agents" of bioterrorism concern. Congress strengthened these regulations in 2002, following the anthrax letter attacks in the fall of 2001.
Under the regulations, laboratories throughout the United States
that possess select agents are required to register with the federal
government, and all scientists working with them must undergo an
FBI
security check. Further, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 specifies certain
categories of "restricted persons" who are denied access to select
agents altogether, such as citizens of countries on the State Department's
list of states that sponsor terrorism.
Although the United States has tightened its domestic controls
on who is granted access to dangerous pathogens, such materials are
still widely available overseas. In addition to the large number of
foreign laboratories that store pathogens such as
Bacillus anthracis under insecure conditions,
many of the roughly 500 culture collections worldwide
that sell these materials for scientific or industrial research are
not well regulated.
During the late 1980s, for example, Iraqi government scientists ordered
virulent strains of Bacillus anthracis and other pathogens from
culture collections in the United States and France, supposedly for peaceful public
health research. Although the U.S.shipments were properly approved by
the U.S. Department of Commerce, they found their way into the Iraqi
biological warfare program. This example suggests the need for internationally
agreed upon restrictions on who is given access to dangerous pathogens,
as well as negotiated global standards for ensuring the physical security
and biosafety of microbial culture collections.
Reducing
the Vulnerability of Buildings
Certain high-profile
targets, such as federal buildings, could be made less vulnerable to
bioterrorist attack by ensuring that their air intakes are not easily
accessible from the street or the roof, and by installing high efficiency
particulate air (HEPA) filters in the ventilation systems to remove
infectious microbes from the circulating air.
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