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State
Sponsorship
UN inspectors at work in central Iraq
 errorists
seeking to use
chemical or
biological weapons would not necessarily
operate in isolation. At least in theory, a state-sponsor that possesses
chemical or biological weapons could give them to a terrorist group
to carry out a proxy attack on a third party. Some argue
that even a
rogue state would be prepared to accept the loss of control
and the severe risk of retaliation associated with this scenario, but a government with a powerful opponent that wishes to distract that opponent by enhancing the capabilities of terrorists might consider sharing weapons, materials, or know-how with sub-national groups.
Another way that terrorists could jumpstart their acquisition of unconventional weapons is to recruit CBW experts formerly employed
by a state-level program. This threat is particularly worrisome with
respect to the successor states of the former Soviet Union. During the
late 1980s, the Soviet biological warfare program employed roughly 60,000
scientists, technicians, and other personnel on the development, weaponization,
and production of biological weapons. After the breakup of the Soviet
Union, some of these scientists were recruited by states seeking biological
weapons, such as Iran. In an effort to address this problem of "brain
drain," the United States, Japan, the European Union, and other governments
are providing peaceful research grants to former Soviet weapons scientists
through the International Science and Technology Centers established
in Moscow and Kiev.
The threat of "brain
drain" is not limited to the former Soviet Union. Former CBW scientists
in South Africa and Iraq are currently unemployed or underemployed
and could be tempted by high salaries or other inducements to sell their
expertise to wealthy terrorist organizations. To date, however,
no evidence exists (at least in the public domain) that former state-level CBW scientists have provided assistance to terrorists.
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