Introduction to CBW Terrorism


U.S. Responses to the Threat of CBW Terrorism

ven before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government had begun to address the threat of CBW terrorism. Since September 11, those activities have intensified dramatically.

Blast damage, U.S. Embassy, Tanzania; http://www.fbi.gov/kids/6th12th/adventure/tanzania/tanzania.htm


Blast damage, U.S. Embassy, Tanzania,
August 1998 (source: FBI website)

Government Actions Before September 2001

After the Tokyo subway attack and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the U.S. government began paying considerably more attention to terrorism, including the possible use of CBW. In the years following the 1995 attacks, there were several important developments:

  • Federal spending on defenses against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism rose more than ten-fold between 1997 and 2000, from $130 million to $1.45 billion. A large portion of this amount was earmarked for training and equipping first responders to deal with CBW incidents.
  • In June 1995, President Bill Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39, "U.S. Policy on Combating Terrorism." PDD-39 provided a framework for domestic preparedness operations and set out the responsibilities of various federal agencies in responding to a WMD attack. The FBI would take the lead in the initial "crisis management" phase of an incident, while the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) would be in charge of longer-term "consequence management" operations.
  • In 1996, Congress passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (known as the "Nunn-Lugar-Domenici" program, named after its Senate sponsors) to help local first responders to manage the consequences of a WMD attack before federal resources arrived on the scene. Under this program, the Department of Defense and later the Department of Justice provided training and equipment for first responders in the 120 largest U.S. cities.
  • In May 1998, President Clinton issued PDD-62, "Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas," which focused on WMD attacks. This PDD established an Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism within the National Security Council to oversee federal programs and policies.
  • A variety of federal response teams and capabilities were established, including WMD Civil Support Teams under the U.S. National Guard to assist local authorities, the Metropolitan Medical Response System under the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to provide treatment for victims of mass-casualty attacks, and the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile to ensure sufficient supplies of vaccines, antibiotics, and antidotes. Critics complained that these federal efforts were poorly coordinated and often wasteful of resources.

Government Actions After September 2001

Following the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government undertook new initiatives to counter the threat of CBW terrorism. These efforts included increased cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and the passage of tough laws designed to restrict the activities of terrorists and their support networks. The government also established new bureaucratic structures to address the threat of terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland, but efforts to create a new Homeland Security infrastructure have bogged down under a drumbeat of leadership challenges and constant criticism:

  • On November 1, 2001, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) created the Office of Public Health Preparedness (OPHP), tasked with coordinating a unified national response to national health emergencies. The OPHP coordinates with state and local authorities on public health issues. It also works with HHS agencies such as the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) for deployment of emergency health personnel, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for infectious disease surveillance.
  • On October 8, 2001, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order (E.O.) 13228 creating the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) and the Homeland Security Council (HSC). The purpose of the OHS and the HSC was to coordinate the 40-plus Executive branch agencies dealing with terrorism to "detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States." President Bush appointed former Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge as the first director of the OHS. Lacking budgetary authority, however, the Office soon became entangled in bureaucratic battles with other agencies over resource allocation and faced criticism from the House Government Reform Committee, which declared in 2006 that Department of Homeland Security contracts have "experienced significant overcharges, wasteful spending and mismanagement."

  • On June 6, 2002, after initially resisting the creation of a new Cabinet-level agency, President Bush unveiled a plan to establish a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to manage counterterrorism activities and coordinate intelligence sharing among different federal agencies. Efforts to coordinate information collection and sharing have come under scrutiny, with, in 2006, the DHS Inspector General dismissing an important federal/state collaborative antiterrorism/critical infrastructure database as being full of "unusual or out-of-place" sites "whose criticality is not readily important."

  • On March 1, 2003, DHS assumed operational control of 180,000 officials formerly under the authority of different departments, becoming the second largest government agency after the Department of Defense. DHS assumed responsibility for a variety of activities related to CBW terrorism, such as the president's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board. The Department also makes grants to states and localities designed to assist public safety and law enforcement personnel to prevent, prepare for, and respond to CBW terrorist attacks; however, local law enforcement agencies are, in 2006, facing substantial increases in conventional criminal activity, questioning the continued funding focus on homeland security activities.
  • Anti-CBW research projects have been mired in delay and have failed to produce tangible results. Project Bioshield, a $5.6 billion program to facilitate development of medical countermeasures to biological and chemical warfare threats, has bogged down under accusations of bureaucratic foot-dragging, a failure to devise a viable long-term plan and a failure to build partnerships with larger, more capable pharmaceutical companies.

Chapter 1, page 9 of 9

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents.
Copyright © 2004 by MIIS.