A Brief History of Chemical Warfare

Historical Cases of CW Terrorism

he changing nature of terrorism has led some analysts to believe that terrorist attacks with CW agents are becoming more likely. Two historical cases of actual or attempted CW terrorism are summarized briefly below. (For more information on these cases and others, see Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000].)

Aum Shinrikyo

On March 20, 1995, members of Aum Shinrikyo, a quasi-Buddhist cult in Japan, released the chemical nerve agent sarin on the Tokyo subway, killing 12 people and injuring more than 1,000. The cult had earlier manufactured the sarin in a laboratory at its main compound in the foothills of Mount Fuji.

A closed cult with a charismatic leader named Shoko Asahara, Aum Shinrikyo planned to carry out several large-scale attacks with chemical and biological weapons in Tokyo and other Japanese cities. Its motivations were religious and ideological (to fulfill Asahara's apocalyptic prophecies and take control of the Japanese state) and also tactical (to assassinate enemies of the cult and divert the Tokyo police from a planned raid on Aum's headquarters).

Despite having millions of dollars, thousands of members, and several university-trained scientists among its senior leadership, Aum Shinrikyo managed to develop only a limited chemical weapons capability after five years of effort. The crude delivery system used in the Tokyo subway incident also reduced the effectiveness of the attack. On March 20, 1995, cult members boarded five different subway trains during the morning rush hour and used sharpened umbrella tips to puncture plastic bags filled with a solution of sarin. The liquid flowed onto the floor of the trains and gradually evaporated, filling the enclosed space with sarin vapor. Because only those individuals who were sitting in the immediate vicinity of the puddles or came in direct contact with the liquid sarin absorbed a lethal dose, the attack resulted in only 12 deaths.

Although the chemical attack on the Tokyo subway came as a total surprise to Japanese law enforcement agencies, the incident was not the first time Aum had used sarin. In June 1994, the group had released the nerve agent in the Japanese city of Matsumoto in an attempt to assassinate three judges who were about to rule against the cult in a land-use case. The Matsumoto attack killed seven people and injured 144. At that time, however, the police failed to identify the real perpetrators.


See a streaming video multimedia presentation on the  Aum Shinrikyo CW attack.


The Covenant, Sword, and the Arm of the Lord

In 1985, federal law enforcement authorities discovered that a small survivalist group in the Ozark Mountains of Arkansas known as The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSA) had acquired a drum containing 30 gallons of potassium cyanide, with the apparent intent to poison water supplies in New York, Chicago, and Washington, D.C.

Led by a right-wing preacher named James Ellison, CSA based its ideology on the Christian Identity movement. CSA members devised the scheme to poison urban water supplies in the belief that such attacks could make the Messiah return more quickly by punishing unrepentant sinners.

CSA's sole objective in using cyanide was to carry out mass murder rather than to change government policy. Its members believed that they were on a divine mission and did not fear offending a broader constituency. Because of a lack of technical skills, they acquired an industrial chemical (potassium cyanide) instead of trying to synthesize a more toxic agent like sarin. The plot was also technically unsound given the vast quantities of a toxic chemical that would be required to poison an urban water supply.

The plot failed when U.S. government agents, who were investigating the group for other violent attacks, raided the CSA compound and discovered the cyanide. In reality, the amount of poison possessed by the group would not have been sufficient to contaminate the water supply of even one city.

 

 
Chapter 2, page 2 of 2

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents.
Copyright © 2004 by MIIS.