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Emergency
Response to Incidents of CW Terrorism
Role-playing victims run under water
spray during WMD attack simulation
exercise in Washington, D.C., 1998
Unlike
biological warfare agents,
whose symptoms can take days to appear in exposed individuals,
CW agents induce
incapacitating or lethal effects within minutes after exposure. (The
sole exception is mustard agent, for which clinical symptoms may be
delayed for several hours.) As a result, a chemical attack would cause
immediate casualties, requiring a rapid response by emergency responders
who possess specialized expertise and equipment. Moreover, in contrast
to a biological attack, in which the victims would be widely dispersed
by the time the attack was detected, the emergency response to a
chemical attack would take place in the vicinity of the agent release.
Although much of the historical experience with emergency response to
chemical terrorism comes from the 1995 Tokyo subway attack, one can also
draw useful lessons from industrial accidents involving toxic chemicals.
Responding to a large-scale incident
of chemical terrorism would be the responsibility of local first
responders, assisted by a variety of state and federal agencies. As a
result, coordination among local, state, and federal officials, and
between medical and law enforcement specialists, will be required to
deliver urgently needed treatment without destroying forensic evidence
that could be used to identify and prosecute the perpetrators. The
effectiveness of the emergency response can be enhanced through
exercises that rehearse inter-agency coordination and cooperation.
In general, the most cost-effective
way to prepare for the threat of chemical terrorism is to strengthen the
local capabilities that can be used during the first critical minutes
and hours after an attack. A host of national response teams have been
developed by several federal agencies, including the Marine Corps, the
FBI,
the Environmental Protection Agency,
HHS, and the National Guard. Yet given the fact that most of these teams
would probably require several hours to deploy to the scene of an
incident, it makes little sense to invest a large proportion of domestic
preparedness resources in such efforts.
The Tokyo subway incident also
demonstrated that
first responders to a
chemical attack who lack personal protective equipment, such as police,
paramedics, and ordinary fire fighters, are at risk of becoming
casualties themselves. Accordingly, these individuals must resist the
instinct to rush into a contaminated zone. Instead, they should seal off
the affected area and allow members of the local hazardous-materials
(Hazmat) team, who are fully trained and equipped with personal
protective gear, to rescue the victims.
Most fire departments in major U.S.
cities have
Hazmat teams with
extensive experience in handling spills of toxic industrial chemicals,
such as chlorine and organophosphate pesticides. Since nerve agents may
be hundreds of times more toxic than pesticides, however, Hazmat
specialists need additional training and specialized equipment to deal
with military-grade toxic agents and to decontaminate and treat large
numbers of victims.
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