 |
|
How Does the Treaty Work?
The NPT entails
a careful balance of commitments between the nuclear weapon states that
are party to the treaty and its other, non-nuclear weapon state members.
Under the treaty, a country is defined as a nuclear weapon state if
it had detonated a nuclear explosive before January 1, 1967, when the
treaty was nearing completion. The NPT is a "bargain" between
the nuclear "haves" at the time it was completed and the nuclear
"have-nots."
The nuclear weapons
states under the treaty are China, France, the Russian Federation (as
successor of the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Under the NPT, the nuclear weapon states promise not to transfer nuclear
weapons to any other state or assist any non-nuclear weapon state in
acquiring, manufacturing or controlling nuclear weapons. Although they
are permitted to retain their nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon states
are also committed under the treaty to engage in negotiations on nuclear
disarmament and on ending the nuclear arms race. The NPT is the only
multilateral treaty that legally binds the five nations that had nuclear
weapons in 1967 to pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations.
The NPT regime
provides incentives and reassurances to states willing to renounce nuclear
weapons. In exchange for the commitment to forego developing nuclear
weapons, non-nuclear weapon states gain access to nuclear materials and
technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy under International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards.
The NPT commits the non-nuclear weapon states not to build, acquire,
or possess nuclear weapons and to accept safeguards on all of their
nuclear activities and materials to confirm that these are not being
used for nuclear weapons.
IAEA safeguards
serve as the
verification mechanism for the NPT ensuring that NNWS are
complying with their nonproliferation obligations. NNWS are required
to conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of comprehensive
or
full-scope safeguards. Safeguards—accounting and auditing procedures,
including on-site inspections—are to be applied to all nuclear
materials
that could readily contribute to the development of nuclear weapons
in NNWS parties. Safeguards verify that nuclear activities and materials
are not diverted to nuclear weapons. However, they do not verify that
a state has not acquired a nuclear weapon by other means even though
that is one of the prohibitions under the treaty. These safeguard agreements
are to enter into force not later than 18 months after the date of initiation
of negotiations between the NNWS and the IAEA.
Over the years,
the IAEA has broadened the scope of the materials and facilities that
safeguards cover and strengthened safeguards techniques. In 1992, following
revelations that Iraq had violated its safeguards obligations under
the NPT by operating nuclear facilities that it had not declared to
the IAEA, the IAEA Board of Governors reaffirmed the agency's authority
to conduct "special inspections" of suspected undeclared sites in NPT
non-nuclear weapon states. In 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted
a model protocol, which, when ratified by an NPT non-nuclear weapon
state, will provide expanded inspection authority for the IAEA in that
state. Known as the "Additional Protocol"
(INFCIRC/540), it will
give the IAEA increased access to all aspects of a non-nuclear weapon
state's nuclear program, even where nuclear material is not involved;
require more detailed information on that program; allow for use of
improved verification technologies (such as environmental sampling);
and require more extensive inspections at declared nuclear sites.
Multimedia: Safeguards
|
|