1975 Review Conference
Parties: 91
Issues: Treaty objectives, treaty implementation, and strengthened adherence, U.S.-Soviet arms race
Resolved: Review conferences would be held every five years. The Final Declaration reaffirmed commitment to treaty objectives and urged nuclear weapon states (NWS) to comply with disarmament obligations.

The treaty stipulated that five years after its entry info force, a review conference would be held in Geneva, Switzerland. This conference convened in 1975 and decided to hold review conferences every five years thereafter to review the implementation of the NPT, and assure that its purposes and provisions were being realized. In 1975, there were 91 parties to the treaty. The most pressing issue at the conference was dissatisfaction with the continuing U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race. The conference urged the NWS to achieve nuclear disarmament as provided for in Article VI of the NPT.

1980 Review Conference
Parties: 112
Issues: Implementation of nuclear disarmament and halting of the arms race, peaceful nuclear assistance and cooperation
Resolved: Parties were unable to reach consensus on a Final Declaration. Many NNWS called on the United States and USSR to ratify the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) II (which the United States had withdrawn from consideration following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), and called for the conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

By the time of the Second Review Conference, the membership had increased to 112 parties, including Japan and West Germany. Implementation of nuclear disarmament under Article VI remained a challenge.

1985 Review Conference
Parties: 131
Issues: Horizontal proliferation to non-member states, especially Israel and South Africa; CTBT
Resolved: Final Declaration urged expansion of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) and progress on nuclear disarmament.

At the review conference, some argued that horizontal proliferation, particularly in Israel and South Africa (neither of which was a member of the NPT), was threatening the treaty's objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. By 1985, several NWFZ treaties were in existence: the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 in Latin America, the Seabed Treaty of 1971, and the Treaty or Rarotonga in the South Pacific. While the Antarctic, Outer Space, and Seabed treaties relate to environments not inhabited by people, they, like the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga treaties, represent efforts to prevent the introduction of nuclear weapons into areas that up to this time have been free of them.

1990 Review Conference
Parties: 140
Issues: Implementation of nuclear disarmament, CTBT, safeguards agreements, security assurances
Resolved: No Final Declaration was produced because of disagreement over Article VI and frustration that CTBT negotiations had not progressed.

At the Fourth Review Conference in 1990, participants welcomed nine new members, to make a total of 140 parties. China and France were present as observers.

1995 Review and Extension Conference
Parties: 178
Issues: The treaty's duration, nuclear disarmament, Middle East, strengthened review
Resolved: According to Article X.2 of the NPT, 25 years after entry into force, a conference of NPT members would decide whether to keep the treaty in force indefinitely or extend it for an additional fixed period or periods.

By the Fifth Review Conference in 1995, some states that once possessed nuclear weapons had renounced that option and had formally joined the NPT as NNWS. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed in 1992 to give up the nuclear weapons deployed on their territories by the Soviet Union and to join the NPT as NNWS. South Africa dismantled its six nuclear weapons and joined the NPT in 1991. Argentina and Brazil both had apparent nuclear weapon programs, but halted their development and joined the NPT in 1995 and 1998, respectively. In total, an additional 38 states had acceded to the treaty by 1995, including the NWS of China and France, increasing its total membership to 178 states. China and France were allowed to join the treaty as NWS because they manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967 (as provided for in Article IX of the treaty).

While the majority of the states favored the treaty's indefinite extension, some NNWS wanted the treaty extended for a fixed period of 25 years as a way to maintain leverage over the NWS with regard to progress in nuclear disarmament. Thus, if the NWS did not comply with their obligations by continuing to make progress with disarmament, the NNWS had the option of not renewing the treaty. Those arguing for indefinite extension of the treaty saw any other option as undermining the authority of the NPT and of the nonproliferation regime, as well as weakening the basis for nuclear disarmament by the NWS.

After much debate, it was decided to extend the treaty indefinitely as part of a package that included separate decisions on the strengthened review process, principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, and a resolution on the Middle East.

In terms of Decision 1, "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty," the states parties agreed to hold preparatory committees (PrepComs) for the review conferences in each of the three years preceding a review conference. If necessary, a fourth preparatory committee meeting could be held in the year of a review conference. At the PrepCom meetings, states parties should consider principles, objectives, and ways to promote the full implementation of the treaty, as well as its universality. PrepCom meetings can also make recommendations for further action to the review conference.

Decision 2, "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," was adopted in order to accomplish full realization and effective implementation of all the provisions of the treaty. This decision also called for the full realization and effective implementation of Article VI of the treaty, including through a program of action on nuclear disarmament. The program of action included the conclusion of a CTBT no later than 1996, a ban on production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, and systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, with the "ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons."

The resolution on the Middle East called on all states in the region to join the treaty and put all nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Although Israel was not named directly, it is the only state in the Middle Eastern region not party to the treaty. The resolution also required all states in the region to work toward a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction, and called on all NPT states parties, in particular the nuclear weapons states, to support this goal.

The Conference was unable to agree on a Final Document due to differences between NWS and NNWS on how to characterize past progress in achieving the objectives of the treaty, in particular in relation to Article VI.

2000 Review Conference
Parties: 187
Issues: Nuclear disarmament, regional issues in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Korea, non-compliance, universality, IAEA safeguards
Resolved: This was the first review conference since 1985 to adopt a Final Document. Of 187 member states, 157 participated and Cuba attended as an observer. The document included an unequivocal undertaking by the five nuclear weapons states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament as part of "Thirteen Practical Steps" for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI. The document resulted from appeals to the NWS by the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), comprising seven NNWS countries: Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden. The Thirteen Practical Steps require the NWS to:

1. achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT;
2. establish a moratorium on nuclear test explosions pending the entry into force of the CTBT;
3. negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament;
4. deal with nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament;
5. implement the principle of irreversibility with respect to nuclear disarmament measures;
6. undertake unequivocally to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals;
7. work toward the early entry into force of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible, while preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions in nuclear weapons;
8. complete the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, Russia, and IAEA;
9. take specific steps agreed to by the NWS leading to nuclear disarmament:

• further unilateral nuclear weapon reductions;
  
• increased transparency with regard to nuclear weapon capabilities and the implementation of reductions under Article VI;
  
• further reduction of non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons;
  
• concrete, agreed upon measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons;
  
• a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk of their use and to facilitate nuclear disarmament; and
  
• the engagement of all five NWS, as soon as appropriate, in the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
  

10. place excess weapon fissile material from dismantled nuclear warheads irreversibly under IAEA or other international verification arrangements to preclude the re-use of such materials for military purposes;
11. reaffirm that the ultimate objective of the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under international control;
12. report regularly within the strengthened review process on the implementation of Article VI and the "programme of action" outlined in Decision 2 of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference; and
13. develop further verification capabilities to assure compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements.

The United States supported all of these measures at the time of their adoption at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. However, the United States no longer endorses a number of these steps. In particular, the George W. Bush administration does not support ratification of the CTBT, withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and has endorsed an informal approach to nuclear weapon reductions with Russia that does not include ratification of START II.

Concerns were also expressed over the importance of Iraq's and North Korea's compliance with IAEA safeguards, the tensions between India and Pakistan, and Israel's continuing opaque nuclear policies.  As well, all states in the Middle East were invited to take practical steps towards the establishment of "a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction," and report their progress at the 2005 Review Conference.  The conference deplored the nuclear test explosions carried out by India and Pakistan in May 1998.  In efforts to achieve universal membership, the conference called on the remaining four states not party to the treaty (Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan) to join the treaty.

The Conference also adopted the decision on "Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty." In this decision, the states parties reaffirmed that three sessions of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) should be held in the years prior to the review conference, and that if necessary, a fourth session would be held in the year of the review conference. In addition, the states parties recommended that specific time be allocated at sessions of the PrepCom to address specific relevant issues. They also agreed that the purpose of the first two sessions of the PrepCom would be to consider principles, objectives, and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the treaty, as well as its universality. At the third and fourth (if necessary) sessions, the PrepCom should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the review conference. The last session of the PrepCom should also finalize the procedural arrangements for the review conference.

The Review Conference convened under the presidency of Ambassador Sergio de Queiroz Duarte from Brazil on May 2nd and concluded on the 27th. One hundred and fifty three states parties out of 188 (this number does not include the DPRK) in total assembled at the UN Headquarters and 119 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) attended as observers. Also, several international organizations such as the IAEA, as well as intergovernmental organizations including the African Union, the League of Arab States, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) participated as observers.

When the NPT states parties met at the 2005 Review Conference, they sought to find effective solutions to meet the most difficult challenges the NPT has faced in its 35 year history. Unfortunately they failed to do so. The failure of the Review Conference to respond collectively to numerous challenges facing the treaty today, has already led many to forecast that the treaty is doomed to fail, especially if the 2010 Review Conference has the same fate.

The states parties seem to have run out of options for dealing with the only three states that have not joined the treaty—India, Israel, and Pakistan—now armed with nuclear weapons. Despite North Korea’s announced withdrawal from the treaty in January 2003, the states parties have yet to collectively respond to this unprecedented challenge. This apparent inaction appears tantamount to tacit acceptance of yet another nuclear-armed state outside the treaty. Concerns have increased that some NNWS, such as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya, have in the past been, or continue to be, involved in clandestine activities related to nuclear weapons development. Moreover, concerns about the acquisition of nuclear material by sub-national terrorist groups and clandestine networks such as that of A.Q. Khan have intensified. Responding to these new nonproliferation challenges, new initiatives have been taken, of which some have generated debate over further restriction on the inalienable right of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The majority of states parties continue to be deeply concerned that despite the core bargain of the treaty—to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote the ultimate elimination of these weapons—more than 30,000 nuclear weapons continue to exist in the arsenals of the five NPT nuclear weapon-states and the three de facto nuclear capable states.

The Review Conference represented a missed opportunity for states parties to respond to these challenges, and address long-standing issues. But, a Review Conference should not only be judged by the ability or lack thereof by states parties to agree by consensus on a final declaration. Although short on substance, the Conference offered an opportunity to explore new ways to strengthen the Treaty, including ways to enforce compliance and to prevent further withdrawals. While the Conference could not find ways to deal collectively with these challenges, it did focus the spotlight on a number of pressing issues of common concern.

The 2005 NPT Review Conference was further significant since it marked the 10-year anniversary of the NPT’s indefinite extension agreed to in 1995. It was also the first Review Conference since adoption of the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament at the 2000 Review Conference. In addition, 2005 marked the 60th anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings of 1945.

Disagreement over procedural issues prevented negotiations on substantive issues until late in the second week of the Conference. States parties were only able to reach agreement on the agenda on Wednesday, May 11th, 10 days after the opening. The Main Committee meetings were supposed to start on Wednesday during the first week. Disagreement over the agenda stemmed from the United States’ attempts to block negotiation on the nuclear disarmament commitments made at the 2000 and 1995 Review Conferences. Naturally the Non-Aligned Movement responded with an equally uncompromising stance. Since the Main Committee meetings only started on May 19, the allocated time for substantive negotiations was insufficient. None of the Main Committees were able to adopt agreed upon text with the result that no final document could be presented to and adopted by the final plenary.
 

2002 PrepCom  
2003 PrepCom
2004 PrepCom