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Disarmament
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states parties
to the NPT, in particular the nuclear weapon states (NWS), have a legal
obligation in accordance with Article VI of the treaty to pursue negotiations
in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and towards nuclear disarmament. In addition,
the NWS agreed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference to undertake
"systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally"
(program of action in the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation
and Disarmament") as part of the package to extend the treaty indefinitely.
At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, states parties adopted by consensus
a
final document including "Thirteen
Practical Steps" for systematic and progressive efforts to implement
nuclear disarmament to which all states parties are committed under Article
VI. The final document calls for an unequivocal undertaking by the NWS
to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading
to nuclear disarmament. However, since the 2000 Review Conference, very
little progress has been made to implement these thirteen practical steps.
The policies of the United States, in particular, have been a significant
setback to the disarmament agenda. The United States has turned away
from a number of elements of the decisions reached at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference
and the 2000 NPT Review Conference, most notably those elements calling
for early entry into force of the CTBT and movement towards additional
strategic nuclear weapons reduction treaties following the approach
of the START Treaty. The current U.S. administration believes that the
CTBT
is not consistent with U.S. national security because it may interfere
with the preservation of a reliable and safe U.S. nuclear deterrent.
To date, of the 44 states of which ratification is required for the
CTBT's entry into force,
11 states have yet to ratify it, including
the United States and China; in addition, India, Pakistan, and the DPRK
have not yet signed it. Although all five NWS and the non-NPT nuclear
countries currently maintain a moratorium on nuclear weapon tests, some of
these countries might resume testing. China's
intention to modernize its nuclear arsenal may require the resumption
of nuclear testing, as might India's
goal to acquire thermonuclear arms, and
Pakistan's
objective of matching India's capabilities.
One of the other items listed among the thirteen practical steps calls for " a
diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies…." The United
States, (considering its 2001
Nuclear Posture Review) and Russia (with its growing
reliance on nuclear weapons in its security doctrines), have generated serious concerns that the NWS are increasing, not decreasing the role of nuclear weapons. The Bush administration has argued, however,
that by including conventional capabilities as a prime element of the
U.S. deterrent, the new U.S. Nuclear Posture Review diminishes
the salience of nuclear arms in U.S. defense doctrine.
The U.S. administration has also embraced a more informal approach
to nuclear arms reduction with Russia than the one embodied in the START
treaty. The
Treaty
on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) signed in May 2002 has been criticized as lacking any verification measures and not providing for irreversible disarmament, which is called for in the 13 Practical Steps. The United States has also questioned the effectiveness of the NPT in dealing
with determined proliferant states, such as Iran and North Korea,
(and in the past, Iraq) preferring to address these challenges through intensive military and
diplomatic initiatives. The U.S. administration's strategies in this
regard are outlined in official strategy documents such as The
National Security Strategy (September 2002) and the National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002).
Many states continue to be
concerned about the possible development of
new types of nuclear weapons by the United States despite U.S.
insistence that it is not developing such weapons. There are also
parallel concerns about the emergence of new justifications for the use
of nuclear weapons that are being developed by the United States. In
addition, the new U.S. Department of Defense
draft nuclear doctrine
(March 2005), entitled Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, included
aggressive nuclear postures such as modernization of nuclear weapons on
a high alert status and preemptive attacks.
During the sessions of the
Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, most NNWS
expressed concerns that some NWS are systematically rolling back
undertakings launched and agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference
and that they are faltering in their commitment to Article VI. At the
2005 Review Conference, the divergence of views on disarmament
obligations between NWS and NNWS (mainly the Non-Aligned Movement countries) culminated, which played a
significant role in the inability of the conference to reach agreement
on any substantive issues in its final document. NAM countries
highlighted the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament since the 2000
Review Conference, while the United States asserted that it remains
committed to Article VI of the NPT. This divide was further deepened by
the
U.S. insistence that excessive focus on nuclear disarmament would
diminish the importance of the parties to the nonproliferation articles
of the NPT. At the 2005 NPT Review
Conference, many NPT states parties including the NWS offered proposals
and reported on steps taken toward nuclear disarmament but the
conference failed to adopt a consensus final document on all respects of
the treaties. NPT parties at the 2007 Preparatory Committee for the 2010
Review Conference expanded disarmament related proposals, many of which
were included in the factual summary by the PrepCom Chairman (submitted
as
Chairman’s working paper.)
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