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India and Pakistan
conducted nuclear tests in May 1998 and openly declared their possession
of nuclear weapons and their status as nuclear powers. India first
tested a nuclear explosive device in 1974 but did not test
again until May 1998. Pakistan responded to the May 1998 Indian tests
by conducting its first nuclear tests, six in all, later that same month.
These tests represented the first time since the NPT's entry into force
that new states declared their possession of nuclear weapons.
Because they did not detonate a nuclear device prior to January 1967,
India and Pakistan cannot be considered nuclear weapons states (NWS)
under the NPT regime unless the treaty is amended. A month after the
tests, the
UN Security Council
called on India and Pakistan to immediately and without condition
become parties to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) and to
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Canada, Japan, and the
United States also imposed sanctions on both countries, which were
lifted in October 2001 as a result of both countries' cooperation in the
global war on terror led by the United States.
Pakistan has become a major ally
of the United States in fighting
terrorism. Critics contend that the
lifting of
these sanctions shows that the United States places higher priority
on consolidating support for its war against terrorism than on
addressing the threat represented by these new nuclear states.
Experts estimate that by the end of 1999, India had enough weapon-grade
fissile material for approximately 65 nuclear weapons.
India's historical
objections to the NPT have been based on its own nuclear aspirations,
and the idea that the treaty is a form of "nuclear apartheid" that allows
the NWS to maintain their arsenals, while others are forced to give
up their nuclear aspirations. Indian diplomats point to a lack of progress
on disarmament by the NWS as proof that the treaty has been unfairly
implemented.
Reversing its long held nonproliferation policy toward non-parties to
the NPT, U.S. President Bush announced on July 18, 2005, a cooperation
agreement to pursue full-scale civilian
nuclear cooperation with India. On December 18, 2006, after months
of deliberation and debate, President Bush signed the "Henry J. Hyde
United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act," which
allows Washington to cooperate with Delhi on civilian nuclear projects.
On July 27, 2007, the United States announced that it had reached an
agreement with India on the terms governing the U.S. supply of
nuclear equipment and technology. The United States must first conclude
a bilateral cooperation agreement with India and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group must lift restrictions on nuclear transfers to a non-NPT nuclear
weapon state.
Since civilian nuclear cooperation between states has been considered
one of the incentives for joining the NPT, the principal concern of
critics is that this agreement would negatively impact the NPT regime
since India would obtain the same privileges as NPT parties. Concerns
also exist that this would lead to recognition of India as a nuclear
weapon state. As of October 2007, due to opposition from lawmakers in
both the United States and India, progress on the deal had stalled.
Reversing its long held
nonproliferation policy toward non-parties to the NPT, U.S. President
Bush announced on July 18, 2005, a cooperation
agreement to pursue full-scale civilian
nuclear cooperation with India. The agreement will require U.S.
domestic legislative maneuvering, and may encounter resistance both
domestically and internationally. Since civilian nuclear cooperation
between states has been considered as one of the incentives for joining
the NPT, the principal concern of critics is that this agreement would
negatively impact on the NPT regime since India could obtain the same
level of privilege as NPT parties. Concerns also exist that this would
lead to recognizing India as a nuclear weapon state.
Pakistan is believed to have begun its nuclear weapon program in 1972,
although no nuclear tests were conducted until 1998.
Pakistan procured
uranium enrichment technology surreptitiously from
Western European countries. China
provided Pakistan with nuclear weapon design assistance before
China joined the NPT. It is estimated that Pakistan had enough weapon-grade
fissile material for approximately 40 nuclear weapons by the end of
1999. Pakistani leaders have said that they will join the NPT once India
does so.
Both countries profess that nuclear weapons are needed to deter the
other country. In addition, India claims that its nuclear deterrent
is in response to China's nuclear weapon program.
Tensions between India
and Pakistan over Kashmir, which date to the partition of British
India in 1947, continue. In February 1999, India and Pakistan
signed
the Lahore Declaration, which stated their intention to find
a peaceful resolution to their territorial disputes and to develop
confidence-building
measures (CBMs) for nuclear and conventional weapons and
for ballistic missiles. Although renewed crises since 1999 have delayed
the implementation of these CBMs, neither country has expressed an
intention to join the NPT, although each has declared a unilateral
nuclear testing moratorium.
Another proliferation problem linked to South Asia came to light in
February 2004 when the Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Quadeer Khan
confessed to transferring nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North
Korea. Khan claims he was acting independently, without government
approval. But whether the Pakistani government was aware of Khan's
activities remains unclear. The exact extent of his activities is also
unclear, and his network may have had additional customers beyond the
three countries listed above. The revelation of Khan's illicit nuclear
supply network did, however, reveal insufficiencies in Pakistan's
pre-existing export control laws. In the aftermath of these revelations,
the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs moved to pass
new export control
regulations. In September 2004, a
bill was passed by the Pakistani parliament, strengthening existing
nuclear export control laws by instituting harsh penalties for
violations, including up to 14 years of imprisonment, seizure of
personal assets, and a higher fine.