ran ratified the NPT on February 2, 1970 as one of the original signatory states and concluded its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA on May 15, 1974. By the mid-1970s, Iran initiated a nuclear power program with the assistance of the United States, but the 1979 revolution ended all nuclear efforts until 1984, when Iran embarked on an extensive fuel cycle research and development program.

Iran's plans for building a civilian nuclear power program, coupled with its security situation, have led many analysts to express concern regarding its intentions to develop nuclear weapons. The concerns over Iran's nuclear program intensified in mid-2002, when U.S. intelligence learned of the existence of two sites—a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant near Arak that had been funded by front companies. Iran later confirmed the existence of the facilities, which it had previously failed to disclose to the IAEA. IAEA investigations also determined that nuclear materials had apparently been introduced to a location known as the Kalaye Electric Plant, in apparent violation of Iran's safeguards obligations.

Iran claimed (and continues to claim) that it has an inalienable right to pursue nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, a right which is reinforced by Article IV of the NPT. However, Iran's plans for building facilities that encompass the full nuclear fuel cycle to support its civilian nuclear power program have prompted much concern among some Western countries, in particular the United States. Critics contend that Iran's development of nuclear fuel cycle facilities capable of enriching uranium—potentially to weapons grade—and producing and separating plutonium, cannot be justified in economic terms, although Iran insists it is pursuing a nuclear program for energy production only. Many countries are concerned that Iran is misusing Article IV of the NPT to obtain and develop technologies and materials that could be used in a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

Some countries have expressed doubts about the need for Iran to pursue such highly advanced nuclear facilities and technology. These doubts increased following the IAEA Director General's June 2003 report to the Board of Governors meeting regarding Iran's failure to declare all its nuclear facilities, materials, and activities in a timely manner, as required by Iran's comprehensive safeguards agreement. Findings of enriched uranium in environmental samples taken at Natanz and the Kalaye Electric Company heightened international suspicions over Iran's nuclear program. Iran had earlier claimed that it had never tested the equipment at these facilities with uranium.

During the 2003 PrepCom, concerns over Iran's nuclear program were expressed by a number of countries. The chairman of the PrepCom, in his summary report, specifically called on Iran to sign the Additional Protocol and to ensure full and forthcoming cooperation with the IAEA. The Additional Protocol would allow the IAEA to visit any nuclear facility in Iran to check for clandestine nuclear facilities and to investigate any questions or inconsistencies concerning Iran's nuclear program.

The resolution passed in September 2005, leaving the door open for future referral of Iran to the Security Council and was finally adopted in February 2006. On February 4, 2006, the 35-nation board of the IAEA voted to “report” Iran to the Security Council over its decision announced in January, to restart nuclear research. The above resolution passed with 27 votes of approval, 5 abstentions, and 3 opposing votes. This was the first time that Russia and China agreed to go along with the position of the EU-3 and the United States over Iran. However, Russia and China insisted on using the word “report” instead of “refer” in the text of the IAEA resolution. Iran rejected the above resolution calling it, “illegal, illogical and politically motivated.” In response to the September 2005 resolution, Iran decided to scrap the “containment and surveillance measures” as defined under the 1997 Additional Protocol, limiting the intrusive powers of the inspectors and putting a halt to snap inspections as well. Iran also resumed small scale enrichment activities at its Natanz facility as of February 16, 2006, and by May, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, claimed that Iran managed to enrich uranium up to 4.8 percent purity. However, he maintained that Iran had no intention of enriching uranium beyond five percent purity, as this level is sufficient for making fuel.

In a parallel diplomatic process vis-à-vis a deal backed by the United States and the European Union, Russia continued to pursue negotiations with Iran that would allow Russia to host Iran’s uranium enrichment program leaving only the uranium conversion to be carried out on Iranian soil. However, as negotiations on this point continued, Iran was at pains to make it clear that it considered uranium enrichment to be a sovereign national right to which all states with a peaceful nuclear program are entitled, and would not accept Russia’s proposal to host its enrichment. This rejection of the Russian proposal led the United Nations Security Council to convene a formal meeting on March 15, 2006, to discuss a draft resolution penned by France and the United Kingdom, which called on Iran to comply with IAEA demands by suspending uranium enrichment activities. The resolution also called on IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei to report to the UN Security Council on Iranian compliance within 14 days and urged Iran to “ratify and implement in full” the Additional Protocol. Then on March 29, 2006, the UN Security Council released a Presidential Statement on Iran’s nuclear program, which called on Iran to take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors. It also declared that suspension of enrichment and full verified compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Further exacerbating the situation, Iran’s President Ahmadinejad made a speech in April 2006 in which he discussed the existence of a second, secret uranium enrichment facility operating with P-2 centrifuges. Undisclosed work on P-2 centrifuges would constitute an additional violation of Iran’s safeguard obligations. Following the speech, Iran made it clear that it refused to answer questions regarding the P-2 centrifuges. However, in an effort to avoid Security Council sanctions, Iran volunteered to resume implementation of the additional protocol, allowing snap inspections, if its nuclear dossier were to be dropped by the Security Council and returned to the IAEA. At the same time, Mohammed Saeedi, the deputy head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, made it clear that enrichment would continue in spite of renewed implementation of the additional protocol.

In May 2006, the European Union decided to change its tactics in an effort to get Iran to halt enrichment without having to resort to United Nations Security Council sanctions. In a proposal, the EU offered to help Iran obtain advanced civilian nuclear technology in exchange for a cessation of enrichment activities. This proposal also received some support from the White House. Iran’s President Ahmadinejad immediately rejected the offer. Similarly, the United States made its own offer to Iran in what was an apparent about-face in U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis Iran. The U.S. offer involved direct talks with the EU-3 and Iran if Tehran were to agree to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities and permit more intrusive international inspections. In response, Iran said that it was willing to engage in direct talks regarding its nuclear activities but rejected the precondition to negotiations that it first suspend its enrichment and reprocessing of uranium.

Iran’s refusal to engage in direct talks with the United States caused the U.S. to join forces with Britain, France, China, Russia, and Germany in June 2006 to put together a package of incentives in an effort to entice Iran to abandon its uranium enrichment. This package included four main incentives: 1) the provision of light water nuclear reactors and enriched fuel; 2) support for Iranian membership in the World Trade Organization; 3) the lifting of restrictions on the use of U.S. technology in agriculture, and 4) the availability of spare parts for civilian aircraft made by U.S. manufacturers. Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, responded by saying that there were “problems and ambiguities” in the incentives package, and Iran reiterated in July, that it refused to accept any preconditions for nuclear talks with the West.

Iran’s continued rejection of proposals by the West to entice it to cease its uranium enrichment activities and enter into negotiations caused the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany to agree to refer Iran to the United Nations Security Council in July of 2006. As a result, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1696 on July 31, which demanded that Iran cease its uranium enrichment activities by August 31. The resolution passed 14 votes to 1, with Qatar the lone dissenter.

In August 2006 Iran continued to deny access to IAEA inspectors seeking to visit the Natanz enrichment facility. During that same month, President Ahmadinejad inaugurated a new heavy water production plant at Arak. Iran claims that the Arak Heavy Water Plant is in full compliance with international rules and regulations and is for peaceful purposes only. Later in August 2006, IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei released a report on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The report stated that Iran has ignored the UN Security Council resolution to suspend all enrichment related activities. The report also stated that while Iran had not acted in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol, it was providing the IAEA with the required reports and continued to comply with basic, mandatory inspections of nuclear material and facilities. The report also indicated that particles of highly enriched uranium had been found on storage containers located at the Karaj Waste Storage Facility.

Despite contentions over Iran’s uranium enrichment activities, Russia has continued with the construction of Iran’s Bushehr reactor. Sergei Kiriyenko, the head of Russia’s Atomic Energy Agency said in September 2006 that the reactor was scheduled to come online in September 2007. Russia also agreed to ship about 80 tons of fuel to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant project by March 2007. However, development plans stalled in March 2007 as Russia reportedly pulled out approximately 2,000 of the technicians and engineers used to support this project, and refused to deliver the promised fuel to Bushehr power plant until Tehran complies with U.N. Security Council demands that it halt its uranium enrichment program. The fate of the Bushehr reactor is currently uncertain.

In October 2006, U.S. President George Bush signed a law that imposes economic sanctions against nations and companies that aid Iran’s nuclear program. The Iran Freedom Support Act says that the United States should “not bring into force an agreement of cooperation with the government of any country that is assisting the nuclear program of Iran or transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles.” In that same month Iran put forward its own proposal in an attempt to end the nuclear standoff and satisfy the demands of the IAEA, while maintaining its ability to conduct its own uranium enrichment. The proposal suggests that France establish a consortium for the production of enriched uranium in Iran; this way France would be able to monitor and control Iran’s enrichment activities. France immediately rejected the proposal and said that it would only negotiate with Iran through the U.N. Security Council. Also in October 2006, Iran launched a second cascade of 164-centrifuges at its pilot fuel enrichment plant. It appears that the cascade is being vacuum tested in an effort to assess its durability; reportedly, no UF6 (uranium hexafluoride) has been introduced into the cascade.

In response to Iran’s continued uranium enrichment program, the U.N. Security Council supplied Iran with an ultimatum on December 23, 2006, which stated that unless Iran ceased all enrichment activities it would face further sanctions. However, in February 2007 an IAEA report concluded that Iran had actually accelerated its uranium enrichment activities. The report detailed the continued construction of a heavy water reactor, the transportation of 9 tons of gaseous feedstock to the main facility in Natanz, and the planned expansion of centrifuge installations to 3,000 by May 2007. This acceleration of enrichment activities caused the IAEA to approve the suspension of 22 nuclear technical aid projects to Iran as part of imposed U.N. Security Council sanctions.

Negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear program have been ongoing throughout 2007. There has yet to be any concrete solution to what has already been a long and arduous negotiation between Iran, the IAEA, and the United Nations Security Council.
 

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents.
Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.