Chapter 5 Source: http://www.empnet.com/imageworks/Raj1.html

Iraq

n the 1980s, Iraq developed a secret nuclear weapons program that was not detected by IAEA inspections. This event led to a program to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system by adding a so-called Additional Protocol to the existing safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear weapons state members of the NPT. This voluntary additional agreement is designed to provide a comprehensive picture of a state's nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including nuclear-related imports and exports, and to give the Agency more tools to detect undeclared nuclear-related activities.

Following the 1991 Gulf War, the UN Security Council assigned the IAEA responsibility for dismantling Iraq's nuclear weapons program. The IAEA Iraq Action Team (renamed the Iraq Nuclear Verification Office on December 1, 2002) cooperated with UNSCOM to eliminate Iraq's WMD. Ongoing monitoring and verification activities took place throughout the 1990s. IAEA and UNSCOM inspectors were sometimes refused access to sites, limiting their ability to verify Iraqi compliance. In December 1998, UNSCOM and the IAEA withdrew all personnel from Iraq because of Iraqi unwillingness to grant them access to suspect weapons sites. After intense negotiation in the UN Security Council, UNSCOM was replaced in 1999 by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).

During the period from 1998 and 2002, no inspections were taken under UNMOVIC. The IAEA was restricted to conduct regular NPT related safeguards inspections in January 2000 and 2001 at sites declared to the Agency. It was unable to pursue its more far-reaching responsibilities under relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. IAEA Director General ElBaradei stated on April 24, 2000, that since the cessation of IAEA inspections in Iraq on December 16, 1998, the Agency had not been in a position to provide any assurance of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991).

Based on intelligence reports (US National Intelligence Estimate, UK Government Dossier) detailing the threats of Iraq's WMD program, the United Sates and many other countries continued to emphasize after 1998 the need for the resumption of inspections and disarmament in Iraq. These calls for Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations intensified after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Bush administration argued that Iraqi WMD posed an unacceptable threat. U.S. and U.K. intelligence reports concluding that Iraq had revived its WMD programs after 1998 were one of the reasons that the U.S. Congress authorized the use of force against Iraq in October 2002.  

Responding to this growing international pressure - in particular the threat of military intervention by a coalition of states led by the United States and the United Kingdom - Iraq announced in November 2002 that it would accept the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1441, which had been adopted earlier that month. The new resolution called for "anytime, anywhere" inspections and other provisions that were far more demanding than the previous Security Council resolutions.

IAEA and UNMOVIC inspections based on Resolution 1441 resumed in late November 2002. This round of inspections continued until the U.S.- and U.K.- led coalition preparing for military action to disarm Iraq informed the inspectors that such action was imminent.  At that time, as he was withdrawing inspection teams, the IAEA Director General, Mohammad ElBaradei, announced that "no evidence or plausible indication of a revival of a nuclear weapons programme" had been found. The IAEA and UNMOVIC withdrew from Iraq on March 18, 2003, and on March 20, the U.S.- and U.K.-led coalition forces began military strikes against Iraq with the objective of disarming Iraq of its WMD by force and toppling Saddam Hussein's regime. After the US declaration of victory on May 2, 2003, the Iraq Survey Group, a task force comprised of experts from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia started searching for WMD in Iraq.

In September 2004, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) announced in its report that there were no WMD in Iraq at the time of the U.S.-led invasion. Inspectors instead found that Saddam Hussein had planned to recreate his WMD programs after international sanctions were lifted. Even then, though, his planning was reportedly more focused on the development of ballistic missiles and tactical chemical warfare capabilities, rather than nuclear weapons. The ISG’s inquiry did yield evidence, however, that Iraq concealed elements of its nuclear program from inspectors after 1991, including by secreting away documents, hiding technology and attempting to maintain the brain trust of scientists who had earlier worked on the nuclear program.

As a result of the findings of the Iraq Survey Group, the United States Congress arranged for a Senate Committee inquiry into the case of mistaken intelligence which released a report on March 29, 2005 about the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. The Committee reviewed the prewar intelligence and then determined whether or not the conclusions the intelligence community reached were realistically based on their prior knowledge. In most cases, including the status of Saddam's nuclear program, the committee accused the intelligence community of using insufficient sources, being too wedded to previous assumptions, and failing to research the issues to a reasonable degree. The report states the intelligence community was "almost completely wrong" in its assumptions on the nuclear program, and distributes the accusations widely throughout all agencies within the intelligence community including the National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

 

Chapter 5, page 4 of 11

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents.
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