Chapter 5 Source: http://www.empnet.com/imageworks/Raj1.html

 

North Korean

orth Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT on January 10, 2003, stating that its withdrawal "will come into force automatically and immediately" the next day. North Korea stated that it had suspended its 1993 withdrawal from the treaty on the last day of the required 90-day notice period and thus did not need to give a further notice to other NPT parties and the Security Council as described in Article X of the treaty. Whether or not the DPRK's view that its withdrawal from the NPT was effective in January 2003, whether its withdrawal only became effective on April 10, 2003 (90 days after the January 10 announcement), or whether its withdrawal should be recognized at all, North Korea no longer considers itself bound to the treaty. North Korea's withdrawal casts a shadow over the validity of the NPT regime, and impacts the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.

North Korea tested its first nuclear device on October 9, 2006, less than one week after the October 3, 2006 “clarification statement” by the North Korean Foreign Ministry declaring Pyongyang’s intention to conduct a nuclear test. . In reaction, the UN Security Council placed sanctions on North Korea, Resolution 1718.

North Korea's withdrawal is significant, as this is the first time that a state party has taken such action. However, there exist differences of opinion among states parties over the legality of North Korea's withdrawal procedures. The states parties have yet to collectively respond to this unprecedented challenge. At the 2005 Review Conference, for the first time in NPT history, the treaty had to deal with the issue of withdrawal. Since the Conference failed to adopt any substantive issues in its final document, it was not able to address how to respond to the withdrawal collectively. Nevertheless, the conference offered an opportunity to explore new ways to strengthen the Treaty including the matter of preventing further withdrawals.

North Korea now joins the small group of states (India, Pakistan, and Israel) with nuclear weapons outside the treaty. North Korea's withdrawal could trigger further defections from the treaty, and in particular, could set a precedent for other states, including Iran. In addition, North Korea's action could provoke other states in the region to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. An additional concern is the potential for North Korea to sell weapons-grade fissile material or nuclear weapons themselves to other states and non-state actors, including terrorist groups.

Of more concern is that North Korea continues to be in non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations and refused to open all its nuclear facilities for IAEA inspection even before its withdrawal from the treaty. Since 1993, the IAEA has been unable to fully implement its comprehensive safeguards agreement with North Korea. In October 2002, during a meeting with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, North Korean officials acknowledged the country had a secret development program to produce enriched uranium. In December 2002, North Korea disrupted IAEA safeguards measures at the Yongbyon facilities, and on December 31, 2002, all IAEA inspectors were expelled. In February 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors decided to refer the North Korean issue to the UN Security Council. In April 2003, the UN Security Council expressed its "concern" over the situation in North Korea and said it will keep following developments.  The Security Council has, however, not taken further action.  The IAEA continues to call for North Korea to promptly accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards and cooperation with the IAEA in their full and effective implementation.

Efforts to resolve the crisis peacefully and diplomatically have been made through the Six-Party talks since August 2003 involving the Republic of Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States.  While the Six-Party Talks process often hit a roadblock, progress has been made to some extent.  After boycotting the fourth round of the talks in the fall of 2004, in February 2005, North Korea announced that it was indefinitely suspending its participation in the talks. In the same statement, North Korea openly declared that it possesses nuclear weapons. In July 2005, North Korea announced its intentions to rejoin the Six Party Talks. After nearly two years of impasse, a “statement of principles” was agreed on by all parties at the conclusion of the fourth round of talks (September 13th – 19th). The statement included a commitment by North Korea to “abandon all nuclear weapons” and “to return, at an early date, to the NPT.” However, North Korea insisted that the dismantlement of its nuclear program be contingent upon receiving a light water reactor, which caused another stalemate.

On February 13, 2007, in the most successful round of the Six-Party Talks (in part due to a shift in U.S. policy), North Korea agreed to an “Action Plan” based on the 2005 “Statement of Principles.” Under the deal North Korea would shut down its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon within 60 days in exchange for 50,000 tons of heavy-fuel aid. Separate bilateral talks with the United States and Japan would also begin in order to normalize relations. In the Action Plan’s second phase, if North Korea dismantles its nuclear weapons program completely, another 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil will be delivered along with other humanitarian, economic, and energy aid. On March 19, 2007, assets on Banco Delta Asia were lifted and on July 14, North Korea re-admitted IAEA inspectors. The inspectors verified that indeed the Yongbyon nuclear facility had been shut down.  On October 3, 2007, at the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks, parties reached an agreement to disable North Korea’s nuclear program before the end of the year. The deal will establish a schedule for resolving remaining issues related to shutting down North Korea’s nuclear facilities.

 

 

 

Chapter 5, page 6 of 11

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents.
Copyright © 2006 by MIIS.