Chapter 5 Source: http://www.empnet.com/imageworks/Raj1.html

Nuclear Terrorism

he terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 have brought a greater awareness of nuclear terrorism to the international community. Preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material or other radioactive material from power plants, research facilities, hospitals, industry, or from insecure nuclear weapons facilities has become a top priority for the international community. Responding to this threat, the IAEA Board of Governors in March 2002 approved an Action Plan to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. During the Preparatory Committee Sessions for the 2005 NPT Review Conference and at the Review Conference, many states parties and the representatives from the IAEA emphasized the importance of strengthening safeguards of nuclear materials given the increase in the perceived threat of nuclear terrorism.

There are several possible ways that terrorists could obtain nuclear weapons, such as manufacturing, purchasing, or stealing them. However, all of these are extremely difficult and involve formidable challenges and risks, as well as resources. Nevertheless, terrorists could possibly obtain nuclear weapons. A particular concern is that terrorists might acquire highly enriched uranium and use this fissile material to make a simple nuclear explosive device.

In this context, IAEA highlighted the importance of ensuring comprehensive and effective physical protection of nuclear material. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which covers physical protection during international transport, and other IAEA-issued standards provide countries with guidelines on ways to voluntarily secure their nuclear and radioactive materials. However, mandatory and legally binding international standards for the physical protection of nuclear material within a state do not exist. In July 2005, parties to the Convention agreed on major changes to make it legally binding for states parties to protect nuclear facilities and material for states’ peaceful use, storage, and transport. In order to bring the changes into effect, ratification by two thirds of the states parties is required.

The increasing security concerns over nuclear terrorism demand more international cooperation. The G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction adopted at the Kananaskis Summit in June 2002 provides funding to secure nuclear and radioactive materials around the world. States parties to the NPT have generally supported this initiative. Moreover, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 adopted in April 2004 requires states parties to criminalize proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems by non-state actors as an essential undertaking to reduce the dangers of proliferation of WMD to terrorist groups. Many countries, mainly from the Western Group expressed their endorsement for the Resolution at the 2005 Review Conference.

Another important international legal instrument to deal with nuclear terrorism, the Draft International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, proposed at the UN General Assembly in 1996, was adopted by the UN General Assembly on April 1, 2005. The Convention opened for signature on September 14, 2005. In order for the treaty to enter into force, 22 countries must ratify the treaty.  As of October 2007, 107 countries had signed the Convention.

Since the NPT was primarily designed to deal with states, it has very little capacity to deal with the new threat coming from non-state actors using nuclear weapons, or material and technology to develop improvised nuclear explosive devices. To prevent and respond to this new threat more promptly, states parties to the NPT should pursue unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral counter-terrorism measures to augment the NPT regime.
 

Chapter 5, page 8 of 11

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents.
Copyright © 2006 by MIIS.