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Nuclear-Weapons-Free
Zones (NWFZs)
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Article VII of the NPT, the right of states to establish specified zones
free of nuclear weapons is assured. The role of nuclear-weapon-free
zones (NWFZ) in strengthening the security of the states that belong to
such zones was recognized when the NPT was drafted. Members of NWFZ
treaties are required to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
To date, the
Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America and the Caribbean, the
Treaty of Rarotonga in the South Pacific, the
Treaty of Bangkok in Southeast Asia, the
Treaty of Pelindaba in Africa, and the Central Asia Nuclear Weapon
Free Zone (CANWFZ) Treaty have established regional NWFZ.
Of these five treaties, the Pelindaba Treaty
and the CANWFZ Treaty have yet to enter into force.
The newest treaty establishing the
CANWFZ, was signed September 8, 2006 by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan at Semipalatinsk, a former
nuclear test site in Kazakhstan. In addition to these NWFZ
treaties, other agreements, including
the Antarctic Treaty,
the Outer Space Treaty,
the Moon Agreement, and
the Seabed Treaty denuclearize and demilitarize specific areas
of the globe, as well as outer space. (Mongolia also declares itself,
and is internationally recognized, as a single-state nuclear-weapon-free
zone.)Members of NWFZ treaties are obligated to use the nuclear material
and facilities that are under their jurisdiction exclusively for
peaceful purposes. Member states also undertake to prohibit and prevent
the testing, use, manufacture, production, or acquisition by any means
of any nuclear weapons. The storage, installation, deployment, and any
form of possession of any nuclear weapons are also prohibited. The
Treaties of Rarotonga, Bangkok, and Pelindaba prohibit dumping
radioactive materials at sea anywhere within the zones.
NWFZs are tightly intertwined with the issue of
negative security assurances. Nuclear weapon states (NWS) that have
ratified the relevant protocols to NWFZ treaties undertake legally
binding commitments to respect the status of these zones and not to use
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states parties to such
treaties. At this stage, only the states parties to the Treaty of
Tlatelolco enjoy legally binding negative security assurances from all
the NWS, because all the NWS have ratified the relevant protocol to this
treaty.
None of the NWS has signed the protocol to the Bangkok Treaty because
they object to the inclusion of continental shelves and exclusive economic
zones (EEZ) in the zone. They also argue that the terms of the treaty
impinge on freedom of transit in the zone, which they contend is
inconsistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. In addition,
the NWS assert that the continental shelves and EEZ are not clearly
defined in the South China Sea, creating ambiguity over the scope of the
treaty and protocol obligations. The United States is also concerned about
precise language of the protocol regarding legally binding negative
security and the permissibility of port calls by ships which may carry
nuclear weapons.
The security assurance protocol to the Pelindaba Treaty was ratified
only by China, France, and the United Kingdom. The United States has
signed the protocol, but it is pending ratification. When the United
States signed the protocol, a U.S. official reiterated that the protocol
will not limit the options available to the United States in response to
any possible future attack by an African NWFZ party using WMD.
As justification for the use of nuclear weapons in such a case, the
doctrine of
"belligerent reprisal" is often cited. Belligerent reprisal allows
states to retaliate against illegal acts by adversaries in wartime under
the law of armed conflict. The only purpose of a reprisal is to induce
the enemy to cease its illegal activity and to comply with the law of
armed conflict. This U.S. policy has been criticized by some arms
control specialists because it undermines the negative security
assurances given to the member states of all the NWFZ treaties.
Libya's announcement on December 19, 2003 that it would relinquish
its entire WMD program under international verification may signal a
shift that prompts the United States to move toward ratifying the
protocol to the Pelindaba Treaty.
The first zone to be established
entirely in the northern hemisphere, the CANWFZ is also strategically
important in terms of counterterrorism. Progress toward its
establishment was stalled, mainly by objections from three nuclear
weapon states, namely, the United States, United Kingdom, and France.
Despite the oppositions from these states, the treaty was signed by all
five Central Asian states.
Given the significance of the CANWFZ in terms of its geopolitical and
security situation, the establishment of such a zone in the region shows
strong commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament by these
countries. In addition to the political implications, the CANWFZ Treaty
stipulates concrete provisions relevant to strengthening the regional
and international nonproliferation regime. The treaty obligates the
Central Asian states to legally adhere to the
Additional Protocol to the IAEA safeguards on their civilian nuclear
facilities. In addition, these countries are required to meet
international standards for the
physical protection of nuclear material.
With regard to future NWFZs, although NWFZs in the
Middle East and South Asia have long been considered important goals by
many states, the fact that Israel (in the Middle East) and India and
Pakistan (in South Asia) have nuclear weapons outside the NPT has so far
been a major stumbling block to establishing NWFZs in these regions. The
2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document requested a report on the
implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, which calls for
the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as
other weapons of mass destruction. There has been no significant progress
on the establishment of such a zone since 2000, however.
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