However, the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon program
after the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated that IAEA verification focusing
only on declared nuclear material and activities was not effective.
Moreover, since 1993, the IAEA has been unable to implement its
comprehensive safeguards agreement with North Korea. The events during
the 1980s and early 1990s in both Iraq and North Korea proved that a
more effective verification system is essential to detect a clandestine
nuclear weapons program and build confidence that states are in
compliance with nonproliferation obligations. In addition to concerns
over Iraq and North Korea, recent discoveries of undeclared nuclear
activities Iran, and the disclosure of
Libya's undeclared nuclear activities have underlined the need to strengthen the safeguards system.
Strengthening the IAEA verification system is one of the most urgent
challenges for the IAEA and the NPT. The IAEA should be able to provide
credible assurances not only about declared nuclear material in a state
but also about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and
activities. In order to enable the IAEA to make this conclusion, NPT
state parties need to have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and
an
Additional
Protocol in force. The Additional Protocol is a voluntary
additional agreement between an NPT state party and the IAEA to provide
a comprehensive picture of a country's nuclear and nuclear-related
activities, including nuclear-related imports and exports. With the
agreement in place, the IAEA will have access to any place on a nuclear
site and to other locations in a country where nuclear material is, or
may be present. A country with this agreement in place is also required
to provide access to all locations that are, or could be, engaged in
activities related to the
nuclear
fuel cycle and, in cases where such access may not be possible, to
make every reasonable effort to provide access without delay.
As of
October 2007,
84
Additional Protocols have entered into force.
During the Preparatory
Committee Sessions for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the importance of
achieving universal adherence to the Additional Protocol by all
NNWS party to the NPT, particularly those states
with sensitive nuclear technology, was emphasized. While the 2005 NPT
Review Conference failed to adopt any substantial agreement in the final
document, many states parties, mainly western group countries, called
for IAEA Additional Protocols to be adopted as the safeguard standard
for the NPT.
Iran’s suspected covert
nuclear weapons program, the revelation of Libya’s clandestine nuclear
weapon development program, and the emergence of global clandestine
supply networks (such as that headed by the Pakistani scientist A.Q.
Khan) have refocused IAEA safeguards activities on controlling nuclear
fuel cycle technologies. In fall 2003, IAEA Director-General Mohamed
ElBaradei advocated a multilateral approach based on improved control
over nuclear technology, operational transparency, and nuclear fuel
supply assurances for civilian use to those countries that have decided
not to acquire enrichment and reprocessing plants needed to have the
complete nuclear fuel cycle.
In June 2004, the IAEA
Director-General commissioned an international Expert Group including
representatives from 26 countries to examine the nuclear fuel cycle and
multinational approaches. The group released its
report on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle in
February 2005. The report outlines five approaches to strengthen
controls over fuel enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel repositories, and
spent fuel storage. At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, while most of the
states parties recognize the importance of preventing further
proliferation of nuclear weapons, many states parties, in particular
from developing countries, are concerned that any additional restrictions
on access to the civilian nuclear fuel cycle would contradict the
provisions of Article IV. Some of these states argue that proposals to
internationalize nuclear fuel cycles may further enhance the
discriminatory nature of the NPT and cement the technological dominance
of the nuclear weapon states over the non-nuclear weapon states.
Safeguards work by the IAEA was woefully under-funded for many years.
This problem made it more difficult for the IAEA to carry out all of its
NPT-related verification and other duties. An increased budget was
approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in September 2003. However, to
conduct a fuller range of safeguards activities, the IAEA still must
rely heavily on countries' voluntary contributions.
One way to further strengthen
the IAEA safeguards system is to revise
the Small Quantities Protocols (SQP). At the Board of Governors
meeting in June 2005, the Board endorsed the idea that SQPs should be
strengthened since this system has proved to be ineffective to verify
countries’ compliance with nonproliferation obligations. At the Board of
Governors meeting in September 2005, the Board decided to modify the SQPs
applied to States with little or no nuclear material in facilities.
According to this decision, the revised text will become the standard
for SQPs. In addition, with the aim of considering all ways and means to
further strengthen the IAEA safeguards system,
the Special Committee on Safeguards and Verification was established
in June 2005.