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Proponents |
Opponents/Critics |
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Nonproliferation Compliance: Strengthening compliance enforcement |
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Many states from Western Group
and Others (WEOG) argue that compliance enforcement mechanisms
should be enhanced to prevent and respond to violations of
Articles I and II. The United States in particular has stated
that the NPT is in a “crisis of compliance,” and urges NPT parties to take steps to punish
treaty violators. EU states
have also
stressed the role of the Security Council in enforcing the NPT’s
nonproliferation provisions.
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While the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM) states parties have not voiced strong opposition to measures to enhance
compliance enforcement, it has continually brought attention to
the central role of the IAEA as the "competent authority" in verifying and assuring
compliance instead of establishing a new system for enforcement. These states also emphasize the danger of
infringement on the right to peaceful use of nuclear technology
through accusations of non-compliance.
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| Issue |
Nonproliferation Compliance:
Censuring Iran for Treaty violations |
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The United States
and most of WEOG states have believed
that
Iran is in noncompliance with its nonproliferation
obligations, and have asserted that Iran is busy developing a clandestine
nuclear-weapons program.
The IAEA Board of Governors meeting in
September 2005, for the first time, adopted a resolution stating
Iran's noncompliance. After Iran removed IAEA seals on its enrichment-related
equipment at its research facility in Natanz on January 10,
2006, negotiations between the EU-3 and the Iranian government
completely collapsed. The EU-3, as well as China and
Russia, joined the United States to called for Iran to be
referred the UN Security Council. At a special session of
the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in February 2006, the Board
decided to refer Iran's nuclear issue to the UN Security
Council.
Both the EU-3 and the United States have declared that Iran must
permanently cease its enrichment and reprocessing activities to
provide assurance that it is only seeking nuclear technology for
peaceful purposes. |
Member of the NAM
together with Russia and China have been
reluctant to critique Iran’s safeguards transgressions, and have
played a significant role in weakening the language of the
IAEA
Board of Governors’ resolutions
on Iran. Iran itself maintains
that it is in full compliance with the NPT, and is exercising
its “inalienable right” to the peaceful use of nuclear
technology, including the use of enrichment and reprocessing
technologies.
China and Russia, however, persuaded by the United
States and the EU 3, voted for the resolution to refer the
Iran's nuclear issue to the UN Security Council at the IAEA
Board of Governors meeting in February 2006. |
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| Issue |
Peaceful Uses: Limiting the transfer of nuclear fuel cycle
technologies |
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The IAEA,
supported by a significant number of WEOG states, have begun to pay increasing attention to the
proliferation sensitivity of particular aspects of the nuclear
fuel cycle, primarily uranium enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing technologies. In order to close this purported
“loophole,” several proposals have been made to place
limitations on the development of these fuel cycle technologies,
including the call by the United States to restrict these
capabilities only to states that already possess them. IAEA
Director-General ElBaradei suggested a different approach by implementing a
voluntary moratorium on the development of enrichment and
reprocessing facilities and by establishing multinational fuel cycle
centers under IAEA control. In order to explore ways to address
this issue, the IAEA created an expert panel which issued a
report entitled “Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel
Cycle.” |
Many NNWS, mostly
from the NAM, have voiced strong opposition to proposals for
restricting the development of fuel cycle technologies on the
grounds that such limitations would be in contravention of the
“inalienable right” to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. States such as
Argentina and South Africa have argued that restrictions should
not be placed on states that comply with the treaty and seek
nuclear energy for peaceful use. Egypt has questioned the
legality of such restrictions, arguing that they may constitute
a reinterpretation of the treaty, thereby requiring an amendment
to put them into effect.
Japan suggests that the international
community continue to discuss and thoroughly examine the issue
of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.
Japan has been highly suspicious of proposals for "Multilateral
Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle" commissioned by
IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei. At the 2005 NPT Review
Conference, Japan questioned how this approach would actually
contribute to solving the issues of countries that have already
violated their international obligations on nonproliferation or
of countries of proliferation concern. Japan also expressed
concern over the restriction of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. |
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Peaceful Uses: Strengthening Nuclear Export Controls |
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Many of the states that belong to
the nuclear export control regimes, (NSG and Zangger
Committee), have argued that both national and multilateral
export controls must be enhanced to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons-related technology and materials to NNWS and
non-state actors. These calls for strengthened national export
controls were bolstered by the adoption of Security Council
Resolution 1540, which requires all states to implement national
export controls over WMD and related materials. States such as
Germany have declared the need for the IAEA to determine the
minimum standard of export controls in order to achieve greater
harmonization and ferret out the “weak links” in the export
control regime. |
Most NAM states continue to express their concern that strengthening nuclear export controls
will further limit states’ access to materials needed for
development. They argue that export controls threaten to hinder
access to the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
According to a working paper issued by the NAM, export controls that
place a limitation on the peaceful use of nuclear technology are
incompatible with the NPT, and should be removed. |
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Disarmament: Facilitating Early Entry into Force of the CTBT |
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With the
exception of the United States, all NPT States Parties
are in agreement that the entry-into-force of the CTBT is an
important
next step forward toward nuclear disarmament. These states, in
particular the members of the NAM, argue that the CTBT once
entered into force, will prevent the development of additional
nuclear weapons since it would outlaw any form of nuclear testing.
States across
political and regional groupings, including four of the five NWS,
continue to call for all states, but in particular the
Annex 2
states required for the Treaty’s entry-into-force, to sign and
ratify the CTBT.
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While
twelve Annex 2 states have
yet to ratify the CTBT, the United States has been recognized as
the primary hurdle to the Treaty’s entry-into-force. For a
number of reasons related to verifiability and the
nuclear-weapon stockpile security, the United States has
declared that it no longer supports the CTBT, and continues to
oppose any language supporting
the treaty’s entry-into force in the context of the NPT review
process. |
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| Issue |
Disarmament: Negotiating a verifiable FMCT |
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Most
states have declared their support for the commencement of
negotiations on a fissile material control treaty (FMCT) in the
Conference on Disarmament (CD). However, in light of the new U.S.
position to support only negotiations on a treaty without
verification, the degree of support for the commencement
of negotiations on "a non-discriminatory, multilateral and
internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the
production of fissile materials cut off treaty (FMCT)" as stated
in
the Shannon Mandate
has come to vary. The Mandate was adopted by consensus by the CD in 1995. Most
NAM countries continued to call for "a non-discriminatory,
multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable
treaty," while some WEOG countries including the EU and Canada,
seemed to avoid specifically mentioning verification.
Nevertheless, the states that place verification as a
requirement for FMCT negotiations cut across groupings, and
include states such as Germany, Egypt, Austria, Italy, and
Australia. |
The United States has determined
that an FMCT cannot be effectively verifiable. The United States
supports the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT in the
CD, but does not support the negotiation
of verification provisions. This new U.S. position is a departure
from its position which the United States took during the 1990s to support the commencement of
internationally verifiable FMCT. |
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Disarmament: Further Reducing Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons |
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Many NNWS, most notably, Austria,
Sweden, and Ukraine have declared that disarmament measures,
particularly by the Russian Federation and the United States, have largely
neglected the large amount of non-strategic (or tactical)
nuclear weapons still deployed by the NWS. These states have
called for further reductions in these weapons in a verifiable
and irreversible manner. In addition, these states have
specifically called upon Russia and the United States to reaffirm,
codify, and fully implement the 1991/1992
Presidential Nuclear
Initiatives (PNI) on the reduction of non-strategic nuclear
weapons. |
While the United States has
declared that it has implemented its obligations under the
1991/1992 PNIs, the Russian Federation maintains that its
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons are an important part of its
security force. Russia argues that non-strategic weapons should
not be considered separately from other weapons systems. In
addition, Russia has linked its forward deployment of
non-strategic nuclear weapons to the presence of U.S. nuclear
forces in NATO states, arguing that these weapons should be
removed. |
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| Issue |
Safeguards: Standardizing the Additional Protocol |
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Nearly all WEOG states, as well
as the IAEA, have called for the Additional Protocol to become
the new standard for
safeguards to provide greater assurance
that NNWS are not engaged in nuclear proliferation. These states
have urged all states to conclude both Comprehensive Safeguards
and Additional Protocols with the IAEA. States such as
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have called
for the Additional Protocol to become a condition of supply of
nuclear technology, a measure which the United States promoted in the NSG. |
While nearly all states have
expressed their support for the importance of the Additional Protocol,
many states, in particular, NAM states, have declared that the
protocol should remain a voluntary measure. These states
believe that NNWS should
not have to bare an additional burden, particularly given their
views that little progress, if any, has been made towards
nuclear disarmament. Egypt,
for example, has so far resisted any attempts to standardize the
Additional Protocol. A
Non-Alignment Movement
working paper noted that the Additional Protocol distinguishes between
legal obligations and confidence building measures. |
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| Issue |
Legally Binding Negative Security Assurances |
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The NAM states
and most other NNWS, although to various degrees, have
consistently argued that part of the package deal that led to
the indefinite extension of the treaty in 1995 was the condition
that the NWS would work toward legally binding assurances that the NWS would not
use nuclear weapons against NNWS. The NAM and NAC have called for the creation of a subsidiary body in the
context of the review process to
discuss the creation of such a mechanism. China, which maintains a “no
first use” policy, has joined the call for a legally binding
agreement on negative security assurances. |
The NWS, with the
exclusion of China, are opposed to legally binding negative
security assurances. The NWS were also opposed the creation of a
subsidiary body to address the issue. The 2005 Review Conference
did agree to establish a subsidiary body to its main Committee I
to consider both nuclear disarmament and security assurances.
While NWS are opposed to legally binding negative security
assurances, they have all issued political statements not to use
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS. However, with
the exception of China (no-first use) these statements include
exceptions that would allow the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons, if the NWS are attacked by NNWS. Any future legally
binding instrument would most likely require similar provisions.
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| Issue |
Withdrawal: Strengthening Withdrawal Provisions |
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In light of North
Korea’s withdrawal from the treaty and its subsequent
announcement that it would develop nuclear weapons, many states,
primarily from the WEOG, have expressed a need to ensure that
the withdrawing state should not be allowed to use technologies
and materials gained as a result of its treaty membership. A
number of proposals have been issued to strengthen the
withdrawal provisions of the treaty, including calls by the EU
and South Korea for consultations with the withdrawing state to
discourage any threat of withdrawal; by Australia that the
Security Council should immediately consider any state
withdrawal, and by the United Kingdom and France that
withdrawing states should remain responsible for Treaty
violations.
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While little open opposition has
been expressed in regard to strengthening the treaty’s
withdrawal provisions, many states, particularly from the NAM,
assert that the sovereign right of withdrawal must not be
curtailed. |
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