Chapter 4

2003 PrepCom

he Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 NPT Review Conference was held in Geneva from April 28-May 9, chaired by Ambassador Laszlo Molnar of Hungary. One hundred and five States parties and representatives from the IAEA participated in the PrepCom. Representatives from the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)
, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the European Commission, the League of Arab States, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference attended as observers, and representatives from 37 non-governmental organizations attended the plenary meetings of the PrepCom.

The 2003 PrepCom was held in the midst of the crisis of the nuclear nonproliferation regime as a whole. North Korea's withdrawal from the treaty, the invasion into Iraq to disarm Iraqis of WMD, and Iran's alleged nuclear weapons development were the most notable incidents confronting compliance obligations by the NNWS to the NPT. On the positive side, Cuba acceded to the treaty in November 2002, and Timor Leste also joined the treaty in May 2003. In addition, there was progress toward a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

The events in Iraq were somewhat muted given the situation of ongoing war. The emergence of a U.S. pre-emptive counter-proliferation doctrine caused concern over the erosion of the nonproliferation regime.

North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, the first in the treaty's 33-year history, was the issue causing the greatest concern among the states. Many states expressed their concern and regret over the actions taken by the DPRK in violation of its treaty obligations and its declaration of withdrawal.

Like the first PrepCom, the second PrepCom prepared a Chairman's Factual Summary under his own responsibility. Although the summary is not a negotiated report, to some extent key states negotiated the text of the summary. The 10 pages and 42 paragraphs of the factual summary include a number of substantive matters such as North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, concerns over Iranian non-compliance, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, safeguards, export controls, nuclear-weapon-free zones, regional issues, and strengthened physical protection of nuclear material.

Some highlighted issues were security assurances, non-strategic nuclear weapons, and nonproliferation and disarmament education.

As they had been since the 2000 Review Conference, non-strategic nuclear weapons issues continue to be a focus among the NNWS. The U.S. National Security Strategy, which established the doctrine of pre-emptive strikes as official U.S. policy, focused attention on negative security assurance among the non-aligned movement (NAM) countries.  Also, the lack of commitment by the NWS to implement their nuclear disarmament obligations were clear setbacks to the Thirteen Practical Steps.

The importance of strengthening safeguards on nuclear materials was also emphasized, given the increase in the perceived threat of nuclear terrorism. Support for the G-8 Global partnership preventing nuclear terrorism was also included in the factual summary. Many states parties also supported the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and urged other states to accede to the Convention.

Despite the smooth conclusion of the PrepCom, it is difficult to evaluate the degree of success of the meeting. The purpose of the PrepCom, which was agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, was to "consider principles, objectives, and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the treaty as well as its universality" in order for the third PrepCom session to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference. The level of agreement on progress made toward the full implementation of all aspects of the treaty is questionable. The future of the treaty depends on the political will and commitment of all parties to implement the NPT regime and enforce its requirements.

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Chapter 4

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents.
Copyright © 2004 by MIIS.